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Chapter 1

THE PROBLEM AMD ITS IMPORTANCE

Prison riots have long been recognised as persistent and
pervasive problems in American society.

However, the general

orientation of prison administrators and correctional organizations
has led them to view the riots as dysfunctional and disruptive, and
to disregard their positive functions.
In reviewing the literature on prisons, it became increasingly
clear to the writer that an adequate science of prison violence must
depend heavily upon the research skills and theoretical insights of
sociologists who will bring them to bear on the prison community.
Perhaps no more compelling evidence can be found of the failure of
sociologists to taka advantage of the rich research potential of the
field of corrections than the nearly total disregard by sociological
Investigators of the series of prison riots that occurred in
correctional institutions throughout the United States during the ya<nrs
1968 to 1971.

Yet these riots ware among the more striking phenomena

of collective violence which have occurred in the nation.

THE PROBLEM

Statement of the Problem.
Of special interest to the writer are the functional, as con
trasted to the dysfunctional, consequences of violence.

Accordingly,

the present, study examines some of the functions of violence*- in terms
of the changes which it brings about in social structure.
1

Since 'the

terms violence, change, and social structure subsume so much, attention
will be focused on prisons as a special type of social institution and
structure, on prison riots as a major form of violence, and on prison
reform as a specific type of change.

The purpose of the study, then,

is to identify and analyze some of the functional consequences of prison
riots in terms of the changes or reforms which result therefrom.

Con

comitantly, the study' is an attempt to relate violence as a causal
factor in terms of the kinds of changes it brings about in the social
structure of the prison.

In linking violence and change, they will

necessarily be treated as contingent factors, for it is obvious that
violence ..may be a result as well as a source of change.

Importance of the Study
No one engaged in thought about history can remain unaware of
the role violence has played in human affairs.

It is at first glance

rather surprising that violence has been singled out so seldom for
special consideration.

In fact, it did not even rate an entry in the

1968 edition of the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.
A cursory examination of the contemporary work of American sociologists
indicates that violence has been a very much neglected field of inquiry.
As a result,-much less is known about the causes and consequences of
violence, and especially the consequences, than about the scope,
intensity, and duration of violence under various circumstances.
Moreover, the literature that does exist has not been noteworthy for
attempts to relate violence and change, although a number of studies
on conflict (e.g., Coser, 1956? Dahrendorf, 1959) have tried to do
this by explaining structural change in terms of group conflict.

The American Correctional Association points out in its Manual
1 of Correctional Standards (1966) that no complete and definitive survey

has "been made of the effects of riots on the prisons in which they
occurred or, for that matter, on prisons in general,

Many of the

studies (e.g., Flynn, 1953; MacCormick, 195^; Conrad, 1966; Fox, 1971)
which have “been done on prison riots have dealt with the causes, rather
than the consequences, of the riots.

The importance of these studies

notwithstanding, research into the causes and consequences of collective
violence in correctional institutions has, for all intents and purposes,
been ignored or at least passed over with little consideration.

The

present study will serve to illustrate the need for more research con
cerning the relationship between violence and change in correctional
institutions because, at best, it forms only a small, visible segment
of a phenomenon which lies largely beneath the surface of official
recognition.

THEORETICAL APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM

Although much of Lewis Coser’s work is concerned with the wider
subject ox social conflict rather than with the narrower topic of
violence, it will nevertheless serve as a convenient springboard from
which to launch an investigation into the functional consequences of
violence.

Implicit if not explicit in some of Coser’s works is the

notion that violence (which he calls social conflict) is not only
inevitable, but may actually have important functional consequences.
Somewhat in line with this, Conrad says:

", . , there is no denying

that mass violence in prison sometimes gains objectives which inmates

could not otherwise hope to achieve'1 (1966:115).
writes:

Or, as Loveland

"It is frequently true that desirable and necessary improvement

in prisons ccmes about as the result of disturbances, riots, and mass
escapes" (1966:6).

As many advocates of change will no doubt agree, it

often takes the unusual event, with loss of life and property, to
stimulate the thought processes of men*

Thus, it will be the thesis of

this writer that prison violence can be functional to the extent that
it brings about certain types of desired change in the social structure
of the prison.
To focus on the functional aspects of violence is not to deny
that other aspects of violence are destructive of group unity or that
they lead to disintegration of specific social structures.

One need

not look far for examples.
An article in Life magazine has been entitled, "A Riot Is An
Unnecessary Evil” (1952:138).

The theme of the article is that prison

riots are evil, horrendously so.

They are economically wasteful.

are destructive of life, limb, and property.
of inmates and prison employees.
penologists and prison systems.

They

They destroy the morale

They destroy public confidence in
One could further trace the far-

reaching extent and character of the evil that these disturbances
create.
But, are riots unnecessary?
how one looks at the question.

The answer depends, perhaps, on

For example, as one author writes:

« . without riots our prisoners would be treated with the barbarity
of uncivilized tribes; or the cruelties of.the dark ages" (Wallack,
1953:7).

According to this point of view, riots can be considered an
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antidote against the
evil*

maltreatment' of prisoners and, hence, a necessary

One could, of course, counter this theory by saying that prison

riots should not be necessary to bring about humane conditions in penal
institutions in a civilized society.

However, as Wallack says:

. . . none of us who have observed the situation could
be so smug as to discount the effect riots have had in
improving the shameful and inhumane conditions chac often
prevail in penal institutions. They have served this pur
pose more than once (1953:7).

RESEARCH METHODS AND PROCEDURES

This study takes the form of a secondary analysis of qualitative
data.

The data were gathered from a variety of sources, the most

important of which are as follows:
and monographs;

(a) correctional journals, reports,

(b) informal discussions with prison officials,

correction officers, and former inmates;
accounts of prison disturbances;

(c) newspaper and magazine

(d) direct communication with forty-

three state departments of correction; and (e) to a limited extent,
nonparticipant observation.

These, of course, were supplemented by a

review of other relevant literature, particularly that dealing with
violence and change.
Attention is focused almost exclusively on state penal
institutions as distinguished from federal institutions.

Intermingling

of state and federal institutions was purposely avoided in an effort
to hold the number and types of variables to a minimum.

Further, the

writer concentrated primarily on those riots which occurred during the
period January 1, 1968 to December 31, 1971.

This period was considered

particularly appropriate for study as it not only encompassed a series

r

D

■K:0 f contemporary prison riots and disturbances, but also an era of con'V
jjshsiderable unrest in the larger society.
jjf'

Although prisons tend to isolate inmates from the larger
society, prisons themselves are among the institutional complexes of

fz.-

■" society and, like other social institutions, are caught up in the
currents of time and place.

For this reason, it was felt that certain

‘ of the prison riots which occurred during the period covered by this
study would reflect some of the unrest which prevailed in the free
community--"the outside vorldM--and would therefore provide a clearer
conception of the sociology of the prison community.
There are at least two methodological difficulties involved in
this study:

reliance on official statements and overcoming the biases

of other writers.

In Chapter 3, there is a tendency to rely more

heavily on official statements than on public documents or special
commission reports.

This stems from the fact that the latter sources

were simply not available or readily obtainable in the majority of
cases.^

The official statements must therefore be used with a certain

degree of caution and weighted accordingly.
The writer is also well aware that a valid picture of prison
riots can be uncovered only by remaining completely objective.

Many

writers, however, have had a tendency to include their own values in
their discussions of prison violence.

They often assume, at least

^The writer attempted to obtain special reports on prison dis
turbances from the Federal Bureau of Prisons, American Correctional
Association, state departments of correction, six different univer
sities, and several notable penologists. However, with few exceptions,
these efforts met with negative results.

?

implicitly, that prison riots are bad.

This infusion of personal

values has undoubtedly colored and limited a gocd deal of the litera
ture on prison riots.

Although occasional doubt may arise, the writer

has attempted to guard against becoming partisan, either consciously or
unc onsciously,
If it turns out that the present paper strikes the reader as
being rather controversial, a further word of explanation concerning
this unusual approach can be found in Appendix A.

DEFINITIONS OF TERMS USED

Prison
The term "prison” is used as a convenient overall designation
for adult correctional institutions above the level of the county jail
and city workhouses.

Included under the general heading "prisons” are

penitentiaries,*- reformatories for men and lor women, road and forestry
camps, farms, and such special institutions as those for insane and
mentally defective criminals (Manual of Correctional Standards, 1966:
33).

Today, prisons are commonly referred to as correctional facili

ties, thus suggesting that their goals at least are corrective or
rehabilitative^ in nature.

Prison Riot
Nhen a disturbance becomes a riot is, of course, a matter of
definition.

Unfortunately, the literature on prison riots has been

^The term "penitentiary,” which derives from the Latin, is
widely used as a synonym for prison "and suggests a place where a man
may be sent to do penance for his sins against society” (Leinwand,
1 9 7 2 :2 ^ ).
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more descriptive than definitive.

There i s,.it seems, no universal

agreement on a definition of prison riots.

As Gary Marx points out:.

’’The numcer of attributes to be used in characterizing riots is large,
and we lack a generallv-agreed-upon set of concepts or measures for
classifying them” (1970:2^).

It is also difficult to say whether or

not a riot has occurred in a prison because many revolts defined as
’’minor” disturbances by prison officials are probably viewed by the
public as full-scale riots depending upon the amount of publicity they
are given by the mass media.
In an attempt to arrive at a definition of prison riots which
can gain acceptance by prison officials, the following definition is
taken from the American Correctional Association’s manual on the
Causes, Preventive Measures, and Methods of Controlling Prison Riots
and Disturbances:
A riotous situation may be declared in the event of a
group of inmates assaulting any constituted official,
destroying state property, banding together to resist
authority, refusing to return to cells and wards, or any
overt act which would be detrimental to the orderly routine
of the institution (1970:87).
While this statement is more a working definition than a legal defi
nition of a prison riot, it is important to this study and will serve
as a useful point of departure.

As will be noted, the definition is

quite general and in need of further amplification.
Of particular significance in the American Correctional
Association’s definition of a riot is the use of the word ’’group,”
which is suggestive of collective action or behavior on the part of
members of the inmate community.

In offering a legal definition of a
:.4@-

riot, both the Encyclopedia Americana (19^2) and American Heritage

Dictionary of the English Language (1970) state that a riot is a breach
of the public peace by an unlawful assembly of three or more persons
for a common purpose.

Similarly, Charles Fricke, in his Criminal

Definitions, Terms, and Phrases, defines a riot as "the assembly of
three or more persons who disturb the public peace by using force or
violence to any other person, or p r o perty (1968:68).
all have one thing in common.

These definitions

They imply that collective action is a

necessary ingredient in riotous situations.

If prison riots are out

growths of collective behavior, and it appears that they are, they offer
a rare opportunity for a systematic analysis of the dynamics of collec
tive violence.
B y way of further clarification, an assault is "an unlawful
attempt or threat to injure another physically" (American Heritage
Dictionary of the English Language, 1970).

Assault nearly always

implies physical contact and the application or attempted application
of force or violence.
A constituted official may include anyone from the prison war
den or superintendent down to the guard or correction officer.
Taken alone, destruction of property is a rather nebulous term
for it gives the reader no indication how much destruction of what kind
of property there must be before it reaches riotous proportions.

An.

inmate who breaks a chair in his cell and sets fire to his mattress
has most assuredly destroyed property.
labelled a riot.

However, this would hardly be

On the other hand, if a group of prisoners break

chairs and set fires in their cells, a riotous situation begins to
take form.

The amount of destruction done during prison riots varies

widely and, as might be expected, it is difficult to apply a rule of *
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thumb in those cases where destruction, of property is the only criterion
used in determining whether or not a riot has in fact occurred.
Slowdown and sitdown strikes might be considered examples of
inmates banding together to resist authority.

Refusing to return to

cells or wards is another means of resisting authority, for it repre
sents willful disobedience of orders, as well as prison rules and
regulations.
The catch-all phrase, "or any overt act," could Include almost
anything— from an inmate yelling that there is salt in the coffee to
the taking of hostages.
Conceivably, prison riots can cover a wide range of acts, and
many prison disturbances can be properly classified as prison riots
based on the American Correctional Association's definition.

V iolence
The term "violence" will share a prominent place in this study
and will be used frequently in referring to prison riots,

"In the

social context violence may be defined roughly as the illegal employ
ment of methods of physical coercion for personal or group ends"
(Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, 193*0•

Group violence, or

collective violence as it will more commonly be referred to in this
paper, is defined by the National Commission on the Causes and Pre
vention of Violence as "the unlawful threat or use of force by any
group that results or is intended to result in the injury or forcible
restraint or intimidation of persons, or the destruction or forcible
seizure of property" (1969:59)•

.

11

Change and/or Reform
The terms "change” and "reform" will be used Interchangeably
throughout this study and will be interpreted to mean any significant
alteration in the prison's social structure, i.e., its administrative
organization, communication network, rules and regulations, classifica
tion procedures, etc.

In other words, any deviation in the social

structure of the prison at a given point in time (T2) from, that of a
preceding point in time (Tl) shall be considered structural change.
It should be emphasized that the study will be concerned primarily
with those changes which can be related or attributed directly to the
riots.

A PREVIEW

In the succeeding chapters, an attempt will be made to show
some of the causes and effects of prison violence, with special
emphasis on the positive functions of riots.

This will be accom

plished by drawing examples from available research literature and
data collected from various state departments of correction.
Chapter 2 will cite some perspectives on violence and social
change which have been gleaned from the literature and can be
generalized to correctional institutions.

This chapter will attempt

to show that violence can and sometimes does serve positive functions.
Chapter 3 reviews a series of prison riots which have occurred in the
United States in recent years.

The discussion in this chapter will

be largely descriptive In nature, but will identify some of the
causes and consequences of prison riots as reported by penologists in
the field.

Since it has such far-reaching importance in any study of

prison violence, the riot at New York State’s Attica Correctional
Facility in September, 1971, will be singled out for special examination
in Chapter 4.

This is intended to provide a microcosmic case study of

a riot so that the reader can look more closely at the dynamics of
collective violence at work in a major penal institution.
5,

In Chapter

the author will analyze some of the causes and consequences of

prison riots.

Attention will then turn to an examination of seme

theoretical perspectives on prison riots in Chapter 6.

Finally,

Chapter 7 will be devoted to a summary and a discussion of some of the
conclusions reached during this study.

Chapter 2

SOME PERSPECTIVES. ON VIOLENCE AND CHANGE

To better understand violence and change in contemporary
American society, it is necessary to place the subject in perspective,
both socially and historically.

In this chapter, some of the social

functions of violence will be discussed in capsule form--the purpose
here being to show that violence is not of necessity dysfunctional as
some of its prophets may lead one to believe.

The discussion which

follows represents an attempt to explain some of the rationale behind
violence by briefly examining the role it has played in bringing about
social change.

The latter half of the chapter will be devoted to a

discussion of some of the lesser, albeit'important, functions of
violence.

Some of the perspectives discussed herein will prove helpful

in analyzing and explaining the dynamics of prison violence in later
chapters.
One of the things that seems to stand out in much of the
literature on violence is the notion that many movements of social
revolt which have proved successful have been compelled to use violence
at some point in time.
Hancock writes:

In his article on "The Ordeal of Change,”

MIn every age since the beginning of man, we have

experienced recurrent periods of excessive lawlessness and violence"
(1969:17).

He goes on to say:

‘V e were born in violence, we opened

up the West in violence, our labor movement was conceived and nurtured
in violence” (1969:22).

Although considerable evidence can be mustered

to document the contention that violence is a persistent characteristic
13
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in American social life, only a few observations will be made in this
chapter.

LEGITIMACY OF VIOLENCE

Violence constitutes a significant and recurring theme in the
American value structure.
social life.

it runs like a thread through the fabric of

To many people, violence means illegitimate behavior--

behavior that is contrary to the mores or against the legal codes,
behavior that exceeds the limits of tolerance of the society at large.
However, as the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of
Violence points out in its report on violence In the United States:
Historically men have not acted on the principle that all
violence is to be avoided.
Our nation is no exception.
Like
all others, our society has recognized some uses of violence
as necessary and legitimate and some as unacceptable and
illegitimate (1969:233).
In discussing some of the perspectives on violence in America today,
Dr. Xialter Menninger states:

"Indeed, a major function of society is

the organization and legitimation of violence in the interest of main
taining society Itself" (1969:10).
The acceptability of violence can be conceptualized as being
on a continuum ranging from fully legitimate at one pole to completely
illegitimate at the other.

To cite a simple example, the parent who

spanks a child may be engaging in legitimate violence, but the parent
who breaks a child1s arm would be engaging in illegitimate violence.
With respect to the rationality of violence, Arendt has this to say:
Violence . . . Is rational to the extent that it Is
effective in reaching the end that must justify it. And
since when we act we never know with any certainty the
eventual consequences of what we are doing, violence can

15
remain rational only if it pursues short-term goals.
Violence does not promote causes, neither history nor
revolution, neither progress nor reaction; but it can
serve to dramatise grievances and bring them to public
attention (1970:79).
Whether various forms of violence are considered legitimate or illegiti
mate is a function of perception; that is, ,it depends on how they are
perceived in the eye of the beholder.
A great deal of violent behavior in America is legitimate or
positively sanctioned.

Many occupations— e.g., policemen, boxers,

wrestlers, bouncers, soldiers— allow for and even require violence in
one form or another.
conditions.

Each has a mandate to use violence under certain

Hans Toch, however, says that "no form of violence is more

accepted and more damned, more ignored and more feared, than collective
violence’* (1969:195).

War may be taken as an example.

Until recent

years, warfare has been an almost noncontroversial feature of the human
condition.

With few exceptions, societies have condoned the violence

of war and rewarded and decorated those who distinguished themselves
on the battlefied by inflicting death and destruction.
In battle, violence is committed because the individual's mili
tary vocation demands it.

The soldier is instructed to follow

destructive routines, and, for the most part, he complies because he
has learned to do so, and because he accepts his role as defined.

Typi

cally, he may gain no satisfaction from violence beyond those of
discharging his obligations efficiently and of participating in the
collective destruction of a consensually defined enemy.

To be sure,

there are soldiers who seek out ’’blood” and ’’gore” beyond the call of
duty and who gain considerable reward and personal satisfaction from
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the administration of death and destruction.^

There are those who

volunteer for elite ''killer units" that operate behind enemy lines;
there are others

Tvho

prize assignments as snipers or scouts; and there

are persons with a penchant for heroic stature in defiance of "sensible"
odds.

As Dr. Menninger so aptly put it:

"Man is an animal, one of two

species in nature which indiscriminately kills its own kind.

(Rats are

the other!)" (1969:6).

COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE AS A CATALYST OF CHANGE

Although violence has been a disagreeably persistent character
istic of American social life, the theme of violence has taken different
forms in response to America's changing social organization and value
system.

Historical analysis suggests that while much of the American

violence has been prompted by environmental conditions that no longer
exist, many of the social tensions that produced violence in the past
are recurrent and remain relevant.

Some forms of collective violence,

although by no means unique to America, are discussed below.

Internal War

(Revolution)

The sanctioning of violence on a national, as opposed to an
international, level can be seen in the case of internal war.
war," says Eckstein,

"Internal

"Is practically the essence of contemporary

^An example of this occurred in March, 1969, when a platoon of
American soldiers passed through a Vietnamese hamlet called My Lai and
left more than a hundred Vietnamese civilians, Including small children,
lying dead. The "massacre at My Lai" was by no means the bloodiest in
American military history, however.
One even bloodier occurred at
Wounded Knee, South Dakota, in 1890, when more than 200 Oglala Sioux
Indians were killed by United States cavalrymen.
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political life” (1964:3).

3roadly speaking, internal wars are attempts

to change by violence, or threat of violence, a government's rules,
policies, or organization.

Regardless of who wins them, internal wars

always succeed in changing societies, even though the changes may not
correspond with original intentions.
Revolution (using the term internal war in a somewhat narrower
sense) is not the same thing as social change, but is a form of it
(Johnson, 1966:5).

However, in order to understand its occasional

attractiveness as an alternative, it must be studied as part of the
general phenomenon of social change.

The concept of revolution in

political analysis refers specifically to the form of change that
occurred, for example, in France in 1789, in Russia in 1917, and in
China in 1949.

While there may be some room for disagreement, many

authorities contend that the United States, itself, is of revolutionary
origin.
As a special kind of social change, revolutionary change
involves the intrusion of violence into social relations, and is an
acceptable means of change only when purposive policies of change are
not forthcoming.

As Lerone Bennett points out:

"Revolutions are

usually the last link in a long chain of events, and they are usually
preceded by a long period of social unrest" (1965:2).
"revolution . . .

In short,

is the acceptance of violence in order to cause the

system to change when all else has failed, and the very idea of
revolution is contingent upon this perception of societal failure"
(Johnson, 1966:12).
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Social Conflict
In his Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society, Ralf
Dahrendorf w r ites:
. . . all that is creativity, innovation, and development
in the life of the individual, his group, and his society is
due, to no small extent, to the operation of conflicts between
group and group, individual and individual, emotion and
emotion within one individual. This fundamental fact alone
seems to me to justify the value judgment that conflict is
essentially good and desirable (1959:208).
"Change and conflict," says Dahrendorf, "are equally universal in
society" (1959:210).

Similarly, Eckstein (1964) acknowledges that all

social systems contain persistent social strains that generate social
conflict and provoke social change.

Once conflict groups get organized,

they engage in conflicts that effect structural changes.

The more

importance the individual participants in a conflict attach to its
central issues, the more intense is the conflict.

"The more intense

conflict is, the more radical are the changes likely to be which it
brings about" (Dahrendorf, 1959:236).

It may be argued, then, that

the degree of change varies directly with the intensity of conflict.
Lewis C o ser, another leading proponent of social conflict
theory, states that there are occasions for conflict in every social
structure (1956:152).

In his opinion, a certain degree of conflict is

an essential element in group formation and the persistence of group
life.

He claims that "engaging in conflict with another party means

that a relationship with that party has been established" (1956:121).
Once relations have been established through conflict, other types of
relations are likely to follow.
Philosophy, Coser has written:

Borrowing from Karl Marx's Poverty of
. . conflict leads not only to

ever-changing relations within the existing social structure, but the

total social system undergoes transformation through conflict"
(196?:25).

A certain amount of group conflict is therefore considered

necessary, as it not only establishes new relationships, but helps to
relieve previously existing tension within a given social structure.
Whether given forms of conflict will lead to changes in the
social system or to ultimate breakdown and formation of a new system
depends largely on the system’s rigidity and resistance to change.

On

the one hand, conflict tends to be dysfunctional for a social structure
in which there is insufficient toleration and institutionalization of
conflict.

What threatens the equilibrium of a social structure is not

conflict but, rather, the rigidity of the structure itself.

A flexible

society, on the other hand, benefits from conflict because such
behavior, by helping to create and modify norms, assures its con
tinuance under changed conditions.

A rigid system, by not permitting

conflict, will impede adjustments and, by so doing, will maximize
the danger of breakdown (Coser, 1956:128-157).

Mass Movements
Mass movements are another conspicuous instrument of social
change for, as Eric Koffer^ points out:

'*. . . mass movements are often

a factor in the awakening and renovation of stagnant societies" (1951:
1^9).

They are preoccupied with the future and, as such, come to change

the present.

Like other types of social movement, mass movements breed

^In his book, The True Believer, Hoffer examines mass movements
from Christianity in its infancy to the national uprisings of our time.
His analysis of mass movements is a brilliant ^ tudy of the mind of the
fanatic— the man whose personal failings lead him to join a cause— and
is a genuine contribution to social thought.
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enthusiasm and excitement, and generate a proclivity for united action.
They draw their adherents from many types of humanity, but largely from
the ranks of the discontented and the frustrated.

As Hoffer says:

For men to plunge headlong into an understanding of vast
change, they must be intensely discontented yet not destitute,
and they must have the feeling that by the possession of seme
potent doctrine, infallible leader or some new technique they
have access to a source of irresistable power. They must also
have an extravagant conception of the prospects and poten
tialities of the future.
Finally, they must be wholly ignorant
of the difficulties involved in their vast undertaking
(1951:20).
The frustrated are particularly attracted to a mass movement's
call for action, for they sea in action a cure for all of their social
ills.

People with a sense of fulfillment are satisfied with the status

quo, whereas, the frustrated favor radical change and are quick to join
a cause.

A rising mass movement, suggests Hoffer, attracts and holds

its following by:
. . . the refuge it offers from the anxieties, barrenness
and meaninglessness of an individual existence.
It cures the
poignantly frustrated not by . . . remedying the difficulties
and abuses which made their lives miserable, but by freeing
them from their ineffectual selves--and it does this by
enfolding and absorbing them into a closely knit and exultant
whole (1951:44).
An active mass movement seeks to instill in its followers a
propensity for united action and self-sacrifice "by stripping each
human entity of its distinctiveness and autonomy and turning it into
an anonymous particle with no will and no judgment of its own" (Hoffer,
1951:79).

Stripped of his autonomy, the individual turns into a highly

reactive entity and, like an unstable chemical, hungers to combine with
whatever comes within his reach.

In due course, he finds himself a

part of a homogeneous plastic mass that can be transformed more or less

21
at will.

,!The human plasticity necessary for the realization of drastic

and abrupt changes seems, therefore, to be a by-product of the process
of unification and of the inculcation of a readiness for self-sacrifice”
(Hoffer, 1951:79).

Social Movements
While this chapter has thus far dealt with one set of elements
in collective behavior, a few additional comments concerning social
movements as agents of change are in order.

Herbert Blumer observes:

Social movements can be viewed as collective enterprises
to establish a n ew order of life. They have their inception
in a condition of unrest, and derive their motive power on
one hand from dissatisfaction with the current form of life,
and on the other hand, from wishes and hopes for a new scheme
or system of living (1969:8).
Outstanding instances of specific, as opposed to general, social
movements are reform movements and revolutionary movements.
social movement,” reports Blumer,

”is one which has a well-defined

objective or goal which it seeks to reach.
an organizational
A

"A specific

In this effort, it develops

structure, making it essentially a society” (1969:11).

social movement of the specific type does not come into existence

such a structure and organization already established.
organization is developed in the course of its career

with

Instead, its
(Blumer, 1969:11).

It should be pointed out that agitation is of primary importance
in a social movement.

It is a prime mover so to speak.

For a movement

to begin and to gain impetus, it is necessary for people to be jarred
loose from their customary ways of thinking and believing
1969:13).

(Blumer,

Agitation is therefore a means of arousing the interest of

people while at the same time jarring them loose from their traditionalistic views.

The necessary agitation may come through the
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discrediting of the prevailing order by men of words with a grievance.
According to Hoffer,

"the man of words undermines established

institutions, discredits those in power, weakens prevailing beliefs and
loyalties, and sets the stage for the rise of a mass movement" (1951:
120)o

He goes on to say:

". „ . the faultfinding man of words, by

persistent ridicule and denunciation, shakes prevailing beliefs and
loyalties, and familiarizes the masses with the idea of change"
(1951:127).

SOME OTHER SOCIAL FUNCTIONS OF VIOLENCE

Violence as a Social Response
History has shown that people often turn to violence as a last
resort.

Lerone Bennett was quoted earlier as saying:

"Revolutions are

usually the last link in a long chain of events, and they are usually
preceded by a long period of social unrest" (1965:2).

The step-by-step

process leading to violent behavior may look something like t h i s :

A

person has problems--he seeks relief--he obtains no satisfaction--he
becomes bitter.

When solutions to his problems are not forthcoming, he

is forced into protest-oriented action.

Bienen claims that violence can

be "attributed to a failure to solve problems which arise under a number
of objectively specifiable conditions" (1969:75).

It comes about, for

example, when groups cannot obtain a hearing or when they feel they have
a vested interest in suppressing voices being raised.

Toch reasons that

violence arises "as a reaction against unmet aspirations and consists of
retaliation against the symbols of perceived ^inresponsiveness" (1969:
233).

It follows, then, that the objects of violence are often those

persons and agencies who remain unresponsive to group aspirations.
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The National Commission on the Causes and Prevention- of Violence
spent eighteen months deliberating the broad subject of violence in
American society.

In the course of its deliberations, the Commission

identified some themes of challenge for the American people.

One of

these themes is particularly worth noting as relevant for continuing
the discussion on violence;

Historically, when groups or individuals have been unable
to attain the quality of life to which they believe they are
entitled, the resulting discontent and anger have often
culminated in violence. Violent protest today-^from middleclass students to the inhabitants of the black ghettos and
the white ghettos— has occurred in part because the protestors
believe that they cannot make their demands felt effectively
through normal, approved channels and that "the system1’ for
whatever reasons, has become unresponsive to them (1969:28?).
Still another factor contributing to violence today is the
notion that the only way one can be heard is by making a loud enough
noise to attract the attention of the news media.

Increasingly, certain

groups come to feel that they are listened to only when they become
violent, or they find violence to be the primary means of getting
attention.

3

Menninger quotes William James as saying;

. . . no more fiendish torture could be devised than when
you speak, no one answers; when you wave, no one turns; but
everyone simply cuts you dead. Soon, . . . there wells up
within you such hostility, you attack those who ignore you . . .
(1969:9)*
A vivid illustration of this plea to be heard was the slaying
of eleven Israeli Olympians by Arab terrorists during the Olympic games

hen members of the American Indian Movement seized the village
of Wounded Knee, South Dakota, in February, 1973* they correctly assumed
that the news media would be attracted to the dramatic possibilities of
the event (Schultz, 1973-^S)*
&
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.in Munich in September, 1972.

The attack on the Israeli Olympic team,

which was promulgated as a means of gaining the release of 200 guerrillas
being held captive in Israeli prisons, is symptomatic of the currents of
violence in the world today.

As it turned out, the terrorists failed in

their attempt to gain the release of the imprisoned guerrillas, but suc
ceeded in temporarily disrupting a world sports event and, in so doing,
drew the spotlight of international attention to their cause.

Violence as a Danger Signal
In his article on the ’’Social Functions of Violence,” Coser
(1966:12-13) acknowledges that violence serves as a danger signal.
example,

For

”if the incidence of violence increases rapidly, be it in the

society at large or within specific sectors of it, this can be taken as
a signal of severe maladjustment” (Coser, 1966:13).

This signal is so

loud and drastic that even those who are not otherwise noted for their
sensitivity to social ills can perceive it.

Along these same lines, the

National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence reports:
If we are wise--if we listen carefully and x^atch closaly-we will realize that violence is a social bellwether:
dramatic
rises in its level and modifications in its form . . . tell us
that something important is happening in our political and
social systems (1969:2).
Much as one might deplore the violence in prison riots, it is
possible that they, too, constitute effective signaling devices to prison
officials for, as Caldx*ell notes, ’’prison riots have from time to time
dramatically revealed serious x^eaknesses in our prison system” (1965:
545).

To be sure, violence can be seen as a manifestation of underlying

conditions.

Yet perhaps because of this, those persons in high-ranking

positions may feel compelled to effect changes in these conditions*
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Violence as a Safety-Valve Meehanism
In an article in The Annals of the American Academy of Political
and Social Science (197002), Gary Marx comments that some evidence of
strain can be found in any complex body of riot data,

Leinwand (1972),

comparing life in prison to living in a pressure cooker, says:
are tensions between prisoners and those who guard them.

’’There

There are

tensions amongst prisoners themselves as hatreds mount and competition
for minor privileges grows” (1972:35)*

Others (e,g,, Wallack, 1953;

MacCormick, 195^) have suggested that life in prison is like living on
top of a powder keg about to explode.

If it can be concluded that all

social systems contain persistent social strains as Eckstein (196^)
suggests, then It is conceivable that violence serves as an outlet— a
safety-valve mechanism if one insists— for the release of strain or
tension.
In a series of propositions distilled primarily from the
theories of Georg Simmel, Coser writes:
Social systems provide for specific institutions which
serve to drain off hostile and aggressive sentiments.
These
safety-valve institutions help to maintain the system by
preventing otherwise probable conflict or by reducing its
disruptive effects.
They provide substitute objects upon
which to displace hostile sentiments . . . .
Through these
safety valves, hostility is prevented from turning against
its original object. But such displacements also involve
costs both -for the social system and for the individual:
reduced pressure for modifying the system to meet changing
conditions, as well as dammed-up tension in the individual,
creating potentialities for disruptive explosion (1956:^).
In those cases where safety-valve institutions exist for the
displacement of strain and hostility, violence, if and when it occurs,
is likely to be less intense, as some of the pressure will have already
'

been drained off.

In the absence of such safety-valve institutions,
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however, violence itself must logicall:/- serve, as a safety-valve mecha
nism for the release of pent-up feelings of hostility.
Violence as a Form of Therapy
"Rioting Is Good for Some People," says an article In a
February 9, 1972, edition of the -Manhattan Mercury.

This was the con

clusion reached by Dr* H. A. Lyons, a consultant psychiatrist at
Belfast’s Purdysburn Hospital, after completing a study in Northern
Ireland,

Dr, Lyons found that a man who acts out his aggressive feel

ings, by throwing a brick or a punch, is less likely to suffer from
depressive illness or to commit suicide than a person who represses his
frustrations.

The study revealed that the number of suicides in Belfast

declined fifty percent as street riots intensified there several years
ago.
Dr. Lyons studied figures showing the number of suicides in
Belfast and the number of people with depressive illness, a serious
mental disorder.

He compared the average for relatively quiet years,

1964-1968, with figures for the year 1969-1970, which was characterized
by numerous riots in and around Belfast.

As the riots increased, he

reported that " ’there was a significant decrease in depressive illness
in Belfast in both sexes and all age groups*" (The Manhattan Mercury,
February 9, 1972:6c).

On the average, the decrease worked out to about

thirteen percent, but depressive illness was down as much as sixtyseven percent in the worst riot areas.

For purposes of contrast,

Dr. Lyons also studied figures for the same years in a relatively non
violent area, County Down,

There he found both suicides and depressive

illness on the increase in 1969-1970.
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SUMMARY
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The ^receding discussion has identified ana examined, a series of

% -instances

in which violence may perform important social functions.

The

. approach was meant to be exploratory and tentative rather than exhaustive
-.-and systematic.

Enough has certainly been said, however, to show that

I violence is far from being totally dysfunctional as persons are often
vy«\
p led to believe.
>*
V * '

y

ru ■ ■

V
v

t

It was pointed out early in the chapter that violence is a per
sistent characteristic of American social life and that it takes dif■
ferent forms in response to its changing social context.
Some forms of

s violence are legitimate or positively sanctioned.
In discussing the
h
- place of violence as a catalyst of change, various types of collective
behavior with a propensity towards violence have bean cited.

Generally

speaking, collective violence has its inception in a condition of unrest,
and derives its impetus from dissatisfaction with the current form of
life and the wish for better things.

Based on the preceding discussion,

it can be inferred that violence is a correlate of change.
some ancillary social functions of violence were discussed.
seen that violence may serve as a (1) social response,

Finally,
Here it was

(2) danger signal,

(3). safety-valve mechanism, and/or (4) form of therapy.
In the next chapter, a number of prison riots will be selectively
discussed.

An attempt will be made to Identify some of the causes and

consequences of the riots in an effort to better show the correlation
that exists between violence and change.

Chapter 3

SOME CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF PRISON RIOTS

Violent and disruptive behavior is by no means novel to cor
rectional institutions.

Penal history has documented numerous incidents

of open and violent rebellion in prisons across the United States.

Just

as the trend on college campuses and in the community at large has been
one of protest over national issues and for social reform in recent
years, so the tendencies in correctional institutions appear to follow
similar patterns.

PRISON RIOTS:

AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Historically speaking, there were riots and mass escapes in the
old Simsbury, Connecticut, copper mine as early as 1774.

The same h ap

pened in the Walnut Street Jail^ in Philadelphia, at Newgate Prison prior
to the establishment of the Auburn Prison in Ne w York,

in the early Maine

and Massachusetts prisons, and, in fact, almost everywhere from the
beginning of prisons in the United States (Teeters, 1953:14).

Further,

Caldwell reports:
During 1929 and 1930, serious prison riots broke out in
many institutions throughout the country . . . .
A series
of investigations followed and produced some sweeping prison
reforms, one of which was the reorganization of the federal
prison system and the establishment of the Federal Bureau
of Prisons (1965:545).

^Built in 1775, the Walnut Street Jail ,lwas regarded as the
first true penitentiary of the Western Hemisphere" (The Kansas City
Star, August 13, 1973:2).
28
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The year 1951 Is an appropriate point or departure for a review
of modern prison riots because a major wave of prison violence occurred
during the years 1951-1553.

MacCormick (1954:18), for example, lists

thirty-nine riots, strikes, and other serious disturbances in prisons
and reformatories for men in the United States during the period May,
1951, to December 31, 1953, more than had taken place in the preceding
quarter-century.

In just eight short months, some twelve different

states had twenty-one riots varying in length and intensity (U.S. News
& World Report, December 19, 1952:19).

The riots of greatest magnitude

and importance began in April, 1952, when violent and destructive revolts
that occurred almost simultaneously in the New Jersey Prison at Trenton
and the Michigan Prison at Jackson were followed by a series of distur
bances in prisons throughout the country.
There was a relative calm in correctional institutions until
1955, when another series of riots began in the State Penitentiary at
Walla Walla, Washington, and spread across the country.

Although Utah,

in 1957, and Montana, in 1959, experienced what were termed serious
incidents because of the number of hostages involved, another major epi
sode of prison violence did not occur until 1968, when a riot resulting
in extensive property damage occurred in the Oregon State Penitentiary
at Salem (Time, March 22, 1968:22).
bances occurred at San Quentin.

That same year, two other distur

These disturbances were characterized

by coordination with members of the community outside the correctional
institution and consisted of work strikes and refusals to participate
in weekend recreational activities.
The series of riots that occurred irr^correctional institutions
in 1968 prompted the American Correctional Association (previously known
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as the. American Prison Association) to revise its official position
paper entitled, A Statement Concerning Causes, Preventive Measures, and
Methods of Controlling Prison Riots and Disturbances, which was origi
nally published in 1953.

The revised version, similarly entitled, was

completed in October, 1970, and is the result of work by a specially
selected committee headed by William D. Leeke, Director, South Carolina
Department of Corrections,

It identifies the major causes of riots and

disturbances in correctional institutions and recommends methods ox
preventing and controlling riots,

A comparison of the causes identi

fied in the Association’s two versions of prison riots will be presented
in Chapter 5.
There has been little relative calm in prisons since the riot
in the Oregon State Penitentiary in 1968.

During recent years, prisons

in many parts of the nation have been the scenes ox a succession of
riots and lesser disturbances.

Some of these disturbances have resulted

in bloodshed, many have caused property damage, and most of them have
produced sensational headlines.

As an aftermath, boards of inquiry have

been appointed, witnesses questioned, reports made, etc.

But in all

this, the general public has seldom gotten more than a glance at the
reform measures which have been precipitated by the riots.

RESULTS OF DATA COLLECTION

As part of the data collection effort in this study, letters were
sent to the heads of forty-three state departments of correction request
ing information on the incidence of riots in their institutions during
'y#
the period January 1, 1968 to December 31 >1971.
■

In all, replies were
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received from thirty-one states.

Fifteen states reported incidents

within their correctional system during the period mentioned above,
eleven replied that there were no incidents in their systems, three
hinted that they had had disturbances but had not conducted any studies
and were therefore unable to provide any *'meaningful'* information, two
completely evaded the questions asked of them, and twelve did not
respond.

The affirmative replies represented information on thirty-five

riots throughout the United States,

The following discussion is based

on a sampling of the incidents as reported by prison and law enforcement
officials.

Oregon State Penitentiary
As mentioned previously, a major disturbance occurred at the
Oregon State Penitentiary at Salem on March 9, 1968,

Although the

Oregon Corrections Division did not make any reference to prisoner
demands or underlying causes of the riot in its correspondence with
this writer, the changes resulting from the riot seem to be large in
both number and variety.

Some of these changes are discussed below.

Unit team case management system.

The penitentiary adopted a

unit team approach to its case management procedures.

The plan involves

the delegation of decision-making authority to middle management and
line staff members— the persons who are in most frequent contact with
the inmates and, therefore, most knowledgeable of their total situation.

Psychiatric services.
tional in September, 1969.

A psychiatric security unit became opera

The purpose of this unit is to house

emotionally disturbed individuals and provide therapy programs which
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Hill assist in their return to regular status at the earliest possible
time.

Since the unites inception, the Oregon Corrections Division

reports that there has been a noticeable improvement in the morale of
the general population with th© separation and treatment of obviously
maladjusted individuals whose behavior is personally distressing and
disruptive to those around them.
Educational urogram, A wide rang© of educational programs is
now being offered at the institution.

This includes adult basic educa

tion classes for nonreaders, elementary and high school courses, and a
variety of college level courses for which formal credit may be obtained.
General Educational Development (GSD) examinations, achievement and
aptitude tests, civil servics examinations, and a "free school** with
courses organized, developed, and moderated by students are also
available.
Vocational training, A new vocational training facility was
completed in the fall of 1971* and vocational training is now available
for men who desire to learn a trade or wish to further their skill and
knowledge in the craft or trade which they now possess.
Activities program,

A widely diversified activities program has

been established within the institution to serve the many and varied
needs of individual inmates.

It is reported that organized activities

have decidedly improved the overall morale factor, provided inmates with
a certain sense of achievement, and have directed interest toward
socially acceptable leisure time activities.
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Medical services.

The medical facility underwent extensive

remodeling and now consists of a twenty-bed general hospital, with
general medical, contagious, and intensive care units.

Offices and

medical facilities were relocated to enable better services and
supervision.

Pay incentive program.

In 1969, an experimental pay incentive

program raised the opportunity for maximum pay from $1.00 to $3.00 per
day.

Key positions were identified and a pay scale established.

Accor

ding to the Oregon Corrections Division, success of the program was
evidenced by improved morale, less sick time lost, and greater production
by a reduced work force.

New construction.

In addition to remodeling the hospital

facility, an extensive remodeling of the visiting room was accomplished
in the summer of 1968.

Visitors are now permitted to embrace at the

beginning and end of each visit, and wives may visit four times each
month.

Relocation of the furniture factory was accomplished in accor

dance with the recommendations of representatives from the Federal
Bureau of Prisons and other experts called upon during 1968.

The

previous furniture factory was converted into an indoor recreation area.

Inmate speaking engagements in the community.

Increased empha

sis on community involvement has resulted in both citizen participation
within the institution and inmate participation in the community.

This

program has reportedly received widespread acceptance in the community
and has provided an opportunity for the growth and. maturity of the
indiv idua1s invoIved.
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Institutional ombudsman.

In February, 1971, the position of

Institutional Ombudsman was established on a trial basis.

This provided

an avenue of direct communication between inmates and the prison super
intendent and top management staff.

Temporary leaves.

Legislation passed in 1969 permitted the

institution to add temporary leaves as another therapeutic tool in its
rehabilitative program.

.Such leave opportunities were designed to

assist offenders in time of family death or serious illness, to parti
cipate in constructive community-based activities, and, in some cases,
simply to solidify family and/or other relationships deemed beneficial
to the reform and rehabilitation of the prisoner (Based on personal
correspondence between Mr. Robert L. Wright, Executive Assistant of the
Oregon Corrections Division, and the writer).

South Carolina
South Carolina experienced four prison riots during the period
April 1, 1968 to October 5, 1968, three of which occurred in the same
institution.

The Central Correctional Institution and Maximum Detention

Retraining Center at Columbia each had a riot on April 1, 1968.

The

cause of the riot at Central was not given; however, the riot at the
Retraining Center is said to have spread from an adjoining facility.
The Central Correctional Institution saw two more riots on October 1
and 5, respectively.

Again, the exact causes were not reported.

The

disturbances which hinted at the need for reforms were those that
occurred in October, when prisoners listed employees and food among
their grievances.

Food has reportedly improved since that time, with
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the cafeteria serving almost twice as much meat as before.

With regard

to employees, the treatment staff, medical staff, and warden’s staff
were all increased.

A psychiatrist tvas employed on a full-time basis,

and an ’’open door” policy between staff and inmates was emphasized.
Also, the ratio of black officers to white was increased, and certain
physical changes to the prison complex were made to enable a dis
turbance to be isolated to one area (3ased on personal correspondence
between Mr. William D. Leeke, Director of the South Carolina Department
of Corrections, and the writer).

North Carolina’s Central Prison
Central Prison at Raleigh, North Carolina, had a riot on April
16, 1963, which resulted in the shooting deaths of five inmates, as well

as a number of other casualties.

The riot had as its basis the presenta

tion of essentially six demands by the prisoners.
demands were as follows:
time.

In substance, these

(1) The inmates wanted increased visiting

(2) All inmates who had been locked up in the A, B, X, and J

blocks were to be returned to the general prison population.

2

(3) A

grievance committee composed of at least five inmates was to be estab
lished to meet with the administrator at least once a month.

(4) A

system for compensating inmates from the Prison Enterprise Fund was to
be initiated immediately.

(5) The practice of serving cold cuts and

salads during the noon meal in warm weather was to be discontinued; all
three meals were to be served hot throughout the year.

(6) Television

^The significance of this demand is nSt clear. The writer can
only speculate that the prisoners locked up in A, B, I, and J blocks
were considered troublemakers and, in an attempt to avoid a major inci
dent, were segregated from the general inmate population.
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sets were to be placed in the H and E sections of the west wing cell
blocks.

Additionally, the inmates threatened not to eat, work, or

move until the commissioner of the state department of correction came
to the prison yard with representatives of the two Raleigh newspapers
and, in their presence, promise to meet the prisoners1 demands.
In response to the riot, the following actions were taken:
(1) The sheet metal and stainless steel fabrication industry was moved
from Central Prison to Blanch Prison.

(2) The building which had been

used for education classes at Central was converted to Central Youth
Center.

This facility now houses approximately 150 felons under

twenty-one years of age.

(3) Central Prison inmates working in the

highway sign shop, the license tag plant, and the print shop were
replaced by youthful offenders from Central Youth Center.

(4) Two

medium custody institutions, Odom Correctional Institution and
Caledonia Correctional Institution, were upgraded and reclassified as
close custody units; many inmates involved in the riot were then
transferred to these two units.

(5) In order to house some of the

rioters at Odom and Caledonia, it was necessary to transfer inmates
from these two institutions to other medium custody units.

Two

additional field units had to be upgraded and reclassified as medium
custody (Based on personal correspondence between Carolyn H. Wyland,
Administrative Assistant, North Carolina Department of Correction, and
the writer).

P ennsyIvania
Pennsylvania had two riots during the period covered by this
&

study.

The first occurred on May 22, 1968, at the State Correctional
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Institution at Camp Hill and was precipitated by attacks on white
inmates by black inmates.
mately twenty white

During the racial confrontation, approxi

inmates were injured.

initiation of the following
personnel were hired.
relaxed.

(3) Black

mission was granted

This disturbance led tothe

reform measures:

(1) Additional black

(2) The regulation of black literature was
studies were introduced into the prison. (4) P er
to hold Black Muslim services within the

institution.
The second riot took place on July 23, 1971, at the State Cor
rectional Institution at Graterford.

A spontaneous eruption between

two inmates who had been confined to the maximum security block pro
voked a disturbance which resulted in injuries to one inmate and eight
correction officers.

Reform measures, though vague, included some

minor internal changes in operating procedures within the maximum
security block, and the processing of cases in the institution on a
temporary or transitory basis pending classification and permanent
assignment or placement

(Based on personal correspondence between Mr.

Allyn R. Sielaff, Commissioner of Correction, Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, and the writer).

New York State Correctional Facilities
New York State experienced frequent riots and lesser dis
turbances in its correctional institutions during the period January,
1969 to September, 1971.

With few exceptions, the New York Department

of Correctional Services failed to acknowledge the introduction of
reform measures in its correspondence with the writer.

However, some

of the predisposing causes of the riots were identified and are
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considered important to the discussion.

Following is a listing of

occurrences by institution.

Auburn Correctional Facility.

On November 2, 1970, a general

work slowdown took place in the plate and tailor shops at the Auburn
Correctional Facility.

Later in the day, several inmates took pos

session of a yard microphone and urged other inmates, both black and
white, not to go to work in honor of Black Solidarity Day.

Advised of

the tenseness of the situation, the superintendent of the prison
declared a half holiday.
A second disturbance at Auburn occurred on December 20, 1970,
and involved approximately thirty-four inmates in a special housing unit.
After being released from their cells for the purpose of exercising out
doors, they refused to return to their calls or go out for their exercise
period.

Elmira Correctional Facility.

Approximately twenty inmates

created a disturbance in their block over the locking up of a militant
at the Elmira Correctional Facility on July 16, 1970.

The disturbance

was contained without further incident.

Glenham Correctional Facility.

A Spanish-speaking inmate at

Glenham Correctional Facility was observed piercing his ear on July 11,
1970.

When instructed to go to the hospital ward, he refused to do so

and began cursing and shouting.

Later that day, other Spanish-speaking

inmates turned up the television and began smashing chairs and windows..
Considerable damage was done to two wards of the facility, and three
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officers were treated for injuries resulting from blows by broom han
dles and chair legs.

Great Meadow Correctional Facility,

Over a period of twenty

months, the Great Meadow Correctional Facility at Comstock experienced
five different disturbances.
On April 21, 19&9 > some 335 inmates refused to come in from the
exercise yard for the evening meal.

When the deputy superintendent

promised to discuss their grievances with them the next day, they reluc
tantly returned to the mess hall and to their cells.

On October ^ that

same year, twenty-three inmates, who had been transferred from the
Clinton Correctional Facility the day before, refused to eat breakfast
and twenty-seven refused to eat supper.

Eventually, all returned to

their routines, although seven held out for almost a week.

On

November 19, 1970* inmates in the carpenter shop struck, apparently in
protest over having to make billy clubs, and attempted to gain the sup
port of other inmates.
returned to normal.

Leaders were locked up, and the situation

This incident was followed by a sitdown strike in

the mess hall on December 29, 1970.

The superintendent addressed the

inmates and they decided to return to work, but not without the approval
of a militant leader.

On January 11, 1971* approximately fifty inmates

refused to leave the mess hall.

Prison officials, to include a large

group of officers, entered the mess hall and ordered the inmates to fall
in, to which they responded without resistance.

The following day, the

entire prison population refused to leave the yard for work and school,
but gave in shortly because of cold weather.

v
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Graen Haven. Correctional Facility. A disturbance erupted in the
mass hall of the Green Haven Correctional Facility on March 5, 1970.
The disturbance was precipitated by a black inmate who threw his tray
of food and stood on the table and attempted to make a speech urging
other inmates to rebel.

When officers attempted to remove the agitator

from the mess hall, fifty other inmates began to yell and run around the
mess hall throwing trays and utensils.

The disturbance subsided quickly,

but not before several inmates and officers were injured.

New York S t atefs Attica Correctional Facility.

The Attica Cor

rectional Facility had a work stoppage in its metal manufacturing shops
on July 29, 1970.

The disturbance involved approximately 450 inmates

and resulted from agitation on the part of a group of Black Panthers and
white militants demanding higher wages, lower commissary prices, and
more yard time.

The following day, the inmates again refused to work,

holding out for higher wages.

Prison authorities decided to call in the

state commissioner of corrections, who talked with inmate representa
tives and "agreed to increase wages from the previous 6 to 29 cents per
day to 25c to $1.00 per d a y ” (The Official Report of the New York State
Special Commission on A ttica, 1972:129).

Further, an evaluation of the

commissary operation resulted in an order from the state department of
correctional services indicating that no commissary would operate at a
profit in excess of five percent.
A state of unrest prevailed again on November 2, 1970, when a
report was received that there were over 100 black inmates who stated
that, because of Black Solidarity Day, they should not leave the
recreation yard at the appointed time, nor would they obey any white
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man's orders.

Five leaders were identified, taken from the group, and

placed in segregation.

After the seizing of the leaders by prison

authorities, the remainder of the inmates filed into the mess hall when
ordered to do so (Based on personal correspondence between Mr. Edward M.
Carroll, Executive Assistant, New York Department of Correctional
Services, and the writer).
Because of its significance, the riot that occurred at the
Attica Correctional Facility in September, 1971* will be discussed in
detail in the next chapter.

Much information concerning the causes and

consequences of prison violence can be gleaned from the Attica riot.
It therefore lends itself particularly well to the subject at hand and
is worthy of special consideration in a separate chapter.

Idaho State Penitentiary
The Idaho State Penitentiary had a disturbance on August 10,
1971* during which two inmates were stabbed and approximately $15*000
in property damage was incurred.

A special investigating committee

identified the following causes:

(l) The month of August was unusually

warm with temperatures exceeding 110 degrees in the cell houses much of
the time, making it almost impossible for the inmates to sleep.

(2 )

Just prior to the disturbance, an underground tunnel was found in a
separate housing unit for long term offenders.

Some of the inmates

believed that an informant in the institution supplied the adminis
tration with the whereabouts of the tunnel.

(3) An Inmate, who had

been sentenced to the penitentiary on a morals charge, was stabbed to
death.

At the time of the stabbing, the inmate,, was being housed on a

tier where there was strong inmate resentment toward the offense.

.

(b)

Agitation by a group of* inmates prevailed.

Wl

(5) Humors qf inmate

complaints concerning unsanitary conditions relative primarily to food
and water spread throughout the institution.
The investigating committee found other predisposing causes for
the disturbance.
March, 1 9 6 9 ,

One of these centered around the fact that, prior to

the penitentiary had been primarily custodial-orienteci.

However, as a result of a study by the American Correctional Association
and the National Council on Crime and Delinquency, many rehabilitative
changes were recommended.

As new programs such as counseling, psychi

atric, educational, and medical services were implemented, there appeared
to be some resentment on the part of the officer staff to the changes.
Some of the other predisposing causes cited by the committee are
as follows:

(l) Security personnel had failed to follow and/or read

orders pertaining to their respective posts.
training program in effect.
a high personnel turnover.

(2) There was no on-going

(3) There was a shortage of personnel and
(^) The prison facilities were outmoded.

(5) Prison officials were preoccupied with a forthcoming move to a new
site— the state had a new correctional facility under construction at
the time.

(6) There was a conflict between custodial and rehabilitative

philosophies which was accentuated by rapid implementation of new pro
grams.

(7) The inmate population was characterized by an influx of

assaultive, aggressive, anti-authority, drug-oriented, young inmates.
(8) There were insufficient facilities to segregate the young, assaultive
inmates and the older, hard-core inmates front the general population.
From all indications, the disturbance was a'spontaneous eruption
augmented by many of the problems confronting the institution during a
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period of change.

According to the state director of corrections,

inmate grievances could have been achieved through legitimate- grievance
procedures if an appropriate report had been made.
included the following:

(1) The monthly commissary allowance was to be

increased from $25.00 to $40.00.

(2) Two additional visits per month

were to be authorized for approved visitors.
the hospital staff were to be replaced,
was to be removed.
cell-houses.

Inmate demands

(3) Certain personnel on

(4) The kitchen food supervisor

(5) Ventilating fans were to be installed in the

(6) The inmates demanded that food preparation and sani

tation facilities be improved.

(7) Finally,

it was demanded that com

munication between staff and inmates be increased (Based on personal
correspondence between Mr. Raymond W, May, Director of Corrections,
State of Idaho, and the writer).

Louisiana State Penitentiary
A riotous situation involving most of the black prisoners at
the Louisiana State Penitentiary occurred on August 13, 1971.

The

disturbance took the form of an organized, planned protest attributed
to outside agitation.

No reforms or changes resulted from this

situation, as the prisoners* demands were considered unrealistic.

Some

of their demands were reportedly already being met and the others were
for things over which prison officials had no control or jurisdiction
(Based on personal correspondence between Mr. J. D. Middlebrooks, Chief
of the Louisiana State Correctional Services Division, and the writer).

California State Correctional Facilities
As in the State of New York, California has experienced frequent.
.tfi?

outbursts of mass violence in its prisons during recent years.

Three
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black.inmates were killed, and a white inmate was wounded in January,
1970, when a tower guard fired his weapon to break up a fight in an
exercise yard of the maximum security unit at the Soledad Correctional
Training Facility.

Several days later, a correctional officer was m u r 

dered by three black inmates at Soledad.

A second officer was murdered

at Soledad in July, 1970, a third in March, 1971, and a. fourth in May,
1971.

A strike took place at the California State Prison at Folsom in

November, 1970.

This was followed by an unsuccessful strike effort at

the California Men's Colony, San Luis Obispo, in March, 1971.

While

standing outside the hospital cell of a prisoner who had been stabbed
two days earlier, an officer at San Quentin was murdered by two or three
unidentified inmates in July, 1971.
These incidents culminated in an escape attempt at San Quentin
in August, 1971, during which three correctional officers and two inmates
were murdered, and another inmate was killed while attempting to escape.
The latter was George Jackson, a self-avowed revolutionary, who was
facing murder charges as a result of the killing of the correctional
officer at Soledad in January, 1970 (Report to Governor Ronald Reagan
on Violence in California Prisons, 1971:4-12).

Shortly after the escape

attempt at San Quentin, Governor Reagan directed the Board of Cor
rections to review the incident, along with other incidents of violence
which had occurred over a two-year period in California correctional
institutions, and to make recommendations to him regarding ways and
means of halting the increased tempo of violence while providing for
the safety of inmates and correction officers^alike.
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In its report to Governor Reagan, the Board suggested that many
of the incidents resulted from the unlawful activities of selfproclaimed revolutionary forces operating both inside and outside prison
walls.

At one point the report states:

"Information from several

sources alleged that some outside attorneys had encouraged disruptions
in prisons, such as hunger strikes and riots, as a means of generating
unfavorable publicity” (Report to Governor Ronald Reagan on Violence in
California Prisons, 1971:10),

In fact, one attorney was charged with

murder and conspiracy in connection with the escape attempt at San
Quentin.

Moreover, radical groups and underground newspapers were

thought to take advantage of the January, 1970, tragedy at Soledad to
launch a campaign against the California Department of Corrections and
its programs.

Reputed false and inflammatory reports were circulated

concerning the incident, the operation of Soledad, and the prison system
in general (Report to Governor Ronald Reagan on Violence in California
Prisons, 1971:4).
In response to the violence and agitation in California prisons,
the state department of corrections has made a number of program changes
and reforms, some of which are as follows:

(l) It is now generally

accepted in California that costly long-term lock-up in state prisons
should be reserved only for those persons who cannot be safely controlled
in the free community.
cance.

This is a broad reform of considerable signifi

(2) For the first time in the history of the department of cor

rections, double celling (the practice of assigning two men to a cell
designed for only one) has been eliminated.

(3) The department of cor-

rections has started the nation’s largest program of family visitations

in which wives, children, and parents of inmates may visit in nrivary
tor two-day periods.
prisoners, however.

This privilege is extended only to married
(k) The community re-entry process has been'

strengthened with the establishment of three-day passes for men and
women nearing parole.

Such temporary leaves are designed to facilitate

the resocialization of the inmate into the free community.

(5) The

department has embarked on an intensive minority recruitment campaign
aimed at attracting additional blacks and Chicanos (Mexican-Americans)
to the payroll.

(6) The department has expanded “work furlough’* in

which inmates are permitted to leave institutions during working hours
in order to hold jobs in the community.
Other significant reforms include the following:

(7) New voca

tional training courses, i.e., deep-sea diving, computer programming,
and animal psychology, were added to the list of job training classes,
(8) Academic programs were expanded to include junior college classes
and black and brown studies programs.
diagnostic program was expanded.

(9) The state’s pre-sentence

(10) A number of changes were made to

head off criticisms of the indeterminate sentence.

(11) An employee

safety committee was established and represents three main employee
organizations— California Correctional Officers* Association, Teamster’s
Union Number 9^0, and the California State Employees* Association.
Representatives of these organizations are designated to survey cor
rectional institutions on a regular basis and to make recommendations
to the warden for improving employee and inmate safety (Report to
Governor Ronald Reagan on Violence in California Prisons, 1971:1^-20).
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Vermont State Prison and House of Correction for Man
Approximately seventy-five inmates at the Vermont State Prison
were engaged in a major disturbance which began on September 29, 1971,
and ended on October 3, 1971«

While the general unrest which prevailed

in prisons throughout the country at that time may have been a preci
pitating factor, the immediate cause of the uprising was attributed to
the removal of wooden lockers, shelving, and other combustible materials
from the cells.

Specifically, the inmates indicated that the order was

carried out without sufficient lead time to permit them to send excess
personal items home.
A list of demands similar to those presented at Attica and else
where was submitted to State Corrections Commissioner Kent Stoneman.
It was, however, admittedly prepared hastily by inmates who agreed that
some of the demands did not actually apply to Vermont.

For example,

one demand was for special food for Black Muslims when there had never
been more than one or two blacks at any given time in the total cor
rectional system and no one had professed to be a Muslim.
Changes made as a direct result of the disturbance included ini
tiation of scheduled inspections of the prison kitchen by the state
health department, establishment of an uncensored inmate magazine, and
installation of metal storage lockers to replace the wooden lockers.

A

committee had already been appointed to review existing rules and regu
lations for possible reform.

Some of the changes made as a result of

the committee's efforts include an end to mail censorship and elimination
of restrictions on correspondence, greatly liberalized visiting
privileges, and the complete revision of disciplinary procedures.
missioner Stoneman points out that these latter changes would have

Com
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occurred in any event, but he admits that the spaed with which they were
accomplished was hastened by the fact that there had been a disturbance
(Based on personal correspondence between Mr. Kent Stoneman, Com
missioner, Vermont State Department of Corrections, and the writer).
Maine State Prison
There was a disorder of some magnitude at the Main State Prison
on October 12, 1971.

Tension and unrest in the prison had been

increasing since the early part of September.

This was attributed to

disorders in others prisons, along with the highly publicized concessions
made as a result of strikes, violence^ and disorders.

Another important

factor was the widespread emphasis on the civil rights of prisoners,
advocates of which tend to regard prisoners as a deprived minority
unjustly oppressed by prison administrators.
It is also believed that discontent had been intensified by the
medium of group therapy sessions conducted by a visiting psychologist
employed by the vocational rehabilitation program at the prison.

For

instance, it is believed that the therapy group discussed inadequacies
of the prison and its management, and that the discussions led to pro
posed changes which were later incorporated into a list of inmate demands.
Prison shortcomings discussed by the therapy group, had they been known
to the prison administration, might well have been resolved and unrest
thereby avoided.

But the psychologist apparently regarded these matters

as privileged communications and felt that he had no other type of
responsibility to the prison as such.
The inmate council met with the w a r d e # on October 10, and
reported that inmates assigned to work in the kitchen were planning a
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work strike on October 12.

The main complaint of the kitchen inmates

was that they wanted one of the officer chefs removed, apparently
because of his sometimes abrasive and authoritarian personality.

Removal

of the chef was not considered feasible, however, under pressure from
the inmates.
On October 11, prison officials met with the inmate council,
during which the latter presented a list containing twenty-seven demands.
Although many of the demands were considered reasonable and could have
been resolved, others were not thought by authorities to be as reasonable.
With the list came a demand that, unless the matters were resolved
immediately, the kitchen inmates would not work on October 12, and a
general strike would take place the following day.

The meeting reached

an impasse and the inmates scheduled to go to work in the kitchen on
October 12 refused to do so, thus indicating that a general strike would
occur the following day.

In anticipation of the work strike, the warden

decided to keep all but the

kitchen inmates locked

up and

was therefore

able to maintain control over the immediate situation.
Shortly after the warden announced that inmates were not to be
released from their cells, the disorder began.

It grew steadily worse

and continued until the instigators could be separated from the rest of
the inmate population.

After considerable property damage, noisemaking,

and threatening remarks from the inmates, the warden made an appeal
through the inmate council,

but the council failed

torespond

and was

suspended a few days later.
Following is a listing of some of the changes that were made
-

..

..

subsequent to the disturbance:

(1) There were several changes in prison
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regulations, the nature of which were not specified.

(2) Prisoners

were granted permission to draw $10.00 worth of canteen tickets twice
weekly.

(3) Permissible income from inmate craft work was raised from

$1,800 to $2,400 annually.

An inmate who agreed to deposit $300 each

year in his prison account, and further agreed not to withdraw it until
his release, would be permitted to earn up to $2,600 per year.

(4)

Funds with which to install hot water plumbing in the cells were
requested from the state legislature.

(5) Although the inmate council

was suspended, an inmate legislative committee was to be formed to work
with the staff regarding proposed laws.

(6) Plans were being made to

establish a college level study program through the University of Maine.
(7) An "exit" program designed to assist men being released was underway
(Based on personal correspondence between Mr. R. D. Kennedy, Acting
Warden, Maine State Prison, and the writer).

Tennessee Prison for Women
The State of Tennessee had a riot in its women's prison at
Nashville in November, 1971, that resulted in an estimated $4,000
damage.
lows:

Some of the factors which led to the disturbance are as fol
(1) The inmates wanted censorship of mail banned.

(2) They

thought that they were not getting the same privileges as male inmates
at other institutions.

(3) They wanted better educational facilities.

(4) They wanted better recreational opportunities.

(5) They wanted to

be treated as adults and not as children alleged to derive from "Mickey
Mouse" rules.
In response to the grievances, the fallowing actions were taken:
(1) Other than checking for contraband, the censorship of mail was
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banned.

(2)

Visitation privileges were improved.

(3)

The educational

program was upgraded with college-level courses being offered by the
University of Tennessee and taught behind the walls.

(4) A better

recreational program was developed, and a full-time recreation director
was appointed.

(5) The so-called "Hickey House" rules were abolished

(Based on personal correspondence between Hr. William B. Hodges,
Director of Information, Tennessee Department of Correction, and the
writer).

Kansas State Penitentiary
The Kansas State Penitentiary at Lansing had a minor disturbance
on September 27, 1971, when prisoners assigned to food service details
refused to go to work.

In an article in the Topeka State Journal,

Warden R. J. Gaffney was quoted as saying:
apparently was over 'Petty grievances.1

. . the work stoppage

He mentioned low incentive pay

for working in the prison industries and said prisoners objected to
being fed too much pork" (September 23, 1971:2).

Hi a personal conver

sation between the writer and several inmates who were at Lansing at
the time of the strike, it was brought out that there was a lack of com
munication between staff and inmates.

Further, the inmates mentioned

that, prior to the strike, the prison's athletic teams were comprised
entirely of blacks and that some remarks in the dressing room one day
led to a minor clash between blacks and whites.

The inmates suggested

that this incident may have had something to do with ,the strike in
September, 1971.
Warden Gaffney, a retired military pdlice officer and a
reformist in his own right, is quick to boast that his institution will
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never have a riot in the strict sense of the word.

He attributes this

to a number of factors, but namely the prisons "no hostage" rule.
That is, officers would shoot to kill any convict who took a hostage
within the prison, even at the risk of killing the hostage.
Functionally speaking, the Kansas State Penitentiary is operated
along military lines.

The rank and file resemble that of a military

organization and, in fact, consist almost entirely of former military
personnel, many of whom have retired from the military service.

This

has certain advantages as the majority of the employees have had cor
rectional experience in the military service and, in many cases, their
salary serves to supplement their retirement pay, or vice versa.

On

the average, the Lansing Prison ha3 employees who are both better paid
and more experienced, and this would seem to lend itself to a more p ro
fessional and, hence, more effective correctional program.
Based on personal observations, the Kansas State Penitentiary
appears to be making progress in terms of penal reform.

Warden Gaffney

has a wide variety of programs underway and others under study.

These

include programs aimed at giving prisoners training in occupations In
which there is a shortage of workers outside prison.

At present, the

programs concentrate on such things as auto mechanics, drafting, welding.,
machine shop, woodwork, leatherwork, barbering, and even horseshoeing.
There are also private industry-sponsored courses including a PhilcoFord motor repair course and a Radio Corporation of America (RCA) course
in computer programming.

Depending on his job in the institution, a

prisoner can earn as much as thirty cents a^3ty in incentive pay.

At

last report, this amount was expected to increase to sixty-five cents
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per day.

Prisoners can earn additional money through the blood donor

program at the rate of $5.00 per week.

The 1970 legislature authorized

prisoners vzith excellent records to work outside the walls during the
day.

The prison is also experimenting with a home visitation program

whereby well-behaved inmates can be allowed to go home three times a
year for up to ten days at a time.

In another incentive program,

prisoners can accumulate ’’good time” to be deducted from their sentences
at the rate of three days per month.

This amount exceeds the usual

"time-off-for-good-behavior" concept.

Long Binh Stockade
In spite of advanced policies of the United States Army in the
field of corrections, it has not remained immune to prison violence.
For example, the author personally witnessed what has emerged as perhaps
the worst prison riot in the modern history of the United States Army at
the military stockade at Long Binh

(or L.B.J. for Long Binh Jail, as its

inmates called it) in South Vietnam during the summer of 1968.
Although the stockade was built to accommodate a maximum of 400
prisoners, at the time of the riot it was overcrowded with approximately
700 military prisoners whose crimes ranged from going A WOL or smoking
marijuana to theft and murder.

As it turned out, however, overcrowding

had little to do, at least directly, with the trouble at Long Binh.
The riot began with a disturbance between a relatively small
number of blacks and whites in the medium security section of the
stockade.

Military policemen armed with nightsticks entered the co m 

pound to separate the prisoners, but were overpowered and relieved of
their keys.

Moments later the riotous prisoners, their behavior

54

reinforced by their initial success, unlocked the gates of the medium
security area and rushed into the stockade's central courtyard.

There,

led by a group of blacks, the rioters overpowered the guards on duty,
leaving some of them beaten and bloody on the ground*

The prisoners

then proceeded to unlock the maximum security cell block and to set fire
to a number of tents and buildings, several of which, including the
administration building, burned to the ground.
About an hour after the riot started, military police rein
forcements arrived at the stockade.

Thus bolstered, the tower guards

ordered the rioters to "cease and desist."

Many obeyed.

About 250

hardened prisoners, the majority of them black, refused and shouted
obscenities at the guards.

When a force of military policemen advanced

with fixed bayonets, throwing tear gas grenades as they approached, the
blacks fought back with sticks, rocks, and metal rods.

Xn the melee, a

number of military policemen, including the confinement officer, and a
large number of the rioters were injured.

One white prisoner was killed,

reportedly clubbed to death by black prisoners.
When order was restored, military police sorted the prisoners
into "cooperatives" and "uncooperatives."

The uncooperatives, all black

except for several Puerto Ricans, were locked in an enclosed part of the
stockade.

With this action, stockade officials assumed that the

rebellion was over.

This, as it turned out, was a premature conclusion.

Secure in the knowledge that their records had been destroyed along with
the administration building, the black militants gave false names and
service numbers.

Many of them shed their uniforms and donned white

kerchiefs and African style robes fashioned from Army blankets.
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Keenly aware of the sensitivity of the civil rights -issue at
the time, military officials decided not to take the uncooperatives
by force, but, rather, to wait them out.

Each day, cases of C-rations

were tossed over the fence into the area in which the uncooperatives
were confined.

Army investigators and stockade officials, questioned the

"prisoners" about their grievances.

Many of them indicated that they

wanted out of the Army and out of Vietnam.

Besides expressing the

customary stockade grievances, some of the blacks asserted that white
guards had abused them verbally and had given white prisoners far better
treatment.

By military standards, the handling of the holdouts was per

missive and, to a degree, the policy of restraint worked.

Three weeks

after the riot broke out, only thirteen prisoners were still defying
stockade discipline.
The riot at Long Binh would seem to have importance both for
the Army and American society as a whole.

Since the late President

Harry S. Truman integrated the armed forces in 1943, the A r m y has been
proud of the opportunities it offers its black soldiers.

For the most

part, relations between white and black troops in Vietnam had been
good, especially in combat areas where they shared common needs and
common dangers.

In the Long Binh Stockade, with these bonds dissolved,

black soldiers felt they faced the prejudice that they had faced in the
ghettos of the United States and rediscovered their resentment of
authority.

In the end, the riot seemed to suggest that the egalitar

ianism of the Army cannot, by itself, erase the tensions that exist
between black and white Americans.

As in most incidents of this nature ^there was no single, iden
tifiable cause.

The compound in which the riot started was predominantly
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Negro, and racial tension was certainly a factor.

The racial problems

did not appear to be directly related to stockade operations.

Rather,

they were a consequence of society’s ills, the environment, and the
often observed phenomenon of minority members grouping together against
a common enemy, real or Imagined.

Discipline had apparently been lax

in some instances and unjustly administered in others.

Because prisoner

grievances are unique to a given environment and tend to fluctuate with
the mood of the prisoner population, specific grievances, other than
those already mentioned, could not be identified.
Reform measures evolving from the riotous situation at the Long
Binh Stockade included replacement of the confinement officer with a
’'no nonsense** military police officer whose basic philosophy was control,
fair discipline, and meaningful work.

Work programs were selected to

insure productivity and effective utilization of the prisoner's time.
Last, but not least, the basic plant itself was reconstructed.

SUMMARY

This chapter has represented an attempt to identify some of the
causes and consequences of prison violence with a view toward estab
lishing a general cause-effect relationship between violence and change
in penal institutions.

One of the more obvious conclusions that can be

reached from the preceding discussion is that the causes and effects of
prison riots are not always readily apparent.

This problem will be

addressed in Chapter 5.
The prison disturbances represented in this chapter occurred in
■

state institutions of varying age, size, and quality:

the oldest,

57
Ve r mont’s 164-year-old State Prison and House of Correction for Hen;
the newest, South Carolina's Maximum Detention Retraining Center at
Columbia, opened in 1968; the largest, the 3,834 man California Men's
Colony; and one Of the smallest, the 100-inmate Tennessee Prison, for
Women (Directory:

Correctional Institutions and Agencies, 1970:4-81).

Riots in the Maine State Prison and the South Carolina M a x i m u m
Detention Retraining Center are believed to have spread by knowledge of
disturbances in other correctional institutions.

In at least two

prisons, i.e., the Idaho State Penitentiary and the Vermont State Prison
and House of Correction for Men, the causes of the riots can perhaps
be traced to changes in the prison system, thus reversing the causeeffect relationship.

At the Louisiana and California State Prisons,

it was believed that the riots may have been provoked by agitation or
revolutionary forces outside the prison.

A number of persons were

convinced that the riot at Attica in September, 1971, was the result
of a long-planned revolutionary plot.

The New York State Special

Commission on Attica found no evidence to this effect, however.
Complaints concerning food service were made in at least five
of the prisons examined.

Also, it will be noted in Appendix B that

better food service was among the demands submitted by the inmates at
the Attica Correctional Facility in September, 1971.

The monotony of

prison diets can be a major source of discontent, and the dining room
has often been the focal point of prison disturbances.

Therefore, good

food, plentiful and well prepared, would seem to be important in main
taining harmony within the prison.

Although food ma y occasionally
2#
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become a substitute target for other complaints, it also becomes a
primary source of pleasure to men deprived of many of the comforts of
normal life.
While racial tension is known to exist to varying degrees in
prisons, only two of the riots discussed involved direct confrontations
between blacks and whites.

These occurred in the Pennsylvania State

Correctional Institution and the Long Binh Stockade.

Several other

disturbances, e.g., those which occurred at the Louisiana State
Penitentiary in August, 1971, and the Attica Correctional Facility in
March 1970, and September, 1971, respectively, had what might be con
sidered racial overtones, meaning that racial issues may have been
involved.

However, there is no indication that these uprisings involved

overt racial conflicts between blacks and whites.

This is not to

suggest that interracial conflicts do not occur in prisons.
contrary.

Quite the

Based on the evidence presented, however, race riots, in the

usual sense of the term, would seem to be more the exception than the
rule in penal institutions.
The positive consequences of prison riots are diverse and
cover a wide range of reforms and innovative programs.

Throughout

this chapter it can be seen that these reforms do not always emanate
from prisoner demands or grievances.

In short, the causes and conse

quences of prison riots are both complex and varied, thus making a
systematic analysis of these phenomena extremely difficult.
The next chapter will be devoted to a detailed discussion of
the riot that occurred in the Attica Correctional Facility in New York
State in September, 1971.

This discussion will develop a profile of a

59

major prison, disturbance which will shed light on the dynamics of
prison violence.

Chapter 4

THE RIOT AT ATTICA:

A CRITICAL EXAMINATION

This chapter will concern itself with a critical examination of
the riot that occurred at N ew York State's Attica Correctional Facility
between September 9 and 13, 1971.

The purpose here is to indicate some

of the social forces that come to bear on the prison and provoke violent
behavior.
Following the riot, a special fact-finding team, known as the
Ne w York State Special Commission on Attica,

1

was appointed by Chief

Judge Stanley Fuld of the New York Court of Appeals and asked to recon
struct the events that occurred during the rioting and to determine why
they had happened.

The Commission was comprised of nine members,

including a former inmate, and was headed by Robert B. McKay, Dean of
the New York University School of Law.
Much of the information contained in this chapter is based on
the Commission's official report, which was published in September,
1972.

The report is germane to this study for several reasons.

First,

to the writer's knowledge, it is the most completely documented report
compiled on what actually happened at Attica and has general application
to other prisons.

Second, it documents in considerable detail almost

every aspect of the life and structure of the prison as a major social

^Except where otherwise noted in this chapter, the term "Com
mission" will refer to the New York State Special Commission on Attica.
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institution.

Third, and most important, it is a thorough study of some

of the causes and consequences of collective violence in a correctional
institution.
Although the conditions at Attica may not have been identical
to those in other prisons, it is felt that the problems in that
institution at the time of the riot are sufficiently representative of
the prison universe to justify some generalizations.
itself points out:

As the Commission

"Attica is every prison; and every prison is Attica"

p
(The Official Report of the New York State Special Commission on At t i c a ,
1 9 7 2 :xii).
For the sake of clarity ana convenience, this chapter will be
divided into three sections:

Attica Before the Riot; Attica During the

Riot; and Attica Following the Riot.

Accordingly, the following

chronology of events will help to explain what happened before, during,
and after the riot.

ATTICA BEFORE THE RIOT

The Prison
Attica Prison, as it was formerly called, was opened in 1931,
and had the capacity to accommodate 2,370 inm ates
rectional Institutions and Agencies, 1970:52).

(Directory:

Cor

It is said that Attica

was to have been the answer to the problem of prison uprisings which
occurred in the late 1920*s.

When it opened, for example,

"it was

widely hailed as the ultimate prison" (The Official R e p o r t v 1972:14).

1 ■■ ■

^Hereafter designated as The Official Report.
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In July, 1970, it was redesignated a ''correctional facility"; however,
security, rather than rehabilitation, is said to have been the dominant
theme.
A total institution* Attica is almost completely self-sustaining.
It has its own powerhouse, commissary, hospital, laundry, chapel, bakeshop, and kitchen-mess hall complex.

The main housing area consists of

four cell blocks, lettered A through D (See Figure 1).

Each block,

which holds about 500 inmates, is divided into cell groups called
"companies.”
blocks.

Inmates live on three floors in each of the four cell

A central hallway divides the floors into two cell areas, each

containing two rows of cells called "galleries."

Narrow corridors

(tunnels) run from the middle of one block to the block opposite it and
divide the central area into four exercise yards, also lettered A
through D.

The tunnels intersect at a juncture called "Times Square."

C Block

A
B
1
o
c

B Yard

C Yard

Times
A Tunnel Square

A Yard

% Tunnel

c

D Yard

D Block

Figure 1.

Main Cell Blocks and Exercise Yards
Attica Correctional Facility
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The Inmates
There were 2,243 inmates confined in Attica when the riot began
on September 9, 1971.

Fifty-four percent of these ware black, thirty-

seven percent white, and nine percent Puerto Rican.

Almost eighty

percent of the inmates were from urban ghettos, and nearly forty
percent were under thirty years of age.

Sixteen percent of the prisoner

population had completed high school or its equivalent.

Only twelve

percent of the population had no prior police record, and almost seventy
percent had served time in a state, federal, or local prison before
coming to Attica.

More than half of the inmates had a maximum sentence

of seven years or less.

Murder, robbery, burglary, felonious assault,

and dangerous drugs head the list of criminal offenses for which
committed

(The Official Report, 1972:490-493).

After conducting extensive interviews with inmates, correction
officers, observers, and prison experts and administrators, the Com
mission concluded:
. . . the Attica rebels were part of a new breed of
younger, more aware inmates, largely black, who came to
prison full of deep feelings of alienation and hostility
against the established institutions of law and government,
enhanced self-esteem, racial pride, and political aware
ness, and an unwillingness to accept the petty humiliations
and racism that characterize prison life (The Official
R e p o r t , 1972:105).

The Correctional Staff
At the time of the riot, the correctional staff consisted of
398 correction officers and supervisors.

Oddly enough, there were no

black officers and only one Puerto Rican on t]he correctional staff.
Unlike the inmates, correction officers were drawn largely from rural

communities in western New York State and, therefore, were unfamiliar
with the life-styles of the inmates under their control and supervision.
There was no formal training program at Attica for correction
officers between World War II and the late 1 9 5 0 fs,

"More than one-

third of the officers at Attica on September 9 began their jobs during
that period" (The Official Report, 1972:27).

Those who started after

that were given two weeks training, but many reportedly found the
instruction useless.

As a result, most of the correction officers

were not properly trained to communicate with the inmates, nor did
they consider it their duty to understand or resolve inmate problems,
Beginning in April, 1970, correction officers were allowed to
"bid" for job openings on the basis of seniority, and many took advan
tage of this system to transfer from posts involving inmate contact.
Written examinations, rather than job performance and ability to relate
to inmates, were the key to promotion among correction officers.

Prison Life in General
Life in prison was generally monotonous and routine.

Prisoners

were required to spend fourteen to sixteen hours (eighteen to twenty
hours in the case of new inmates) alone in their cells each day.

For

many inmates, weekends signaled increased idleness in their cells.
Inmates left their cells at the same time each day for meals, recreation
in the yard, and for work or school.

They could talk until 8:00 P.M.,

but then had to read, write, or study until lights went out at ii:00
P.M.

This routine varied very little through the entire term of their

sentences.

*0
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Work programs,

MIn theory, work was not compulsory at Attica.

But inmates had the choice of working or being keeplocked

3

without pay

until they changed their m i n d s ” (The Official Report, 1972:36).

In

reality, there were too many inmates for too few jobs at Attica.

For

example, there was work for only 250 of the 450 inmates assigned to the
metal shop.

The metal shop was considered by inmates to be the worst

assignment at the institution and it became a sort of "dumping ground"
for new inmates and those without job assignments.

The vast majority

of those assigned to the metal shop were black and Spanish-speaking,
and they saw in their assignment merely another form of exploitation
of minority labor.

There was considerable racial discrimination in

job assignments with white inmates dominating the more desirable jobs.
Although he was aware of charges of racial discrimination, the deputy
superintendent claimed that he had introduced a quota system to insure
racial balance in jobs and that racial discrimination no longer existed
in the institution.

The Commission found evidence which would tend to

indicate otherwise.

Educational program.

Twelve percent of the inmates were

enrolled in the p r i s o n 1s school program.

Those "inmates who scored

below 5.0 on the Stanford Achievement Test administered during the
reception period were compelled to attend school until they reached
at least that level" (The Official Report, 1972:41).
received a fixed wage of twenty-five cents a day.

Students

Such a meager wage

As the term implies, "keeplocked" simply means that an inmate
is kept locked in his cell.

discouraged some inmates who might otherwise have been interested in
furthering their education and increased the resentment of those who
were forced to attend school.

Since the number of inmates in a class

could be increased without affecting security appreciably,

the school,

like the metal shop, was used by the administration as a ''dumping
ground" for inmates who could not otherwise be employed.

Recreation.

Recreational opportunities at Attica were limited.

There was no gymnasium and no trained recreation director on the staff.
Virtually all recreation took place in the yards.

Unfortunately, the

yards were crowded and chaotic, and baseball players often collided
with basketball p l a y e r s .

Inmates were free to spend an hour to an hour

and a half in the yards on weekdays, and about six hours on weekends,
weather permitting.

Clothing and personal hy g i e n e .

Prison uniforms were coarse,

drab, and ill-fitting, and were reissued to inmates until they wore
out.

The clothing, made in the prison tailor shop, was too hot in the

summer and too cold in the winter.

Toilet articles, such as tooth

brushes, toothpaste, shampoo, and razors and blades had to be purchased
at the inmate's expense or sent to him by friends or relatives.

There

was no hot water in the cells and the majority of the prison population
could shower only once a week.

Meals.

"In his 19/1 annual report, Superintendent Mancusi

wrote that Attica provided

'meals which are tasty, possess eye appeal

and contain the necessary nutritional ingredients to provide a
balanced diet*" (The Official R e p o r t , 1972:47).

In sampling the food,
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however, the Cotnmission found that it did not meet

Mancusi's description.

Although the ingredients were of good quality,

preparation rendered

some food virtually inedible.
to eat pork.

the

Muslims ware forbidden by their religion

However, frequent recourse to the p r i s o n fs swine herd for

main dishes and cooking fats was a means of holding down food costs.
It was once rumored that pork products were being described as beef on
the m e n u s .

Reading material.

Although the prison library contained

approximately 50,000 volumes, the law library collection was limited.
For security reasons, inmates were not permitted to go to the library
and browse.

Instead, they had to make selections from a catalog kept

by another inmate.

There were no newspapers available in the library.

Seventeen different magazines were received by the library, but there
was only one

copy of each issue for over 2,000 inmates.

March, 1971,

all publications were censored by the

education.

Prior to

prison's director of

In March, 1971, a media review committee was established to

insure that incoming material was acceptable reading for inmates.

Visitations.

As a rule, inmates were allowed to receive visits

from their wives, children, parents, brothers, sisters, attorneys,
clergymen, and certain others with special approval.
the right to receive visitors was illusory.
from New York City.

However, for many,

Most inmates were poor and

Transportation from New York to Attica was pro

hibitive, both in terms of travel time and money, for many families and
relatives.

r,When visitors did come, the experience was degrading for

both visitors and inmate” (The Official Report, 1972:61).

The inmate,

68
for example, was subjected to a thorough body search before and after
the visit.

A mesh screen between inmate and visitor prevented all but

minimal contact.

Throughout the visit, inmates and their visitors

were under the watchful eye Of two correction officers positioned at
one end of the room.

Medical car e .

According to the Commission, ”medical care was

one of the primary inmate grievances'* (1972:63).

The medical staff was

headed by two doctors who were also engaged in general practice in
nearby communities.

When queried by the Commission, both doctors

expressed strong negative feelings, even antagonism, toward many of the
inmates.

Little time was spent with a patient, and the normal doctor-

patient relationship was missing.

If an inmate took issue with "the

doctor's disposition of his complaint, he was often threatened with
commitment to the psychiatric ward . . . "
66).

(The Official R e p o r t , 1972:

Jerry Haleva, a consultant for a legislative committee investi

gating prison conditions in California, says:
In most prisons, doctors' attitudes are little better
than the facilities.
"Medical care is dispensed with a
different standard in prisons than it is in the community"
. • o • "Inmates are thought of as prisoners first and
patients second" (Time, July 9, 1973:36).

Dental c a r e .

The prison had two full-time dentists.

When

inmates were examined upon admission to the institution, their teeth
were found to be in generally poor condition.

Since their schedules

did not allow for extensive restorative work, little effort was made
to save teeth.

Many prisoners refused all but emergency dental work
'v>jr

for fear of the pain involved.
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Psychiatric c a r e .

A large portion of the psychiatrists1 time

was spent evaluating inmates for parole hearings, transfers to other
institutions, and in response to special requests from agencies outside
the prisono

Therefore, psychiatrists were unable "to provide other

than an occasional consultation and direct supervision when a true
crisis occurred” (The Official Report, 1972:70),

Even when inmates

had appointments, they sometimes had to wait months to be seen by a
psychiatrist.

Inmates with possible mental or emotional disorders

were sometimes given tranquilizers and other supportive drugs in hopes
that these would help avert serious or repeated episodes of uncon
trollable behavior.

Lacking proper treatment during the early stages,

some inmates became worse than they would have been otherwise, and this
led to increasing numbers of highly disturbed inmates.

In this regard,

the Commission points out:
. • . t h e build-up of emotional tension, the increased
number of emotionally disturbed inmates, and the lack of
effective means of defusing the increasing pressures as
these were generated were all anticipated and identified
by the supervising psychiatrist before the uprising and
he had expressed his fears and misgivings about the
rising tension and disturbed climate within the prison
on several earlier occasions to the prison authorities
(1972:71).

Religion.

Only fifteen percent of the prison population

attended church services regularly.

Those who did, did so because it

gave them the opportunity to leave their cells and socialize.

The

prison was without a minister for the Black Muslims, although efforts
had been made to obtain one.

As a consequence, no meeting place or

organized services were available to the Black Muslims.

Instead, they

$

took advantage of recreation periods in the yard to worship and engage
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in physical fitness activities as encouraged by their religion.

The

Commission determined that:

The administration and officers never understood the
Muslims. They were never given information about what
Muslims believed, and .Muslims saw no reason to explain
themselves to hostile officers.
Officers, ignorant of
Muslim beliefs, assumed that a black group which conducted
itself with an internal, almost military, discipline and
conditioning was committed to violence (1972:73).

Prison r u les.

The rules at Attica were selectively enforced

and poorly communicated.

After November, 1970, rule books were no

longer distributed to inmates upon their arrival at the institution,
and there were no other provisions for communicating the rules to
inmates or, for that matter, correction officers.

In the absence of

generally understood guidelines, new officers were instructed essen
tially as follows:
inmates

'‘Until you are familiar with what is allowed, tell

'No* when they ask for any special permission*' (The Official

R e p o r t , 1972:74).

Accordingly, correction officers had great discretion

in interpreting and enforcing the rules.

This made favoritism, dis

crimination, and harrassment by officers easy.

Inmates were kept off

balance not knowing what to expect from day to day, and often learned
the rules only when they broke them.

Although the administration was

aware that this situation existed, little or nothing was done about it.
Many rules were senseless and served no useful purpose.

As the Com

mission reflected in its report:
. . . I n m a t e s at Attica, but not at other prisons, were
prohibited from chewing gum, because discarded gum had
created a housekeeping problem; they were required to march
to the mess hall and to their jobs with^their hands at
their sides, to stand up in their cells when they were
counted, to avoid loud conversation in the halls, to
turn out their lights at a prescribed hour; they could
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not wear hats Indoors, grow a mustache, or have sideburns
of more than a prescribed length (1972:75-76).
Although the prison commissary sold items which required heating, i.e.,
coffee, tea, and soup,

"droppers"

Inmate security.

4

were prohibited in cells.

Inmates had little sense of security at Attica,

particularly during the first weeks of imprisonment.

The unwary were

subjected to sexual advances and often had to choose between fighting
or submitting.
'homo."

If the inmate submitted, he was likely to be labelled a

Thereafter,

,!his only hope of companionship and protection from

frequent assault was in continuing submission" (The Official Report,
1972:78).

The apprehension of being sexually assaulted caused many of

the younger inmates to carry homemade knives for self defense.

Because

of the low officer-inmate ratio, correction officers could not maintain
the degree of surveillance necessary to preclude sexual assaults.

As

a result, inmates had little confidence in the ability of the officers
to protect them.

Racism between officers and inmates.

It was reported that "the

relationship between most officers and inmates was characterized by
fear, hostility, and mistrust, nurtured by racism" (The Official Report,
1972:80).

Although segregation was supposedly abandoned at Attica in

the mid-1960*s, the Commission found that it still pervaded the prison
in varying degrees.

Except during their military service, many Attica

officers had never been exposed to blacks before.

Some officers

^A dropper is a homemade immersion^coil used by inmates to heat
water or other liquids in their cells.

actively discouraged black-white relationships by threatening to with
hold certain privileges.

The Commission acknowledged that "racism amon

Attica officers may be no greater than what is present in society at
large, but its effect is more intense at Attica" (1972:81).

It was

also noted that racism existed among the inmates, most of whom carried
prejudices with them to Attica.
mission,

"Racial attitudes," reports the Com

"were an undeniable factor among the tensions leading to the

uprising" (1972:82).

The Commission made the following additional

observations:
. • . Aggressive responses to racial bias are increasingly
common outside prison, and this trend exists inside as well.
Inmates today feel that they have the right, even as prisoners,
to rebel against being further put down on the basis of race.
Racism has always been an unsettling force in this country.
The openly rebellious reaction to it developed gradually, but
by now must be recognized as an explosive reality, within
prison as well as "outside." While it is a microcosm
reflecting the forces and emotions of the larger society,
the prison actually magnifies and intensifies these forces,
because it is so enclosed.
In prison there is no possible
escape from oppression (1972:82).

Parole practices.

"In practice, the Parole Board--not the

judge--decides how long an inmate will serve time," says the Commission
(1972:93).

Inmates, parole officers, and corrections personnel all

agreed that the parole system was a primary source of tension and bit
terness within the walls of the Attica facility.

Under existing laws,

offenders can be sentenced to minimum and maximum terms of imprisonment
After serving the minimum sentence, the inmate becomes eligible for
release or parole.
are arbitrary.

Occasionally, the decisions of the parole board

For example, some inmates with a long record of
■)j&
offenses may receive parole, while others, including first offenders,'
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may be denied parole.

The Commission points out in its discussion:

''Inmate frustration is probably inherent in any system which can make
a determination to deny him freedom, but procedures in effect in New
York have the result of magnifying the frustrations" (1972:95).

Parole

conditions were well known by the inmates at the time of the uprising
at Attica.

The Commission observes:

. • • These conditions were a major factor in the p e r 
vasive discontent of those who awaited parole with eagerness
despite what they knew to be the frustrations.
Even a
substantial improvement in conditions inside the prison
walls will not alleviate anxiety and frustration among
inmates unless the system which opens the gates not only
is--but appears to be--equitable (1972:101).

Inmate discussion groups.

Prior to the uprising,

there was a

growing tendency for inmates in the exercise yards to get together in
groups and discuss their problems.

In addition, an inmate-instructed

sociology class was organized in the p r ison’s school.

Although the

class was developed for the purpose of discussing a wide range of socio
logical topics, it became a forum for the interchange of information
about what was happening in the prison and among the different g r o u p s .
Discussions turned to analyses of general prison conditions, the status
and rights of prisoners in the institutions and society, and the various
techniques of protest to effect change in society.

No program for

action was ever developed by the class, however, and the class was
recessed at the time of the riot.

Reforms Sought
Russell G. Oswald, who became Commissioner of the N e w York State
Department of Correctional Services in January, 1971, inherited the
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responsibility of restructuring the entire prison system in New York.
This included converting the penal system from a purely custodial to a
rehabilitative system.

As Oswald put it, his job "was

‘to give the

whole system a new flavor1" (The Official Report, 1972:20).

Giving

priority to those areas which had already coma under attack in the
courts, Oswald*s first reforms granted:
o o o mail and visiting privileges to inmates* coramonlaw spouses; revised censorship procedures to permit inmates
to correspond with attorneys and public officials; and
allowed greater accessibility of news media to prisons to
increase public knowledge of conditions (The Official
Re p o r t , 1972:131).
In July, 1971, a group of five inmates, who called themselves
the ''Attica Liberation Faction" and claimed to represent all races and
social segments of the prison, sent Commissioner Oswald a letter con
taining a manifesto setting forth a series of demands.

These demands

centered largely on improving conditions of imprisonment.

More

specifically, they demanded:
. . . legal representation before the Parole Board;
improvement in medical care, visiting facilities, food
and sanitary conditions in the mess hall, personal hygiene,
clothing, recreational facilities, and working con
ditions in the shops, a uniform set of rules in all
prisons, adjustment of commissary prices; and "an end
to the segregation of prisoners from the mainline
population because of their political beliefs" (The
Official R e p o r t , 1972:134).
The inmates emphasized in their letter that they were trying to
present demands in a democratic fashion and wanted Oswald to be aware
of their needs, as well as the need for prison reform.

Other letters

followed, but promised that the inmates would continue to strive for
*£7

prison reform in a democratic fashion.

Commissioner Oswald responded

by assuring the inmates that changes had been made and would continue
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to be made.

But he also acknowledged that complete change takes time.

In spite of their peaceful lobbying attempt, inmates were unsuccessful
in effecting "such simple changes as clean trays from which to eat In

the mess halls, or more than one shower a week during hot summer
months1' (The Official Report, 1972:138).

Thus, tensions at Attica con

tinued to mount and culminated in the riot on September 9.
the riot, guards and inmates alike commented:

Following

’"The tension was so

thick around here you could cut it with a knife*" (The Official R e port,
1972:141).

All that was needed was a spark to set it off.

ATTICA DURING THE RIOT

The Spark:

Wednesday, September 8, 1971

The initial disruption came on Wednesday, September 8, in
reaction to an incident In A yard which provoked anger and resentment
among inmates in two companies in A block.

Several correction officers

observed what they thought was a fight between two inmates when, in
actuality, the inmates were merely engaging in friendly horseplay.
When the inmates ignored instructions to stop what they were doing, two
of the officers went across the yard to summon them.

The refusal of

one of the inmates to leave the yard led to an unusually intense con
frontation between officers and inmates, during which a lieutenant was
struck by an inmate.

Surrounded by a large group of inmates, the

officers were forced to back down and leave the yard.

That evening,

the two inmates who had engaged in horseplay were removed from their
cells and taken to housing block Z (HBZ),^ or "box" as it is commonly
k?'
^Housing block Z is a special disciplinary housing unit for
troublesome inmates.
In effect, it is a prison within a prison.
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called in prison jargon.

This precipitated angry name-calling, hurling

of objects from cells, and vows of revenge along the two galleries.
Many inmates ve~e convinced
the way to HBZ

(though

that

in fact they were

the two inmates were beaten on
not) even though officers in

the yard that afternoon had promised them that this would not occur.
The Commission discovered that:
. . o There is
a widespread belief among inmates at Attica
that when a man is
taken to the box, especially if at night,
he is brutally beaten on the way, in the elevator going up to
HBZ, and in the segregation center itself.
Because inmates
have no way to verify the facts, rumor becomes a dominant
fact of life in prison, and when the rumors are repeated
often enough, they are believed (1972:149).
Hans Toch makes the observation that "persons who tend to interpret
situations as threatening, or goading, or challenging, or overpowering
can turn harmless encounters into duals, purges, struggles for survival,
or violent escapes" (1969:189).

The Explosion:

Thursday, September 9

The following morning, uneasiness lingered on in Five Company,
one of the two companies from which the two inmates had been removed
the previous evening to segregation.

This company of forty inmates was

used as a repository for men considered to be troublemakers.

The

members of Five Company included numerous men with long disciplinary
histories and an unusual concentration of what the Commission referred
to as "that new breed of inmate:

young, politically active and aware,

avowedly defiant in thought and rhetoric" (1972:151) .
An inmate who had been locked in his cell for throwing a full
can of soup at an officer the previous evening was released from his
call by fellow inmates.

A decision was made to return Five Company to
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their cells after breakfast and, when the inmate was again confined to
his cell, to release the rest of the company to the exercise yard.

The

door to the yard was locked and a lieutenant, who had assured the
inmates the day before that nobody would be beaten, approached the
company as it was lined up in A tunnel awaiting word as to T^hy the
door to the exercise yard was locked.

As he reached the column of

inmates, he was attacked before he had a chance to speak, and the
uprising was underway.
Three correction officers came to the lieutenant's rescue, but
were immediately attacked by the inmates.

Relieving one of the

officers of his keys, the inmates began opening cell doors on A block
and freeing fellow-prisoners.

Approximately 100 prisoners were already

in the yard and, w hen they heard the commotion, succeeded in joining
the rioting inmates by overpowering two officers and unlocking the door
separating the yard and tunnel.

The inmates then began equipping them

selves with football helmets, baseball bats, rakes, pipes, sticks, and
an assortment of homemade weapons.

The Riot Spreads
After the initial outburst of chaotic violence, the inmates
regrouped and set upon the locked gate at Times Square, which separated
A block from the rest of the institution.

The gate gave way allowing

the rioters access to the center square and the keys which unlocked the
gates to the B, C, and D blocks.

From Times Square, inmates spread

throughout the prison with little resistence, attacking officers,
taking hostages, and destroying property.

As the rebellion spread,

other inmates were urged to go to D yard where the riot was to
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culminate.

Some inmates joined actively, but the majority tried to

escape to secure areas, or were simply caught up in the tide.
gallery,

On one

inmates took a vote to determine whether or not they should

join the rioters.

Only three voted to go to the yard.

However, the

vote was ignored, and armed inmates surrounded them and ordered them
to D yardo
A group of rebellious inmates also broke into E block which
housed selected inmates who were part of an experimental DVR (Department
of Vocational Rehabilitation) program.

Many of these inmates were

invalids or otherwise suffered from physical or emotional handicaps.
Nevertheless, they were moved through the tunnels to D yard along with
the other inmates.
The authorities were slow in responding, due largely to the
absence of a riot control plan, the lack of available manpower, and an
antiquated communications system.

Connected with other parts of the

prison only by single-line telephones, those officials in the a d 
ministration building could not immediately appreciate the full extent
of the trouble nor summon help.

A steam whistle located in the power

house was the only means of sounding a general a l a r m h o w e v e r ,

it was

not sounded until approximately one-half hour afcer the riot began.
Within two hours, the inmates had control of four cell blocks
and all of the yards and tunnels, and 1,281 inmates had gathered in D
yard with over forty hostages.^

The Commission reports that "32 Attica

employees were injured during the uprising on September 9" (1972:187).
______________ ______

,zfj

^During the four-days, a total of fifty persons,
civilian employees, were taken hostage by the inmates.

including
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Seven correction officers were injured seriously enough to require
hospitalization and were released by their captors.

One of them was

struck on the head when inmates first broke into Tines Square and later
died as a result of his injuries.

Numerous inmates who had resisted or

gotten in the way of the rioters were also injured.

Rudimentary Inmate Society
During the early hours of the riot,

leaders of various factions

in the prison were vying for authority or, as one inmate put it, "'play
ing king of the mountain'11 (The Official R e port, 1972:198).

Eventually,

however, a self-professed inmate lawyer emerged as a leader and started
issuing instructions and urging the inmates to pull themselves together.
Shortly thereafter, inmate spokesmen began calling for the presentation
of demands for reform.

One of them laid down some ground rules, e.g.,

hostages were not to be harmed, the use of drugs was forbidden, h o m o 
sexual relations were outlawed, fighting among inmates was prohibited,
etc.
Another development during the early stages of the riot was the
formation of a unified internal police force or security guard among
the inmates.

One of the primary functions of the security guards was

to keep the nearly

1,300 inmates within the confines of D yard.

the riot, a number

of inmates testified that they would h a v e left

yard if it had been possible to do so.

After
the

The inmate security force also

broke up fights between inmates, organized a fire detail to put out
fires they had set

earlier, collected and stockpiled weapons, and even

set to work making

new weapons.

-x?
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Immediate Demands Drawn Up
After the initial rhetoric had subsided in the yard, a small
group of inmates began drafting a list of immediate demands.

There

were only six demands at first and these were addressed to President
Nixon and Governor Rockefeller.

The demands included:

(i) complete

amnesty for the rioters; (2 ) speedy and safe transportation to a nonimperialistic country;

(3) intervention by the federal government; (k)

the reconstruction of Attica by inmates or under the supervision of
inmates; (5) negotiation through a group of outside observers; and (6)
the conduct of all communication within the inmates* domain.

Negotiations Develop
The tradition in correctional institutions is not to negotiate
with inmates holding hostages.

Based on this tradition, the staff at

Attica expected that the prison would be retaken immediately, regardless
of the danger involved.

However, thinking that he could reach a

peaceful solution, Commissioner Oswald decided to negotiate with an
informally elected inmate committee.
planned— they just developed.

The negotiations were not

When the Commissioner first arrived at

Attica, the police were not prepared to retake the prison,

B y the time

sufficient assault forces had been summoned, the negotiations were
under way and the Commissioner, reluctant to undertake any action which
would imperil lives, chose to continue the talks.

Before the day was

over, Oswald was to depart from other long accepted norms.

For

instance, he decided to admit newsmen and television cameras to D yard,
and to negotiate with the inmates through an observers* committee as
the inmates had demanded.
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Commissioner Oswald had little control over who became an obser
ver, and many observers merely invited themselves.

The observers were

placed in the position of acting as intermediaries between the inmates
and the state.

The observers* committee was not constituted to serve a

mediation function, however.

It was unwieldy in number— consisting of

over thirty members— and was characterized by marked ideological dif
ferences,

Some observers were affiliated with organizations which were

openly identified with inmates and their demands.

Others identified

with the administration and were largely unsympathetic to inmate com
plaints.

Still others "were more concerned with bringing about a

peaceful solution on any terms than with seeing the uprising become a
catalyst for penal reform" (The Official R e port, 1972:235).
When Oswald first entered D yard, he was immediately presented
with a number of preconditions which inmates demanded be met before they
would begin to negotiate.
and radios be provided.
hesitation,

For example, they demanded that food, water,
Oswald acceded to each of these demands without

"Before leaving the yard, Oswald was presented with a new

set of 15 ’Practical Proposals*

222).

(The Official R e p o r t , 1972:

The proposals (demands) were prepared at the suggestion of one of

the outside observers who considered the list of immediate demands
impractical.

According to the Commission, "the new proposals dealt with

specific internal conditions which had long been among the grievances
voiced b y inmates;

wages, religious freedom, censorships parole,

medical care, food, education, and recreation" (1972:222)*

In respond

ing to the pronosals, Oswald let it be known that he agreed in -principle
with most of them since they were consistent with his own plans for
prison reform, b :
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On Friday, September 10, a group of observers entered D yard to
obtain a complete list of inmate demands.

After gathering their

impressions of the inmate demands, the observers set to work developing
a list of proposed penal reform measures which they hoped the state and
inmates would accept.
three proposals.^

Oswald agreed to twenty-eight of the thirty-

The Commission comments that "many of the principles

embodied in the 28 Points were major advances in penal reform" (1972:
257).
Saturday evening, the observers entered D yard to discuss the
twenty-eight points with the inmates.

Much to their disappointment,

however, the inmates attacked the proposals as trickery, stating that
they were Inadequate and that criminal amnesty, which Oswald did not
agree to, was a necessity if negotiations were to continue.

With the

rejection of the proposals, the negotiations were, in effect, dead.
The observers placed their remaining hopes in a plea to Governor
Rockefeller to come to Attica.

Some of the observers felt that the

Governor's presence would not only buy time, but would lend credibility
to the twenty-eight proposals by showing that the state was genuinely
concerned.

Believing that no purpose would be served b y his appearance,

the Governor refused.

After the inmates rejected a last minute appeal

on Monday morning to accept the twenty-eight proposals, Oswald, with
the Governor's concurrence, ordered the assault.

?A verbatim listing of the reform, measures proposed by the
observers to Commissioner Oswald and the twenty-eight to which he
agreed is contained in Appendix B of this study.
■
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Sensing that, an assault was imminent, inmates led eight hostages,
blindfolded and their hands bound, to the A and 3 catwalks where they
were fully visible to members of the assault force.

Each of the hostages

was held by at least one inmate, most with knives at their throats or
torsos.

Also, a number of the hostages in the yard were held with knives

at their throats.

At 9 : ^ A.M., September 13* the electricity in the

prison was shut off and, at 9:^-6 A.M., a National Guard helicopter
o
dropped CS gas on Times Square where the hostages were standing. As
the gas descended, inmates on the catwalks began to move downward,
pulling hostages with them.

After the first downward motion, state

troopers commenced firing.^

The' Toll
Although the shooting lasted only six minutes, the assault took
the following toll:

. . . 10 hostages and 29 inmates were dead or dying of
bullet wounds inflicted by the authorities; 3 hostages and
85 inmates had suffered non-lethal gunshot wounds, and one
trooper . . . suffered leg and shoulder wounds from shotguns
fired by troopers trying to protect him. No hostages were
killed by inmates on September 13 • • • •
Almost 10 percent of all persons in the yard were struck
by bullets or shotgun pellets, and 13 of the 38 hostages were

CS (OrthoChI orobenzalmatononitrile) is an irritant chemical
agent which was adopted by the Army in 1959* A white crystalline pow
der, it is generally dispensed as an aerosol from burning or bursting
type grenades, or from bulk irritant agent dispersers.
It is immedi
ately effective and physically, but temporarily, incapacitating.
% t a t e troopers had been instructed to fire only at inmates
engaged in overt, hostile acts against hostages and troopers.
However,
there was no explanation of what constituted a^hostile act, and each
trooper was left to use his own discretion in determining whether a
situation warranted the use of firepower. .

killed or wounded by the gunfire (The Official Report,
1972:373-374) .
Four of the hostages on the catwalks, two of whom were killed by gun
fire, suffered neck or throat lacerations.

Shortly after the assault,

the two surviving hostages reported to authorities "that they heard the
gunfire a split second before they felt the knives across their throats"
(The Official R e p o r t , 1972:377-378).

Use of Excessive Force
State police participating in the assault used the weapons
available to them.

For the most part, these included high-powered

rifles with telescopic sights, sidearms
„12-guage shotguns.

(.38 caliber pistols), and

While the rifles and handguns were considered

appropriate for their intended use in the assault, the shotguns, loaded
with "00" buckshot p e l l e t s ^ which spread in flight and hit unintended
targets, created a high risk of injury and death to unresisting inmates
and hostages.
Individual members of the assault force provided detailed,
explanations of hostile or threatening inmate activity which, they
claimed, occasioned their fire.

However, other accounts and objective

evidence--i^e*, photographs--were inconsistent with many of the explana
tions offered by the assault forces.

From an analysis of all of the

available evidence, the Commission concluded that there was much unneces
sary shooting.

Troopers shot into tents, trenches, and barricades w i t h 

out looking first.
:

:—

In addition, even where the firing m ay have been
■

.

^ IOhqqh buckshot cartridges contain nine or twelve pellets, each
of which is approximately 0.33 inch in diameter and a potentially lethal
missile.
:
:
.
h
7
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jastirled--as in the case of a state police lieutenant assaulted by an
inmate in D yard--the use of shotguns loaded with buckshot in the
heavily populated areas of D yard led to the killing and wounding of
hostages and of inmates who were not engaged in any hostile activity
(1972:335).

ATTICA AFTER THE RIOT
Credibility Gap
The aftermath of the riot began with a credibility gap created
whe n prison officials, without any authoritative verification, informed
the public what had happened on the morning of September 13.

Relying

on exaggerated accounts of troopers and correction officers, Attica
officials announced that several hostages had died of slit throats and
that others had been stabbed and beaten with clubs and pipes.

Although

some of the dead hostages bore the marks of beatings, autopsy findings
revealed that all had died of gunshot wounds.

The first reaction of

some officials was to search for ways to dispute or discredit the
autopsy reports.

They even went so far as to accuse the medical

examiner of being a ’"radical left-winger1" (The Official R e p o r t , 1972:
460).

Once it had been established that all nine hostages died from

the gunfire of peace officers during the assault, Oswald confirmed the
findings to newsmen.

Treatment of the Wounded
The authorities were well aware that the assault might result
in a large number of casualties.

However, they failed to make adequate

provision in advance for the evacuation and treatment of the wounded.

When the shooting stopped, there were oyer 1 2 0 dead and wounded inmates
and hostages.

Yet there were only ten medical personnel inside the

walls, and only two of them were doctors.

A National Guard unit carable

of evacuating casualties and rendering immediate first aid had been
mobilised, but had not yet reached the facility when the shooting
stopped.

Doctors at local hospitals, who possessed the necessary exper

tise, professional assistants, and equipment to perform emergency
surgery, were not asked to come to Attica until after the assault.

In

short, no one assumed responsibility for making the necessary medical
arrangements.

Reprisals
State officials expected physical reprisals against inmates in
the aftermath of the riot, but did nothing to prevent them.

A federal

court order consented to by Commissioner Oswald, as well as the twentyeight proposals to which he agreed, contained provisions against repri
sals.

Nevertheless, correction officers and, to a lesser extent, state

troopers and sheriffs* deputies engaged in frequent and systematic acts
of retribution against inmates.
Physical reprisals, accompanied by verbal abuses, began as
inmates were moved out of D yard to be stripped and searched, continued
as the inmates were run through a gauntlet to cells in A block, and did
not subside even after they were locked in their cells.

Reprisals were

especially severe in HBZ, where suspected leaders of the uprising were
taken.

Eight days after the assault, doctors assigned to make a

physical inventory reported finding bruises, lacerations, and broken
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bones among forty-five percent of the inmates who had been in D yard
(The Official R e p o r t , 1972:441).

Prison Reforms Instituted
In the months following the riot, Attica underwent many changes.
Some of the reforms demanded by the inmates in D yard were instituted,
others were not.

After the uprising, the Commission quoted Oswald as

saying "that he did not consider himself bound by the twenty-eight points,
since the inmates had not released the hostages unharmed.

However, he

said he would not be deterred from continuing his plans for improvement s'*
(1972:467).

Although there were changes yet to come whe n the Commission

completed its report, some of the changes which had already been
implemented are enumerated in the following paragraphs.
The officer-inmate ratio improved with the reduction of the
inmate p o p u l a t i o n ^ and the hiring of new correction officers, including
twenty black and Spanish-speaking officers.
were also added to the staff.

A number of female nurses

A shipment of new, well-fitting light

weight olive-green summer clothing was distributed to the inmates to
replace the drab prison uniforms.

New gun towers were constructed in

the yards to improve physical security.

A n ew inmate rule book was in

the process o f being prepared at the time the Commission m a d e its report.
N e w internal communications equipment was on order to replace outmoded
equipment.

A new commissary had been built and, when opened, would

reportedly offer soft drinks for the first time.
*

■^^Within nine days after the uprising ended, 947 inmates, sixtyfive percent of than black, were transferred to other prisons. When the
Commission last visited Attica in August, 1972, the population was 1,308*

33

Major changes ware made in the visiting rules at Attica.
Inmates could now receive visits from almost anyone without obtaining
prior approval.

ried inmateso

Woman, both married and single, visit married or unmar
Former inmates may now visit after gaining the approval

of the superintendent and, if applicable, their parole officer.
is no longer any restriction on the frequency of visits.

There

The screen in

the visiting room has been removed and inmates may embrace their visitors
at the beginning and end of visits, and hold hands during the visit.
Visiting children may sit with inmates during visits.

Finally, inmates

may examine photographs and pass notes, provided they are first read by
the officer in charge.
Inmates are now permitted to go to the yard for evening
recreation until dark two evenings per week.

Black and white television

sets in the yards were replaced with color sets.
take two showers per week instead of one.

Inmates are allowed to

Telephone booths were installed

for use by inmates to make one collect call per month.

The new superin

tendent granted inmates approval to leave lights and cell radios turned
on all night.

Inmates now receive a gratuitous issue of toilet articles,

to include toothbrushes, toothpaste, razors, blades, etc.

Prior to the

uprising, visits to the commissary were scheduled in the order of
inmates' admission to the prison.
according to job assignments.

Inmates now go to the commissary

A liaison committee was elected by the

inmates to establish a formal channel of communication with the adminis
tration concerning grievances and common problems.
A number of changes were also made in job assignment procedures.
Prior to the riot, inmates were assigned jobs based primarily on two
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criteria— job vacancies and the inmates* skills and preferences.

How

ever, inmates were often unaware of the vacancies that existed and were
therefore unable to express a preference.

Even the job assignment board

did not always have current information on job vacancies.

The assignment

board is now kept abreast of job openings, arid all inmates are inter
viewed by the board before being placed.
Inmates can now visit the library two days a week.

They have

also been given access to the Wyoming County Library which absorbs the
mailing costs of books sent to inmates.

The department of correctional

services has started circulating "a list of acceptable literature con
taining 360 periodicals, including Black Scholar, Playboy, and the
Amsterdam.News, and riO books on black studies" (The Official Report,
1972:57-58).

Publications on the approved list are passed on to the

inmates without review.

As a result of a federal grant to the depart

ment of correctional services, the law library collection was updated
and expanded.
Inmates* correspondence rights were broadened.

F or example,

the new rules require only that a correspondent be willing to receive
mail from an inmate and that the permission of the superintendent be
obtained in those cases where an inmate wishes to correspond with
"unrelated minors, married women, co-defendents, inmates in other
institutions, and parolees" (The Official Report, 1972:60-61),

SUMMARY
The uprising at Attica has major significance in any study of
prison violence because it provides considerable insight into what
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occurs before, during, and after a major prison disturbance.

A review

of the literature on prison riots indicates that many of the conditions
that existed at Attica exist to a greater'or lesser extent in other
correctional institutions.

Therefore, some of the lessons learned at .

Attica help to explain why riots occur in other prisons and, in this
instance, are much more fully documented.
A society in microcosm, Attica magnifies the forces and emotions
of the inmate society, as well as the larger society.

Many of its

inmates, for example, came to the institution bitter and angry as the
result of their experiences in the ghetto streets and were therefore
little different than those who walked the streets as free men.

For the

most part, the so-called new inmate was. shaped by the same experiences,
expectations, and frustrations that culminated in the urban ghetto dis
turbances of the I960*s.
Contrary to popular views, the Attica uprising was not planned
or organized in advance by a group of militant inmates.

Rather, it

began as a spontaneous burst of violent anger and was the product of
frustrated hopes and unfulfilled expectations after efforts to bring
about peaceful change had failed.

While there was racial discrimination

and considerable racial tension within the walls, the disturbance was
not a race riot.

Blacks and whites remained solidified.

In the following chapter, some fundamental causes of prison riots
will be analyzed in detail.

Also, some of the problems involved in

determining a causal relationship between prison violence a n d prison
reform will be considered, followed by a presentation of some of the
major reforms that have arisen as a result of contemporary prison riots.

Chapter 5

AN ANALYSIS OF THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES
OF PRISON VIOLENCE
It is evident in the preceding chapters that the exact causes of
prison riots and disturbances are sometimes difficult to determine pre
cisely.

This is partially because, as with other upheavals in social

structure, there is no single cause.

Rather, the causes are exceedingly

complex and emerge from a welter of factors which differ somewhat in
their importance from one institution to another.

The riots themselves

are complex phenomena for which simple explanations do not exist.
Prison riots resemble a jig-saw puzzle of many and varied
pieces.

Imagine, if you will, spread before you some 500 or 600 small

pieces, awaiting your experienced hand to fit them together.

The

finished picture— in this case a four-walled institution housing several
thousand men— is clear in your mind.

This same picture, however, cannot

be complete, nor the puzzle solved, until every single piece is con
sidered

in relation to the whole.

equal importance to

Large or small, each piece is

successful completion of the picture.

the case of prison riots.

So it

of
Is in

Only when all pieces are considered together

can an understanding of why riots occur be reached.

SOME THEORIES ON THE CAUSES OF PRISON RIOTS

Authorities in the fields of penology ^and criminology have
advanced a number of theories which purport to explain the causes of
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prison riots.

Ruth Cavan (1962), for example, points out that riots,

when they do occur, are likely to coma in series.

According to this

contagion theory, "a riot in one prison is likely to be followed by a
series of riots in other prisons’* (Cavan, 1962:435).

Frank Flynn (1953:

74) hypothesizes that rumors of substantial.'concessions gained by riots
spread from institution to institution.

Wallack (1953:7), on the other

hand, believes that the basic cause of prison riots lies almost wholly
within the social body.

"They are caused," he says,

"because our

citizens do not demand nor are they willing with their present outlook
to pay the cost of a modern, humane penal system" (1953:8).

In his

book, The Prison Community, Donald Clemmer theorizes that prison riots
are usually "caused by a long series of Abuses,* which, over a long
period of time, are brought to the attention of the inmate body by
leaders" (1958:148).
In assessing twenty-four disorders in twenty-three cities that
took place during the summer of 1967, the National Advisory Commission
on Civil Disorders

(1968) found that disorders did not erupt as a result

of a single triggering or precipitating incident.

Instead, they were

generated out of an increasingly disturbed social atmosphere, in which
a series of tension-heightening incidents over a period of weeks or
months b e c a m e 'linked in the minds of many persons in the Negro com
munity with a reservoir of underlying grievances.

This conclusion is

particularly relevant in assessing and understanding the causes of
prison violence.

To elaborate further, the National Commission on the

Causes and Prevention o f Violence states:
Violence has usually been the lava, flowing from the top
of a volcano fed by deeper fires of social dislocation and
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injustice, it has not been stopped solely by capping the top,
but has usually subsided when our political and social
institutions have managed to make the adjustments necessary
to cool the fires below (1969:17).
Inmate demands, which are frequently included among the under
lying causes of prison riots, are many and varied.

Some typical

demands, mentioned by both Flynn (1953) and Cavan (1962), include such
things as better food, removal of unpopular personnel, cessation of
harsh disciplinary practices, and better parole systems.

Flynn also

mentions demands for more adequate medical facilities, segregation of
sex offenders, and more recreation.

Lloyd Ohlin (1956) points out that

the demands of inmates are often made up after riots have started.

He

feels they show "little conscious awareness of the underlying causes,
of tension and unrest in the institutional community" (1956 :24) .

SOME BASIC CAUSES OF PRISON RIOTS— PAST AND PRESENT

Stimulated by the mass violence that occurred in American pri
sons during the early 1950*s, the American Prison Association (hereafter
referred to as the American Correctional Association) released a study
of the causes and preventive measures and methods of controlling prison
riots and disturbances in June, 1953.

The beginning of a new series of

prison riots-and disturbances in 1968 prompted the Association to revise
its official position paper in 1970.

Although the Association identified

some fundamental causes of prison riots in both papers, it prefaced its
remarks in the original paper by stating:
The immediate causes given out for a prison riot are usually
only symptoms of more basic causes.
Bad food usually means
N
inadequate budgets reflected in insufficient supplies, poor
equipment, poor personnel and, often, inept management. M is
treatment of prisoners, or lax discipline, usually has behind

9^

it untrained employees and unwise or inexperienced management
(A Statement Concerning Causes? Preventive Measures, and Methods
of Controlling Prison Riots and Disturbances, 1953'!)•
A comparison of the basic causes identified by the Association
in its two papers is shown in Table I below.

TABLE I
A Comparison of the Causes of Prison Riots
Past and Present

Causes as reported in 1953

Causes as reported in 1970

Inadequate Financial Support

Inadequate Finances

Sub-standard Personnel

Inept Management

Enforced Idleness

Insufficient Constructive,
Meaningful Activity-

Lack of Professional Leadership
and Professional Programs
Excessive Size and Overcrowding
of Institutions
Sentencing Practices
Political Domination and
Motivation of Management

Inadequate Personnel Practices
Inadequate Facilities
Inequities and Complexities in
the Criminal Justice System
Unnatural Institutional Environment
Antisocial Characteristics of Inmates
Insufficient Legitimate Rewards
Basic Social Attitudes
Unrest in the Larger Community
Lack of Meaningful Rewards

Sources:

American Prison Association Committee on Riots, 1953*7;
American Correctional Association Committee on Riots and
Disturbances, 1970:1.
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The causes enumerated in Table I are by no means all-inclusive,
and some of them overlap.

For the sake of convenience and discussion,

these causes will be divided into three basic categories— general
causes, internal causes, and external causes.

Also, attention will be

centered primarily on the causes in the revised list, for it is felt
that they have greater contemporary relevance.

These causes are shown

under their respective headings in Table II below.

TABLE II
Causes of Contemporary Prison Riots by Category

Gen eral Causes

Unnatural institutional
environment

Characteristics of the
inmate population

Internal causes

External causes

Poor Management

Basic Social Attitudes

'

Inadequate Personnel Practices

Unrest in the Larger Community

Inadequate Facilities

Inadequate Finances

Insuffic ient Constructive,
Meaningful Activity

Inequities and Complexities in the
Criminal Justice System

Insufficient Rewards

Lack of Meaningful Rewards

General Causes
Unnatural institutional environment.

The Executive Director of

the American Correctional Association was quoted in a newspaper article
as saying:

"Zoos nowadays strive for a more natural habitat for their
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animals and prisons should do the same for inmatesw (The Leavenworth
T i m e s , August 14, 1 9 7 3 :12A).

Gut off from the larger society by

physical barriers, a prison is an unnatural environment which almost
invariably contributes to the emotional stress of those incarcerated.
This unnatural environment is best described by Erving Goffman in his
discussion of the characteristics of total institutions:
First, all aspects of life are conducted in the same
place and under the same single authority.
Second, each
phase of the m e m b e r 's daily activity is carried on in the
immediate company of a large batch of others, all of whom
are treated alike and required to do the same thing together.
Third, all phases of the day's activities are tightly
scheduled, with one activity leading at a prearranged
time into the next, the whole sequence of activities
being imposed from above by a system of explicit formal
rulings and a body of officials.
Finally, the various
enforced activities are brought together into a single
rational plan purportedly designed to fulfill the official
aims of the institution (1961:6).
The removal of man from society and the attendant loss of freedom and
independence, as well as the strict routine of everyday living, and the
loss of privacy, result in a depersonalized human environment.

It is

not difficult to imagine that in certain inmates the combined deper
sonalization of h uman and physical environment can result in emotional
stresses which seek release, and sometimes this release takes the form
of violence.

Characteristics of the inmate population.

The characteristics

of the inmate population must not be overlooked as a basic causa of
riots and disturbances in correctional institutions.

The correctional

institutions in the United States are heavily populated with inmates
from the lower socio-economic strata of society.

'*They are over

whelmingly the poor, the black and the young," say Bagdikian and Dash
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(1972:12).

Although nonwhites in America are approximately thirteen

percent of the total population, they are forty to fifty percent of
the prison population (Bagdikian and Dash, 1972:152).

Inmates are

frequently the products of broken homes, poorly educated, unskilled,
and have unstable work records.

Also, they are likely to have a prior

criminal record,^ low self-esteem, and lack meaningful goals in life.
Platerial failure is the most common denominator of offenders1' (Causes,
Preventive Measures, and Methods of Controlling Riots and Disturbances
in Correctional Institutions, 1970:3).
As mentioned previously in this paper, the N e w Y o r k State
Special Commission on Attica concluded that the inmates in that facility
were part of a new breed.

According to Bagdikian and Dash,

"the most

noticeable new kind of prisoner in the United States is the black
militant" (1972:153).

Black militants frequently refer to themselves

as political prisoners rather than as criminals.

They see themselves

as martyrs of the cause of racial justice and social equality.

Some of

those who make news for allegedly having committed certain crimes, such
as George Jackson and Angela Davis, stir sympathy among less newsworthy
convicts.

Black militants act to organize their fellow i n m ates.

A

polarization along racial lines gives modern prison riots deeper under
currents as in the case of race riots that occur outside prison.
Although the vast majority of prisoners are poor, a number of
affluent middle-class Americans have found their w a y into prisons as a

^At the beginning of 1971, approximately fifty-six percent of
all inmates incarcerated in N ew York State correctional institutions
alone had served prison terms before (The Official R e p o r t , 1972:16).
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result of civil protest, drug offenses, draft evasion, etc.
class Americans expect to be treated civilly and justly.

Middle-

"When con

fronted with primitive prison conditions, cruelty and capricious
handling, they are not so likely as a ghetto veteran to accept it as
the inevitable harshness of a harsh world” (Bagdikian and Dash, 1972:
l60).

Some middle-class prisoners are committed to varying degrees of

social reform or revolution, and have attempted to dramatize prison
conditions with strikes, fasts, and passive resistence.
Prison riots may occur because there are more hardened criminals
in prison in proportion to the number convicted of a crime.

In the

past, the retributive and deterrent aspects of punishment were pre
dominant factors in sentencing a convicted criminal to prison.

Today,

some judges prefer to avoid incarcerating first-time offenders if they
can possibly do so.

Probation attempts to keep the less hardened

criminal out of prison, and parole, in some cases, offers the prisoner
an incentive for good conduct and thus a shorter term.

With the in

creasing use of probation and parole, the percentage of "hardcore”
offenders who are prone to violence will increase.

"Hardened criminals

with long prison records and long sentences are inclined to feel that
they have little to lose by starting a disturbance or participating
in a riot” (Leinwand, 1 9 7 2 : ^ ) .

Internal Causes
Poor management.

There is an old saying that prisons operate

the way the prisoners want them to operate.

Despite this partial truth,

a prison, as with any other social institution, must have competent,
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professional management if it is to operate successfully.

Some of the

symptoms of poor management practices which may precipitate a riot or
d is t urbane e ar e :
. . . Vague lines of authority and administrative respon
sibility, absence of clearly defined and easily understood
rules and regulations, poor communications, partiality in
dealing with inmates and staff, and indecisive action on
legitimate grievances (Causes, Preventive Measures, and
Methods of Controlling Riots and Disturbances in Cor
rectional Institutions, 1970:3-4).
Vague lines of authority and administrative responsibility are
a basic symptom of poor administration and can result in staff conflicts,
inefficient management of the correctional institution, a lack of credi
bility in the administrator's ability, and, above all,
tions and hostility.

inmate frustra

The effective correctional administrator must not

only develop clearly defined lines of authority and administrative
responsibility, he must also insure that inmates and staff understand
and follow the chain of command (Causes, Preventive M e a s u r e s , and
Methods of Controlling Riots and Disturbances in Correctional
Institutions, 1970:4).
The lack of a well-defined chain of command has been one of the
outstanding characteristics of prisons in which major disturbances have
occurred.

To gain the support of his staff and the cooperation of the

inmates, the correctional administrator must demonstrate professional
competence as an organizer and leader.

A correctional institution that

is poorly organized and administered is likely to create disharmony
among both staff and inmates.

As the American Correctional Association

comments in it3 report:
. . . Discord between administrative and line personnel
within a correctional institution, . . . , will diminish the
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effectiveness of treatment programs as well as increase the
level of emotional stress and discontentment among the inmate
population (1970:4).
Either of these results can strengthen the power base of inmate dissi
dents and precipitate a riot within the correctional institution.
Poor communications within the correctional institution is
another indication of poor management.

Several writers point out that

communications between staff and inmates are likely to be poor.

Erving

Goffman, discussing total institutions in general, says:
In total institutions there is a basic split between a
large managed group . . . and a small supervisory staff . . . .
Each grouping tends to conceive of the other in terms of
narrow hostile stereotypes, staff often seeing inmates as
bitter, secretive, and untrustworthy, while inmates often
see staff as condescending, highhanded, and mea n (1961:7).
The American Correctional A ssociation’s Committee on Riots
recommends that a concerted effort be made to insure that staff and
inmates alike are kept informed of matters affecting their welfare.

It

is also important that the prisoners know from official sources, and
not from rumors, what the management is doing or planning which affects
their welfare.

To accomplish this, it is essential that open channels

of communication, both formal and informal, exist between the cor
rectional administrator and his staff, between the staff and inmates,
and between correctional administrators and inmates.

Staff and inmates

are likely to have a higher state of morale and better working
relations if they are kept informed

(Causes, Preventive Measures, and

Methods of Controlling Riots and Disturbances in Correctional
Institutions, 1970:4)*
The American Correctional Association says ,rit is important
that the correctional administrator communicate to the staff and to the

101
inmates his understanding of their needs and their areas of. concern or
grievances" (1970:4).

Whan, administrative action is warranted,

it

should be taken as quickly as possible and the individuals concerned
notified.

In those cases where no action is merited, the administrator

should, explain his reasons for not acting.

This is perhaps one of the

errors made by Commissioner Oswald at Attica prior to the riot in
September, 1971.

He had promised that certain reforms would be forth

coming; however, when they failed to materialize according to the
i n m ates 1 expectations, Oswald merely explained that he needed more
time.

Thus, the inmates began to question his credibility.
Both staff and inmates should be properly prepared for forth

coming changes.

Conceivably, riots caused by a change in institutional

policy can be prevented if effective channels of communication exist
between inmates and officials.

When the necessity for the changes are

clearly understood before they are initiated, the likelihood of hostile
reaction to these changes will be significantly reduced.

It will be

recalled that the inmates at Vermont State Prison rioted when lockers
and shelving were removed from their cells without first notifying them
of what was to happen*

Unaware of the basis for the relaxation of

rules and discipline at Attica, correction officers felt that their
authority was being undermined and that their superiors were not sup
porting them.

When it is necessary to make immediate changes, the

correctional administrator should provide explanations at the earliest
possible date to alleviate the anxieties which the changes produce.
Reed Cozart

(1955:122) advocates the use of inmate advisory

councils, primarily as a means of communication.

Since the council's
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prime functions are airing inmate complaints and identifying for all
the factors leading to official decisions, they might prove useful in
easing inmates into a new disciplinary system.
inmate council

Organization of an

(liaison committee) was, of course, one of the innova

tions that came about as a result of the riot at Attica.
Poor administration is frequently reflected in partiality being
shown to members of the staff, as well as to members of the inmate
population.

To show favoritism to either staff or inmates means that

others are, or feel that they are, being discriminated against.

This

discrimination can produce discontentment which may erupt into
rebellious behavior.

Inmates are acutely aware of any unfair treatment

and, naturally, resent it.

According to Sanford Bates:

A warden who rules his prison with fairness, firmness,
justice, and partiality can usually maintain discipline even
among the most incorrigible of men.
But the minute he begins
to show partiality for one inmate over another a vital
element of control slips from his hands (1955:108).
The impartial treatment of inmates and staff m a y not prevent grievances;
however,

if the staff and inmates feel that they are being dealt with

impartially, their grievances are less likely to result in a d i stur
bance within the correctional institution (Causes, Preventive M e a s u r e s ,
and Methods of Controlling Riots and Disturbances in Correctional
Institutions, 1970:7).

Inadequate personnel practices.

The quality of prison manage-^

ment depends heavily on the training, experience, professional
standards, and morale of the personnel who work within the walls.
American Correctional Association observes that:
. . . Many of the causes for riots and disturbances in
correctional institutions stem directly from lack of staff

The
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training and experience, inadequate professional standards,
and conflicts of philosophy and goals of the overall staff
of the institution (1970:8).
To obtain qualified personnel, a vell-structured recruiting and hiring
program is n e e d e d 0

Personnel must be recruited and hired on the basis

of realistic standards and qualifications, and all should be screened
by competitive examinations.

In order to attract quality personnel,

heavy emphasis must be placed on salaries.

Low salary scales result

in low standards of recruitment, heavy turnover rates, and in excessive
temptations to dishonest conduct, such as the acceptance of bribes.
According to an article in The Christian Science M o n i t o r , a breakdown
of the salaries for prison guards shows that "36 percent earn less
than $6,000 a year; 43 percent earn between $6,000 and $8,000 a year;
16 percent earn between $8,000 and $10,000; and 5 percent earn more
than $10,000” (December 17, 1971:7).

The annual starting salary for

correction officers in Missouri is approximately $5,100.

One cor

rection officer, who has worked at the Missouri State Penitentiary
for more than eight years, makes only $5,900 a year.

The low pay

scale has resulted in a high turnover rate in guard personnel ”and a
work force in which half of the employees are working at at least two
j o b s ” (The Kansas City Sta r , August 22, 1 9 7 3 :1B).

In order to obtain

capable men to administer correctional institutions,

it may be

necessary to pay more than the wages such m en could receive in jobs
outside the prisons.
In addition to attracting and retaining qualified personnel,
Cavan (1962) and Bennett
training of personnel.

(1952) indicate the need for in-service
All too frequently, correctional personnel .
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have had little or no prior training in corrections.

The American

Correctional Association explains that Mthis lack of training together
with no prior experience can be a volatile combination in a correctional
institution” (1970:8).

A comprehensive, well-organized training program

is s must at every correctional institution and should include p r e 
assignment training, as well as in-service training.

One*of the lessons

learned at Attica is that the ability to act and react immediately and
appropriately to problems can mean the difference between preventing a
disturbance and quelling a riot.
Staff and line personnel should share the basic goals and philo
sophies of the institution.

There seems, however, to be some disagree

ment among correctional administrators concerning the precise functions
of prisons, particularly as to whether they exist to protect society,
to rehabilitate or reform offenders, or to punish persons who have
broken the law.

According to the Manual of Correctional Standards, the

basic goal of a correctional system is:
. . . to provide public protection by aiding in the
prevention of crime.
The primary methods employed to realize this objective
include control of offenders, correction of offenders,
coordination of programming with other public and private
resources, research and evaluation and participation of
citizens (1966:1).
In theory, the routine at Attica was intended to rehabilitate criminals.
In practice, however, rehabilitation gave w a y to custody, and the p r i 
sons

staff became preoccupied with security.

Whatever the basic goals

or philosophies of a correctional institution may be, they should be
shared by staff and line so as to reduce staff conflict and insure u n i 
formity in the -treatment of inmates.

-k®
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Inadequate facilities,

Many correctional institutions today

are outmoded, poorly designed, and overcrowded.

The irritations and

frustrations which arise from such conditions encourage prisoners to
riot,

Pilots do not always occur in outmoded facilities.

Obviously,

they can and do occur in some of the most modern penal facilities.
For example, a newspaper article in July, 1973, stated:
The Lucasville £ohio]] prison, so new it still has not
been officially accepted by the state from the contractors,
has been the site of successive episodes of trouble.
There have been guard strikes, inmate fasts, inmate
strikes and a multitude of difficulties with the physical
plant that is costing the state $32.5 million (Des Moines
R e g i s t e r , July 25, 1973:7).
In any event, the physical inadequacy of an institution Is a contri
buting factor which can lead to disturbances.
Ruth Cavan

(1962:437-438) cites four chief causes of cor

rectional institution riots which are directly related to institutional
design.

First, many correctional institutions are too large to enable

individual treatment of inmates.

As institutions increase in size, the

ability to control the inmate population is often decreased.
populations require regimentation,
perpetual crises in control.
overcrowded.

Large

impersonal management, and cause

Second, the institutions are frequently

The Missouri State Penitentiary, which opened in 1835,

has a normal capacity of 1,800 inmates,*although it reportedly housed
4,000 inmates at one time

(The Kansas City S t a r , September 13, 1973:3).

Further, the 121-year-old California State Prison at San Quentin, which
has a normal capacity of 2,743 inmates, had an average population of
3,605 inmates in 1969
A g e n c i e s , 1970:4).

(Directory:

Correctional Institutions and

Overcrowding makes it impossible for the prison to
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conduct required activities since space and equipment will generally
be inadequate.

Further, the more congested the conditions under which

inmates must live, the more conducive is the situation to the moral
degeneration and the mass development of frustration and anger.
correctional institutions are outmoded.

Third,

Approximately twenty-five of

the nation's state and federal prisons are over 100 years old; a few
are more than 150 years old
1971:39).

(U.S. News & World R e p o r t , December 27,

Fourth, inmates lack work.

Obviously, they cannot work if

shops and schools are not provided for them.

Insufficient constructive, meaningful activity.

In analyzing

the fundamental causes of prison riots, Austin MacCormick

(1954:24), an

astute observer of prison conditions, cited enforced idleness as the
biggest single factor in prison unrest.

Similarly, the American Prison

Association's Committee on Riots acknowledged that enforced idleness
"is one of the direct causes of the tensions which burst forth in riot
and disorder" (1953:10).

Enforced idleness of able-bodied prisoners is

certainly one of the great anomalies of modern prison administration.
"A successful prison," says the American Correctional Associa
tion,

"must be a prison filled with

'purposeful activity.*

Any comv

promise with this objective will be punctuated with periodic episodes
of

'destructive activity'" (1970:12).

Not only does purposeful activity

provide an alternative for enforced idleness and the resultant rise in
tension, but it helps to relieve the financial burden on the taxpayer.
Constructive programs, for example, can substantially reduce the cost
of prison operations.

More importantly, some programs allow inmates to
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marketable
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prison.

Interesting and satisfying work is a basic factor in maintaining
emotional stability.

Much prison work, however,

is repetitious and

boring, and does not bring with it the satisfactions that come from
performing a socially useful task.

The work is sometimes unskilled,

and poor prisoners, lacking in skills and education to begin with,
leave prison as unprepared to lead honest lives as before entering the
institution.
In a newspaper article, an Inmate at the Federal Penitentiary
at Leavenworth, Kansas, referred to the prisonfs factories as "employers
of ’slave l a b o r ’ and contended that no one can learn a skill in the
factories useable on the outside” (The Kansas City S t a r , August 1,
1973?8 a ).

This statement, though somewhat exaggerated, contains a

certain element of truth.
for example.

Consider the production of license plates,

While this has been a major source of employment for many

inmates during their incarceration, there is little demand for such a
skill outside prison.
The absence of constructive work does not necessarily mean that
hundreds of prisoners are assigned to idle groups.

For the most part,

they may be dispersed about the prison doing maintenance work, making
minor housekeeping repairs,

or doing work in the scattered, greatly

overmanned productive industries.

A t the time of the uprising' at

Attica, approximately sixty percent of the inmates worked a t jobs
related to the maintenance of the prison (The Official R e p o r t , 1972*36)»
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Insufficient rewards.

The lack of a legitimate system of

rewards in a correctional institution can result in a lack of motivation
and a sense of hopelessness and despair.

This, in turn, can result in

a heightening of tension and can turn into a breeding ground for riots
and disturbances.

Constructive program planning should include a

viable system of rewards for inmates who participate in various pro
grams.

Inmates who are otherwise faced with enforced idleness may find

participation in planned treatment programs rewarding in itself.

The

opportunity to continue their education may be a reward to some inmates,
while the opportunity

to learn a useful skill

may be sufficiently

rewarding to others.

"If participation in programs is used as a reward

for good behavior this constructive activity will serve as a stronger
deterrent to disturbances in the institution" (Causes, Preventive
Measures, and Methods of Controlling Riots and Disturbances in Cor
rectional Institutions, 1970:12).

External Causes
Basic social attitudes.
observes that:

The American Correctional Association

"Underlying many inmate grievances about correctional

institutions are social attitudes which are basic to m e n both In the
institution and in the outside community.

One of these attitudes

is apathy" (1970:12).

If the overall treatment plan within a cor

rectional institution

is to be effective, the

apathetic about its roles.

...

staff must not be

Yet staff members often receive little

port for their position from the community at large.

sup

The general

public is often more concerned about having -ah offender incarcerated,
thus removing the "disruptive" agent from society, than it is with the
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variety

methods
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The

and

result

the

institution,

inmates

react

to

This
this

is often a p a t h y within the

inmate population, with little motivation or enthusiasm on the part of
either inmates or staff to participate in treatment programs (Causes,
Preventive Measures, and Methods of Controlling Riots and Disturbances
in Correctional Institutions, 1970:12),

Gresham Sykes states that what

correctional institutions need most is a public interested in supporting
”an enlightened penal philosophy'* (1959*^01)•
The punitive attitude of a large segment of society is a basic
prepossession that permeates the correctional institution and underlies
many major disturbances.

Often line personnel reflect this attitude of

punishment as opposed to treatment.
Caldwell, 1956; Tappan,
poses:

Some criminologists (e.g.,

i 960 ) hold that punishment has three main pur

retribution, deterrence, and rehabilitation.

There is con

siderable controversy about which of these purposes will best serve
the needs of society.

However, punishment as retribution seems to be a

dominant element in American society.

Retributive punishment is based

on the theory that society has a right to get even with those who have
broken the law and is society's way of retaliating against the criminal.
Although criminals are supposedly sent to prison as punishment an d not
for punishment, a prison is nevertheless a punitive institution.

Its

environment is rigid, hostile, and designed to inflict punishment in
various ways.

Unrest in the larger community.

Durjng the early 1950's, prison

riots were attributed largely to conditions which existed inside the

110
prison.

However, during the 1 9607s and early 1 9 7 0 ?s, it is beginning

to appear that prison riots might also be a reflection of conditions
outside the prison, namely social unrest.

In its revised report,

the

American Correctional Association states:

,7Today, as never before,

the correctional institutions are feeling the impact of unrest in the
larger community"

(1970:15).

Even though an institution may be remote,

it cannot isolate itself completely from the larger community.

Parole

violators and newly admitted inmates are constantly bringing community
attitudes to the institution, and this, coupled with news media
coverage, keeps the inmates well informed about unrest in the general
community.

The New York State Special Commission on Attica noted that

"the young inmate was conscious of the changes in attitudes in the
black and Puerto Kican communities, on the campuses,

in the churches,

and in the antiwar movement" (1972:106).
The report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Dis
orders

(1968) showed how pervasive discrimination and segregation,

black inmigration, and white exodus have been in aggravating problems
in black ghettos ,7where segregation and poverty converge on the young
to destroy opportunity and enforce failure71 (1968:10).

The Commission

reports that "crime, drug addiction, dependency on welfare, and bitter
ness and resentment against society in general and white society in
particular are the result" (1968:10).
The civil rights movement of the previous decade left
frustrated hopes, feelings of powerlessness, and a climate tending
toward approval and encouragement of violence as a form of protest.
The Commission on Civil Disorders found that "a new mood has sprung up
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among Negroes, particularly among the young,

in which self-esteem and

enhanced racial pride are replacing apathy and submission to the
‘s y s t e m ’" (1963:11).

Student protests, civil rights movements, and

anti-war protests seemed to many alienated members of society to have
accomplished what the democratic processes had not accomplished~~to
have focused attention on the need for basic change.
The moods and attitudes discussed above seem to be finding their
way into prisons and may well be the ingredients of the mixture which
has exploded in some state penal institutions during recent years.

The

n a t i o n ’s prisons are by no means insulated from these changing social
moods.

Inadequate finances.

Inadequate financing of prison facilities

and programs is an underlying cause in m a n y , .if not most, prison riots.
Lack of money affects almost every other cause of riots.

Personnel

problems are caused largely, although not entirely, by lack of money.
As the American Correctional Association points out,

"correctional

administrators must often face problems of inadequate facilities, poor
salaries,

lack of treatment personnel, and too few correctional person

nel because of inadequate finances"

(1970:15).

These problems can be,

and sometimes are, directly related to prison riots and disturbances.
In the larger, overpopulated institutions,

inmates m ay be confined in

dormitory-type housing units rather than individual cells.

When this ...

occurs, the propensity to violent behavior increases considerably.

In

some instances, the initiation of constructive treatment programs can
serve as a possible countermeasure for o v e r c r o w d i n g .

However, if

adequate finances are not available, the treatment programs cannot be
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properly staffed,

’’The result is a system in which there is very little

constructive treatment and a potential for the eruption of violence and
disorder” (Causes, Preventive Measures, and Methods of Controlling
Riots and Disturbances in Correctional Institutions, 1970:16),

Inequities and complexities in the criminal justice system.
To d a y ’s criminal justice system is very complex and contains a number
of inequities,

’’The most frequent target of attack,” says the American

Correctional Association, ” is the disparity of the sentencing practices
of various courts” (1970:16).

Frank Flynn (1953) acknowledges that

variations in the length of sentences for- various crimes creates dis
content.

An article in The Christian Science Monitor (December 1^,

1971:9) illustrates some of the disparities that exist in sentencing
practices.

A house painter in New Orleans, for example, was sentenced

to fifty years in prison for selling a matchbox full of marijuana to
undercover agents.

In March, 1971# & ju^y SLn Odessa, Texas, found a

man guilty of selling $10,00 worth of heroin to an undercover agent
and sentenced him to 1,800 years in prison.

The following month, a

jury in Dallas, Texas, sentenced a man with a previous record to 2,500
years in prison for armed robbery and murder.

The problem of disparity

of sentences is further complicated by the folk wisdom that money buys
a good attorney, which often means that the rich man goes free and the
poor man goes ,to prison..

The sons of TV personality Johnny Carson and

the late Robert F. Kennedy, for example, did not go to prison when
they were arrested for possession of drugs.
Another possible Inequity of the criminal justice system has to
do with parole,

Flynn says:

"Despite its emergence in the guise of a
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reformative influence, parole is a major cause of unrest in a large
number of states" (1953:83).

He goes on to say that "the process of

parole selection is fraught with numerous difficulties which may have
reverberations in the prison community" (1953:83).

In a matter of

minutes, the parole board must determine whether the prisoner has suf
ficiently reformed to be entitled to release prior to expiration of his
sentence.

Decisions are sometimes arbitrary and regarded as harsh and

unfair by the inmate.
an adverse decision.

The prisoner seldom has any recourse in case of
Nor does he always know the basis upon which the

board made its decision or whether*he has been fairly treated.

A

denial of parole may bring about discontent, resentment, and frustration
in the individual,

thus encouraging violent behavior.

According to an article in the Kansas City Star

(August 26,

1 9 7 3 :33A), 17,600 parole cases were decided during fiscal year 1971;
however, reasons for denial were not given.

Under a reorganization

plan announced by Maurice H. Sigler, Chairman of the United States
Parole Board, prisoners would not only be given written reasons for
denial of parole, but ,!would have the right to be represented by
attorneys at parole hearings and would have a means of appeal" (The
Kansas City Sta r , August 26, 1 973:33A).

Lack of meaningful rex^ards.

A less obvious external cause of

riots in correctional institutions is the lack of meaningful rewards.
The restrictions imposed on the correctional program by the basic social
attitudes of the general public may deny the offender of any reward.
A n example of this is the difficulty some e-Sr-offenders face when
attempting to find legitimate work following release from prison even
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though they may have completed, a comprehensive training program while
incarcerated.

Another example is the restriction placed on the prison

industries program by the community.

For instance

,institutional

industries can be utilized only for specified purposes, and the m a r 
keting of commodities produced in prison is severely limited so as not

to compete with civilian enterprise.

"These restrictions

. . . impair

the efforts of the correctional system to offer meaningful rewards in
the form of either financial remuneration or meaningful work oppor
tunities" (Causes, Preventive Measures, and Methods of Controlling
Riots and Disturbances in Correctional Institutions, 1970:16).
It must be reiterated that the foregoing causes of prison riots
are not all-inclusive and, in some cases, may merely be symptoms of more
basic causes.

Nonetheless, it should be clear that prison disturbances

can be precipitated by factors or conditions which exist both inside and
outside the prison.

Although the prison administrator may have little

or no control over outside influences, he must not overlook their impor
tance as potential causes of prison violence.

Having n ow discussed some

of the underlying causes of prison riots, the remainder of this chapter
will be devoted to a general discussion of some of the positive effects
of prison disturbances.

SOME FUNCTIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF PRISON VIOLENCE

Based on the data' presented in Chapters 3 and 4, there appears
to be sufficient evidence to support the contention that prison riots
can and do have functional consequences.

As in the case of causes,

however, the functional consequences of prisoneriots are somewhat
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elusive and difficult to assess.

This is because a cause-effect

relationship is not always easily determined.

In one or more of the

cases discussed in Chapter 3, it was reported that certain prison
reforms were in the process of being instituted before the riot
occurred; the riot merely expedited the process.

In the case of the

riot at the Vermont State Prison in September, 1971, changes were
found to be the basic underlying cause, rather than the result, of the
disturbance, although additional changes were introduced following the
riot.
Another consideration that complicates the relationship between
prison riots and prison reforms is the fact that some reforms take time
to implement.

As Flynn points out:

"Any consideration of prison reform

must take into account the fact that progress is going to be slow"
(1953:85).

Although some reforms are a direct result of prison violence,

they often take weeks, even months, to effect.

Some riot-related

reforms, for example, were still being instituted at Attica more than
a year after the September, 1971, riot occurred.

In those cases where

reforms are not immediately forthcoming, the cause-effect relationship
can become obscured by the passage of time.
The positive consequences of prison riots rarely receive as
much public attention as the negative consequences.

On the one hand,

the mass destruction of property, the taking of hostages, and the
infliction of injury or death by a society of captives all have
particular appeal to the news media.

On the other hand, the changes

*

which result from prison riots are rarely as glamorous as their causes,
and, therefore, arouse little or no interest on the part of the media.
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The writer recalls the enormous amount of press coverage given to the
riot at Attica, but he is unable to recall any publicity being given
to the reforms which were introduced following the riot.
While it may be speculative on the w r i t e r ’s part, there are
perhaps several other reasons why prison reforms receive so little
attention.

First, once the violence has subsided, the public quickly

falls back into a pattern of indifference and forgets that the riot
and, for that matter, the prison, ever existed.

The New York State

Special Commission on Attica wrote:
. . . The worrisome reality is that prisons, prisoners,
and the problems of both are essentially invisible in the
United States. We Americans have made our prisons dis
appear from sight as if by an act of will.
We locate
them mostly in places remote from view, and far removed
from the homes of the inmates; . . . and we manage to
forget inmates and custodians alike by pretending that
the prisoners will not return to our cities and our
villages and our farms (1972:xii).
Second, by'drawing attention to prison reforms, particularly those
resulting from prison riots, public attention is drawn to the inade
quacies of the prison system and, in some-cases, to the administration,
which may or may not prove embarrassing to the latter.

Third, poor

relations between the prison administration and the news media may
have a less than positive effect on the positive consequences of prison
disturbances.

In its revised report, the American Correctional

Association states:
The news, media . . . a r e important means by which the
public is informed about the institutions their taxes sup
port*
Correctional institutions should acquire and maintain
good press relations. The press should be informed of
significant events of both a positive and negative nature.
An air of secrecy lends credence to irresponsible inmate
allegations (1970:20).

Elsewhere the Association reports:
The news media have a responsibility to keep the public
informed of newsworthy events and correctional administrators
have a responsibility to keep the media informed of the.
activities within their institutions, Regrettably, many
correctional administrators have overlooked this administra
tive responsibility. The correctional administrator should
be diligent in his efforts to establish an honest and
constructive relationship with members of the mass media. • • •
the new3 media can be Invaluable allies to the correctional
administrator in his efforts to gain public support for his
Institution and its programs (1970:7).
There is yet another possible explanation concerning the lack
of attention devoted to prison reforms emanating from prison riots.
Because few people condone violence as a legitimate means of bringing
about change, the dysfunctional consequences of prison violence have
had a tendency to overshadow the functional consequences.

As a result,

investigators have focused their attention almost entirely on the
causes of prison riots, and on ways and means of preventing them.
While some contemporary authors (e.g., Leinwand, 1972% Bagdikian and
Dash, 1972) have recognized the need for prison reform, their sug
gestions and recommendations along these lines have received little
public recognition and support.
Prison Beforms Introduced
In addition to the reform measures discussed in Chapters 3 and.
4, many other changes have evolved from the series of prison riots which
occurred during the late 1960*s and early 1970*s.

Some of these

reforms may be enumerated as follows;
1.

As part of a major prison reform movement, the United States

Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) has begun to funnel
larger sums of money into state and local prisfons.

For example, grants
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to state and local prisons have been Increased from two million to 250
million dollars over a three-year period.,

Federal aid is being used

by prison officials to Implement a variety of reforms, some of which
are:

a.

Prisons in California and Mississippi "are experi

menting with allowing inmates to have conjugal visits with their wives
as a deterrent to homosexuality** (U.S. News & ¥orld Report, December 27,
1971:3?)■
b.

Officials in Arizona have devoted over a million

dollars to establish probation services for persons convicted of mis
demeanors so that they may be placed on probation in lieu of going to
prison.

Arizona has also constructed a number of halfway houses "where

convicts coming out of prison can live until they can find jobs and
rejoin society** (U.S. News & World Report, December 27, 1971:37)#
c.

In Indiana, LEAA money is being, used in part for work-

release programs that allow convicts with good records to work at jobs-,
outside the prison as they approach the end of their prison term.
While in a work-release status, "the prisoners live in minimum-seeurity
centers near their jobs** (U.S. News & World Report, December 2 7* 1971:
37).
d.

Eight million dollars in LEAA money is going for a wide

range of reforms in New York, " including new clothing, vocational
education, improved food and law libraries for inmates and statewide
training programs for employees** (U.S. News & World Report, December
27, 1971:37).

Further, the 1971 riot at Attica "led to the establish-

ment of a medical reviaw board within the state department of cor
rections and increased salaries to attract qualified physicians to
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the institution1’ (T i m e , July 9, 1973:36).
e.

One of the projects being pursued in Maryland aims to

improve the education of those state prisoners

(about thirty-eight

percent) who have less than a fifth-grade education

(U.S. News 6c World

R e p o r t , December 27, 1971:37).
2.

At the direction of President Nixon, the United States

Department of Justice "has embarked upon a comprehensive,
to make the federal prison system a model for reform"
World R e p o r t , December 27, 1971:37).

10-year plan

(U.S. News &

As a result, the budget of the

Federal Bureau of Prisons was doubled over a three-year period.
3.

A staff training center has been established at the Federal

Reformatory at El R e n o , Oklahoma.

The center offers

"two weeks of

intensive orientation for new prison employees" (U.S. News & World
R e p o r t , December 27, 1971:38-39).
4.

Federal and state courts have begun to develop a code of

prisoners* rights.

Additionally,

"prisoners* rights projects have been

developed by the Legal .Aid Society of New York, the American Civil
Liberties Union, and the law schools" (The Official R e p o r t , 1972:xx).
5.

In addition to the expansion of prisoners* rights,

prisoners* unions have been formed outside the prison walls to act as
collective bargaining agents for inmates within the w a l l s .

One of the

leading prisoners* unions in the country was founded in California in
the spring of 1971, by a group of former inmates headed by John Irwin,
an ex-inmate turned sociologist

(The Christian Science M o n i t o r , December

15, 1971:9).
6.

The American Bar Association rfhas undertaken a major study

of correction problems through a Commission on Correctional Facilities
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and Services « . .*• (The Official Report, 1 9 7 2 ;xx)»

Proposed Reforms Announced
A national conference on corrections, called by President Nixon
in December, 1971* proposed some additional reforms, five of which are
briefly described below.
1.

The Federal Bureau of Prisons will build a national cor

rections academy for the training of correction personnel for federal,
state, and local facilities (U.S. News & Uorld Report, December 27*
1971:37).
2.

The Federal Bureau of Prisons will build a national behav-

ioral-research center in an effort to find out why criminals violate
the law and how they can be stopped or prevented from doing so again
(U.S. News & World Report, December 27* 1971:37).
3.

To help improve educational programs for prisoners, the

LEAA is funding a clearinghouse on correctional education (U.S. News &
World Report, December 27* 1971:37).

In an attempt to reduce racial tensions between inmates and
guards, prison officials have been urged to hire more blacks and
Spanish-speaking Americans.

"The Bureau of Prisons has set a goal of

one-third minority employment in all new hiring** (U.S. News & World
Report, December 27* 1971:37).
5.

Under the Omnibus Correctional Reform Act, some of the

nation*s older and larger penal institutions will be replaced with
smaller, community-based institutions (U.S. News & fforld Report, December
27* 1971:37).

This will bring inmates closer to the community from which

they came and make prisons as they are presently known obsolete.
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There is no denying that prison riots, either singularly or
collectively, have had certain positive effects as evidenced by the
preceding discussion.

Many of the positive effects which, accrue are

often offset by negative effects, however.

Although riots have drawn

attention to some of the inadequacies that exist in penal institutions,
prison reform,has been slowed by a lack of public support and financial
assistance.

For these and other reasons already mentioned,

inmates have

often been hampered in their attempt to bring about certain reforms
through the use of violence.

Accordingly, not all prison riots produce

the desired results.

SUMMARY

The causes of riots and disturbances in correctional institutions
are varied and complex.

It is not possible to identify a cause or set

of causes, the presence of which will always precipitate a riot and the
absence of which will always prevent a riot.

Conditions xtfhich exist or

incidents which occur in a particular institution may precipitate a riot*
In another institution, these same conditions m ay exist or the same
incidents may occur without appearing to have any significance.
fore, the causes must be viewed as complex,

T h ere

interrelated variables

which contribute to the total problem.
The underlying causes of prison riots may be related directly
to the unnatural institutional environment, the typical characteristics
of the inmate population, the management practices of the correctional
administrator, or some policy or procedure within the institution
which promotes dissension.

At times, however, riots may r e sult from.

what has here been referred to as external causes or variables, i.e.,
basic social attitudes, unrest in the larger community, inadequate
financial support, etc.

The importance of internal causes notwith

standing, |the author is of the belief that external causes, particularly
those having to do with social unrest in the larger community and
inadequate finances, have taken on added significance in recent years.
The fact that a series of major prison disturbances occurred during a
period of social unrest and turbulence in the late 19o0*s cannot be
dismissed as mere coincidence.^ Furthermore, many of the other funda
mental causes of prison riots can be traced to a lack of sufficient
funds with which to establish and maintain adequate facilities and
meaningful programs and activities
The positive functions of prison violence are sometimes difficult
to trace for several reasons.

First, it is not always easy to distin

guish those reforms which were in process prior to a riot from those
resulting directly from a riot, thus obscuring the cause-effect relation
ship.

Second, the passage of time between the occurrence of a riot and

the implementation of reforms becomes an intervening variable which
further complicates the understanding of direct causal relationships,
Third, prison reforms receive little publicity, thereby all but
escaping public awareness and leaving a dearth of information in the
research literature.
Attention in this chapter has been focused on some of the funda
mental causes and consequences of prison violence.

In the next chapter,

attention will be turned to an examination of some theoretical perspec
tives on prison riots and reform,

The purpose? of this examination will
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be to provide a somewhat different approach to the study of prison dis
turbances and, In this connection,

to further Illuminate the complex

subject of violence and change as it relates to penal institutions.

&

Chapter 6

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PRISON RIOTS

This chapter will be taken up with some generalizations and an
attempt at an analysis of prison riots in terms of a number of
theoretical perspectives.

While these perspectives may appear to be

oversimplified in certain instances, they nevertheless provide several
alternative approaches to the study of prison violence.

The first of

these perspectives suggests that prison riots may occur as a result of
relative deprivation within the inmate population.

The second proposes

that there is a cultural lag between correctional progress and techno
logical progress.

The third perspective states that prison riots are

cyclical in nature and form a reasonable step in a pattern of repeated
prison reform.

Finally, the fourth perspective proposes that prison

riots serve as equilibrium-maintaining mechanisms, and, as such, help
to re-establish and maintain stability within the prison.

RELATIVE DEPRIVATION

In his book, Why Men R e b e l , Ted Gurr (1970) develops a number
of hypotheses and theoretical models which help to explain some of the
underlying causes of collective violence.

A brief description of

several of these models will be useful in further analyzing and dis
cussing the causes of prison violence.
According to Gurr, the "potential for collective violence is a
function of the extent and intensity of shared, discontents among
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members of a society . . ." (1970:8).

These discontents are said to be

the result of relative deprivation, which Gurr defines as "a perceived
discrepancy between men's value expectations and their value capa
bilities" (1970:13).

'Value expectations are the goods and conditions

of life to which people believe they are rightfully entitled" (Gurr,
1970:13).

Value expectations may also be thought of as wants, goals,

or aspirations.
and conditions

Value capabilities, on the other hand, "are the goods
...

£ peopleJ think they are capable of attaining or

maintaining, given the social means available to thera" (Gurr, 1970:13).
Further on, Gurr elaborates by stating:
The "value expectations" of a collectivit^r are the average
value positions to which its members believe they are justi
fiably entitled.
'Value position" is the amount or level of
a value actually attained. Value expectations refer to both
present and future conditions. Men ordinarily expect to keep
what they have; they also generally have a set of expectations
and demands about what they should have in the future, which
is usually as much or more than what they have at present . . . .
"The value capabilities” of a collectivity are the average
value positions its members perceive themselves capable of
attaining or maintaining. Value capabilities also have both
present and future connotations.
In the present, value capa
bilities are represented by what men have actually been able
to attain or have been provided by their environment:
their
'Value position." In the future, value capabilities are what
men believe their skills, their fellows, and their rulers will,
in the course of time, permit them to keep or attaint
their
'Value potential" (1970:27).
Gurr identifies three patterns of relative deprivation which
can be cited as causal or predisposing factors for violence.

One of

these patterns, the aspirational deprivation model, is shown graphically
in Figure 2.
According to this model, men's value expectations increase without: a corresponding increase in value capabilities.

The perceived

discrepancy (aspirational deprivation) between expectations and

capabilities gives rise to frustration and discontent.

The deprivation-

induced discontent incites action and, when shared by a collectivity
of persons, provides a general impetus to collective violence (Gurr,
1 970:13-50)•

Propositionally, the greater the divergence between value

expectations and value capabilities, the greater the propensity toward
violence.
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Figure 2.

Aspirational Deprivation

Ghetto dwellers are particularly good targets of aspirational
deprivation.

Surrounded by a highly visible, affluent society, they

come to share some of the value expectations of the society around
them.

Deprived of legitimate means of attaining these expectations,

however, ghetto dwellers have sometimes found it necessary to resort
to illegitimate means of attaining the conditions in life to which
they feel they are rightfully entitled.
ghetto riots of the 1960*s.

This is borne out by the

Oppressed and downtrodden, many of these

same individuals find their way into prison full of alienation and
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hostility against their oppressors--the established, institutions of
law and government--and a propensity to rebel against these institutions.
The New York State Special Commission on Attica hit upon this problem
in its official report which states:
Attica, like most of our prisons, had become largely a
black and Spanish-speaking ghetto, and the new inmate was
shaped by the same experiences, expectations, and frustrations
that culminated in eruptions in Watts, Detroit, Newark, and
other American cities . . . .
The new inmate came to Attica bitter and angry as the
result of his experiences in the ghetto streets and in the
morass of the criminal justice system (1972:106).
The foregoing not only serves to illustrate the role that relative
deprivation may play in precipitating violent behavior, but points out
the need to consider the effects of outside influences when studying
the causes of collective violence in prisons.
The decremental deprivation model illustrated in Figure 3 is
also helpful in analyzing predisposing causes of prison violence.

Under

this model, men's value capabilities are perceived to decline while
their value expectations remain virtually unchanged.

Men who find them

selves in this situation may become angry over loss of what they once
had or thought they could have rather than over the non-attainment of
new or intensified expectations

(Gurr, 1970:46).

Conditions that decrease men's value capabilities without also
decreasing their value expectations increase felt deprivation and,
accordingly, the intensity of discontent.
prison community.

Such conditions exist in the

Convicts bring with them to prison the aspirations

and capabilities they develop while members of the free community.
incarcerated, however,

they lose certain rights and privileges, to

Once
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include the means

(capabilities) with which to attain their aspirations

(value expectations).

The resultant discrepancy (decremental depriva

tion) can be expected to give rise to discontent and the propensity to
riot.

The problem confronting penal administrators, if the probability

of violence in prisons is to be reduced, becomes one of how to reduce
the discrepancy between value expectations and value capabilities.
is at this point that prison reform enters the picture.

It

Effective

vocational training programs, for instance, provide inmates with the
opportunities to learn marketable skills or improve existing skills
which,

in turn,

increase their value potential and their chances for

success on the outside.

Computer programming courses being offered in

the Kansas and California state penitentiaries are good examples.
Where these and other constructive programs are nonexistent,

inmate

value capabilities, both present and future, will diminish appreciably.
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Decremental Deprivation

&
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A third pattern of deprivation, referred to as progressive
deprivation, is shown in Figure 4.

In this case, steady improvement

in men's value position generates expectations about continued improve
ment.

If value capabilities stabilize or decline after such a period

of improvement, progressive deprivation results

(Gurr, 1970:52-53).

Gurr cites the following situation as an example of how progressive
deprivation might occur:
The income of Negroes relative to whites of comparable
education increased rapidly towards equality between 1940
and the early 1950*s, but then began to decline, so that
by 1960, half the relative gains of the earlier period were
lost (1970:54).
The progressive deprivation pattern, then, is most likely to occur in
societies undergoing change.
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Progressive Deprivation

Applying the concept of progressive deprivation to a
hypothetical penal situation, suppose that a prison warden, who has
earned the reputation of being a reformist, is succeeded by a more
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conservative warden.

During the reformist's tenure, there was a

substantial acceleration in inmate expectations and capabilities since
many of the reforms which had been introduced benefited the inmates
personally and improved their value position within the prison.

When

the successor assumed his duties, he followed through on several
reforms which were already in process and then concentrated on m a i n 
taining the status quo.

Although the inmates1 expectations continued

to rise, their capabilities began to decline when reforms were no
longer forthcoming.

This led to progressive deprivation on the part of

the inmate population, or major segments thereof, and a propensity to
resort to violent action as an alternative means of gaining what the
inmates had come to regard as justifiably theirs.
Progressive deprivation is apparently the sort of thing Eric
Hoffer was speaking of when discussing the characteristics of mass
movements in his book, The True Believer.

At one point, he claims:

"Discontent is likely to be highest when misery is bearable; when c on
ditions have so improved that an ideal state seems almost within
reach" (1951:33).

It is the taste of better things--not actual

suffering--that excites people to revolt.

Accordingly, frustration is

likely to be greater when people have much and want more than when they
have nothing and want nothing.
It is worth noting that the riot at Attica occurred at the end
of a summer of mounting tensions between inmates and correction officers
and of rising expectations and improving conditions.
had become more relaxed.

Prison discipline

The courts had responded to inmates1 com-

plaints and begun to order limited reforms.

Commissioner Oswald had
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liberalized, rules and was promising new programs, new facilities, and a
new attitude toward inmate problems.

Although reforms were being

introduced at Attica, at least as far as the inmates were concerned,
they were not being introduced quickly enough.

With their hopes set

on bigger and better things, the inmates turned to violence as a means
of speeding up the reformation process.
Before leaving this section, it should be pointed out that rela
tive deprivation may also "arise when individuals compare their own
situation with that of a reference group which has what they want and
think they should have" (Gurr, 1970:105).

For some people, mere expo

sure to, or knowledge of, a better way of life is assumed to raise
expectations.

Accordingly, expectation levels m ay be accelerated by

the "demonstration effect" of other groups that are improving while
one's own group is not

(Gurr, 1970:52).

Denis Brogan (1951), for

example, observed that the new ways and new wealth of the Industrial
Revolution impelled many intellectuals to revolutionary fervor.
The demonstration effect may help explain the contagious nature
of certain prison riots.

As a case in point, the riot at the Maine

State Prison in October, 1971, was attributed, at least in part, to the
highly publicized concessions made as a result of strikes, violence, and
disorders in other prisons.

In this case, it is possible that the

prisoners1 expectations were aroused by concessions gained

(demonstra

tion effect) in other institutions, rather than in the institution to
which they were confined.

CULTURAL

LAG

Some writers contend that prison reforms have not kept pace
xtfith technological progress in the larger society.

Hancock, for one,

says that "American correctional progress has not kept pace with social,
economic, and industrial change” (1969:19).

According to Donald

Clemmer, prisons are behind times and, therefore,
with advances on other frontiers" (1958:319).
on the

'have not kept step

The National Commission

Causes and Prevention of Violence points out that:

. . . our political and social institutions and the programs
they manage are not changing rapidly enough to keep up with the
speed of change in the environment they are intended to support
(1969:86).
In effect, these authors are addressing what William. Ogburn referred to
as the

theory of cultural lag. According to this theory, a cultural lag

occurs when one of two correlated parts of culture changes before or in
greater degree than another part does, thereby causing a maladjustment
between the two parts

(Ogburn, 1922:200-201).

Ogburn distinguishes between the two. aspects of culture by
referring to one as material and to the other as the nonmaterial.

The

material culture may be thought of as the technological culture, and
the nonmaterial culture may be thought of as the nontechnological or
adaptive culture.

Since, at least according to Ogburn, the material

culture tends to outpace the nonmaterial culture, the former becomes an
independent variable and the latter a dependent variable.

Because the

two parts of culture are considered to be correlated and interdependent,
a rapid change in the material culture requires changes in the non-jj

material culture.

When changes in the nonmaterial culture fail to keep
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pace with, changes in the material culture, there is a lag which may
last for varying lengths of time, sometimes even years.

During this

lag, strain and maladjustment between the two cultures occurs.
fore,

There

Mit is desirable to reduce the period of maladjustment, to make

cultural adjustments as quickly as possible” (Ogburn, 1922:201)

if the

stress created by the two change rates is to be reduced.
In attempting to apply the theory of cultural lag to prisons,
two interrelated problems are immediately encountered.

First, the idea

of cultural lag is meaningless until one decides what lags behind what.
Second,

it is not clear, nor is it necessarily to be taken for granted,

that changes in the nonmaterial culture follow, rather than precede,
changes in the material culture as Ogburn suggests.

There is, then,

several different ways to approach the subject of cultural lag as It
relates to penal institutions.
One approach might be to treat the prison as one culture and
the larger society as another.

Since prisons may be considered a part

of the larger society, the culture of the prison reflects the culture
of the society at large.

Therefore, any changes in the culture of the

larger society will necessarily affect the culture of the prison.

When

prisons fail to keep pace with these cultural changes, maladjustment
occurs.

In an attempt to reduce the period of maladjustment, necessary

adjustments are made through changes forced by prison violence.

Once

this happens, synchronization between the two cultures is reached, and
a period of relative calm in the prison may prevail until an intolerable
lag between changes in the prison culture and changes in the culture
of the larger society develops again.
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The foregoing illustration is, of course, an over-generalized
application of the culture lag theory.

An alternative and perhaps more

meaningful approach is just the opposite of Ogburn*s theory and suggests
that changes occur more rapidly in the nonmaterial culture than in the
material culture.

In this case, prison facilities--that is, the physical

plants and equipment therein--are regarded as the material culture, and
man's accumulated knowledge of prison reform is regarded as the nonmaterial culture.

Prison facilities are therefore treated as the

dependent variable and man's store of knowledge concerning prison reform
the independent variable.

Applying the theory of culture lag in this

manner, one would expect changes in the nonmaterial culture to generate
corresponding changes in the material culture.

The evidence presented

in this paper tends to indicate that changes in prison facilities have
not kept pace with the increasing body of knowledge pertaining to prison
reform.
Prisons,

like other social institutions, are the creation of

human intelligence and ideals, and reflect man's accumulated knowledge
about himself and his environment.

There comes a time, however, when

man's knowledge outstrips physical monuments of an older generation,
necessitating their replacement with something more relevant to the
times.

It is therefore conceivable that some prisons m ay be better

adapted to the nonmaterial culture and correctional philosophy of years
gone by than to the nonmaterial conditions that exist today.

Some

relief may be in store in this respect as, for example, plans are being
made to replace the 140-year-old Missouri State Penitentiary with a
it?
series of urban treatment complexes at Kansas City and St. Louis (The
Kansas City S tar, October 26, 1973:4).
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identifying many of the physical inadequacies of prison facilities,
but have given rise to the development of innovative methods and tech
niques of improving institutional facilities.

Although these innova

tions have added to m a n ’s background of knowledge, many have yet to be
implemented.

As it stands, m a n ’s knowledge of prison reform is more

advanced than the prison facilities themselves, thereby creating a lag
and, hence, maladjustment between these two parts of culture.
Prison facilities have failed to keep pace with the growing body
of knowledge concerning prison reform for a variety of reasons.
these reasons have been discussed in detail in Chapter 5.

Some of

At the risk

of being redundant, however, several will be repeated here for illustra
tive purposes.

There is first the problem presented by obsolete

physical plants and equipment.

The American Correctional Association

describes the problem succinctly in its Manual of Correctional
Standards *
The physical plant of all leading prisons and reformitories
and of the early reform schools as well, has always handicapped,
and often completely frustrated the rehabilitative ideals and
methods of correctional administrators.
This was true in 1830,
and it is especially striking and disastrous in the second half
of the Twentieth Century, for too few of the fundamental
characteristics of penal architecture have changed since the
building of the Eastern Penitentiary and the Auburn Prison,
while correctional ideals and techniques have been and are
being revolutionized.
Hence, the gap between correctional ideals
and correctional construction has become even greater through the
years (1966:329).
Many of the existing penal institutions are poorly designed, with inade
quate or non-existent facilities for treatment or training.

To a large
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degree, these institutions ware built prior to 1900.
of the prisons discussed in Chapter 3, for example,
eighty years.
old.

The average age
is approximately

Nine of the prisons mentioned, are more than 100 years

These antiquated facilities make the introduction of constructive

programs extremely difficult,

if not impossible.

Coupled with the problem of outmoded structures are the con
gested conditions created by overcrowding, a situation certain to insure
the defeat of any attempt at program planning or implementation.

Cells

doubled up, two and sometimes three decker beds crowded together in
improvised dormitories is not an uncommon condition in some of the older
prisons.

The Missouri State Penitentiary formerly housed seven

prisoners to a cell and, today, overcrowding in that institution pre
cludes the proper segregation of inmates and inhibits a viable rehabili
tation program (The Kansas City Star, September 13, 1973:3).

Federal

institutions, which have generally been considered ”a cut above” most
state systems, are also susceptible to overcrowding.

For example, the

United States Penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kansas, has been unable to
convert two and six-man cells to,singles due to lack of funds.
Many of the nation*s prisons, to include some of the newer ones,
are too large, and most of them do not lend themselves to the application
of modern penological knowledge.
Association,

According to the American Correctional

”the maximum population for a prison for adults should

not exceed 1,200 . . . .

Any institution operating as a single unit

becomes increasingly inefficient and unsafe as its population exceeds
1,200” (Manual of Correctional
Standards, 1966:341-342).
---------------------

Yet the

average capacity of the prisons examined in Chapter 3 is about 1,700.
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Millions of dollars are being invested in obsolete and decrepit prison
plants that are too large to permit individual treatment.

Because of

costs of entirely new plants, the public is hesitant to abandon
existing facilities.

Instead, it spends more money to make them still

larger and more unwieldy.
Although other reasons for the cultural lag between prison
facilities and accumulated knowledge of prison reform could be cited,
suffice it to say that prison plants have changed with changing needs
and changing ideas.

Thera has, however, been a vast change in the

practical application of correctional ideas and concepts, especially
during the past thirty years or so.
were built before that time.

Most of the prisons of the country

Many of those built since then have

merely been copies of those built previously, with little regard for
any needed change in the physical plant to meet changing correctional
philosophies.

THE CYCLICAL NATURE OF PRISON RIOTS

Penal history, has shown that prison riots tend to repeat them
selves.

Although hardly a year has gone by in which a prison riot has

not been reported, major prison disturbances seem to occur in clusters
at somewhat irregular intervals.

Although it has not been mentioned

elsewhere in this paper, a series of riots occurred in American penal
institutions in 1912 and 1913.

A series of riots also occurred during

the years 1929-1930, 1951-1953, and again in 1955.
by yet another series of riots in 1968-1971.

These were followed

In other words, five

episodes of major prison violence have occurred in the United States in
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Vernon Fox, Chairman of the Department of Criminology at Florida
State'University, claims that prison riots "tend to pattern in five
stages, four during the riot and one afterward" (1971:10).
stages are generally as follows:
of Inmate leaders,

(l) triggering event,

These

(2) emergence

(3 ) interaction with prison officials,

(4) surrender

of the inmates, and (5) investigations and administrative changes (Fox,

1971: 10) .
The present writer submits that prison riots tend to pattern in
seven, rather than five, stages, with one stage occurring prior to and
two following the riot.

According to this view, there is (l) a buildup

of tension and discontent inside the walls, followed by (2) a preci
pitating event which "triggers" the riot, after which (3) self-appointed
inmate leaders emerge and (If-) interact with prison officials, leading
(5) peaceful or forceful termination of the riot and (6) the intro
duction of reforms, followed by (7 ) a lapse into public forgetfulness.
Once the riot has passed through all seven stages, violence incubates
for a period of time and then the cycle repeats itself again.
During stage one> there is a buildup of tension and discontent
which creates a predisposition or readiness to riot.

This buildup may

be rapid or gradual, and may result from a variety of factors. - A
sudden increase in discontent could come about as a result of an
unannounced change in prison policy which affects the welfare of the
general inmate population.

Inmates at the Attica Correctional Faciliity,
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for example, became humiliated when lists of package items which they
could receive ware frequently changed without notice.
hand,

On the other

tension and discontent may occur gradually as a result of a series

of events felt to be humiliating and frustrating.
may be, Horton and Hunt

Whatever the case

(1972) claim that the impetus to collective

action is dependent on a shared belief among the actors.

This belief

"identifies the source of the threat, the route of escape, or the
avenue to fulfillment" (Horton and Hunt, 1972:384).
When a predisposition to riot is present, a precipitating event
is needed in stage two to "trigger" or "detonate" the riot.
to Horton and Hunt,

"some dramatic event, or a report thereof, sets the

stage for action" (1972:384-385).
taneous.

According

This event may be planned or spon

Frequently, planned disturbances take the form of sitdown

strikes, work slowdowns, hunger strikes, or mass escape attempts.

A

spontaneous event, on the other hand, may be almost anything from some
one throwing a tray in the dining hall, to a fight in the yard that
expands

(Fox, 1971:10) into a full-scale riot.

An example of a spon

taneous riot occurred in the New Haven Correctional Facility in New
York in March, 1970, when a black militant threw a tray of food and
then proceeded to implore other inmates to rebel.

Other riots have

occurred spontaneously as a result of mass contagion--that is, based on
news of disturbances in other institutions.

Once a group becomes

emotionally aroused, it "may act upon the first suggested action which
is in line with its impulses" (Horton and Hunt, 1972:387).

Clemmer

acknowledges that, although prison riots may.be either planned or
staged, they are usually spontaneous

(1958:148).

1*M>
Cnee the riot has been precipitated,
emerge in stage three,

innate leaders* tend to

Gresham Sykes reports that "prison riots

depend heavily on the rise to leadership of the mere violent, aggressive
and unstable prisoners who can fuse the many dissatisfactions of prison
life into an organised plan of action** (1959;^!)*

Korton and Hunt

suggest that most collective behavior is initially unstructured and
without leadership.

Therefore, ’’anyone may be able to assume leader

ship by simply calling out suggestions and commands** (Horton and Hunt,
1972:389) and can thus be expected to emerge during a riot.
In their discussion of collective behavior, Horton and Hunt
observe that?
The leadership profoundly affects the intensity and
direction of crowd behavior.
Given a collection of frustrated,
resentful people, a skillful demagogue can convert them into
a vengeful mob and direct their aggression at any "enemy"
who is included among their antagonisms.
Likewise, a leader
can sometimes calm or divert a crowd by a strategic sug
gestion or command (1972:389),
The inmate leader takes a sort of "middle-of-the-road** position
where he can test moderate the extremes and maintain communication with
both the inmates a n d the prison hierarchy.

In those cases where

hostages are taken, some inmates may want to kill them, as was the
case at Attica.

Other inmates may want to give up and surrender to

the administration.

The inmate leader attempts to control these two

extremes in a variety of ways and, .by doing so, stabilises the inmate
group (Fox, 1971:10).
During the fourth stage, interaction takes place between
inmates and prison officials.

This is usually the time when inmates

make their demands or grievances known to thei-administration.

This

141
stage also assists in identifying the alternatives available for the
resolution of the riot.

Although the administration is under no

obligation to negotiate with the rioters, it has often done so,
particularly when hostages are involved.

Of course, the chances for

the use of force or the threat of force are greater when the prisoners
do not hold hostages.

Vernon Fox points out:

When the inmate group is cohesive and their morale is
good, the prisoners will maintain the riot situation,
whether faced with force or negotiation. When the group
cohesion begins to disintegrate by some inmates wanting
to surrender, others wanting to retaliate, and the
leadership wanting to maintain the status quo, the
administration may manipulate it for an early surrender.
This disintegration of group cohesion may be promoted
by negotiation or by force or threat of force, depending
upon the situation (1971:11).
An approach other than force or the threat of force is to wait for
inmate cohesion to disintegrate by periods of inaction which place
strain on the inmate leadership to hold the group together

(Fox,

1971:11) .
Prison riots normally end during stage five with the surrender
of inmates either after negotiation or the use of force or threat of
force.

The important thing during this stage is the regaining of con

trol by prison authorities.

If the administration decides not to

negotiate with the inmates and the latter do not surrender, the use of
force or threat of force is inevitable if the riot is to be quelled
quickly.

Ten guards held hostage by 270 inmates at the Illinois State

Penitentiary at Stateville in September, 1973,. were released when
state police threatened to flood the cell block with tear gas
Kansas City T i m e s , September 7, 1973:3).

(The

As -'indicated, out-waiting

the inmates is one approach in certain situations.

Following an
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uprising at the Indiana State Prison in September, 1973, the warden
was quoted in a newspaper article as saying that "he had only two
recourses:

rush the cell blocks or play a waiting gama" (The Kansas

City T i m e s , September 4, 1973:1).

He decided to do the latter.

The

use of force is a most delecate matter, for it is risky for both the
assault groups and rioters.

Further, the use of force is becoming

decreasingly effective in American society, and it invites derision
from certain segments of the public.

The student riot at Kent State

University, not to mention the riot at Attica, was f,the last straw" as
far as the public was concerned in the handling of protestors by
"strong-arm" methods.
Stage six is the aftermath where investigations are initiated,
reports rendered, and reforms introduced.
most important stage.

In some respects, this is the

The introduction of reform measures following the

riot must help to restore order and confidence in the remaining power
structure by rectifying the undesirable situation that produced the
riot.

Even in those cases vzhere inmate demands or grievances are not

considered legitimate, prison riots may result in changes or reforms.
During phase seven, the general public can fall back into a
state of indifference, quite ready to forget the prison problem until
it is reminded once more by the mass media that violence has broken out
behind the walls of some prison.

As Cozart once remarked:

"We think

about prisoners only when they rebel against bad prison conditions or
when the press or some specially interested group carries on a program
for reform" (1955:18).

FRISCH RIOTS AS B ALANC3-MAINTAINIKG MECHANISMS

In order to better assess the place of collective violence in

the prisons transformation through time, it is perhaps helpful to look
at prison riots in terms oftheir usefulness as equilibrium-maintaining
mechanisms.

As a riot progresses, the prison appears to nova in a cyclic

rhythm from equilibrium to disequilibrium to equilibrium.

During

periods of tranquility, the prison may be considered to be in a state
of equilibrium or relative stability.

When a riot breaks out, dis

organization occurs and the disequilibrium helps to bring about changes
in the prison's 3ocial structure, and these changes act to restore
order and re-establish equilibrium.
Seen in this light, the function of prison riots can be compared
with that of earthquakes.

Lewis Coser quotes an article in the New York

Times:
There is nothing abnormal about an earthquake. An
unshakeable earth would
be a dead earth. A quake is the
earth's way of maintaining Its equilibrium, a form of
adjustment that enables the crust to yield to stresses
that tend to reorganize and redistribute the material
of which it is composed . • . • The larger the shift,
the more violent the quake, and the more frequent the
shifts, the more frequent the shocks (1967:27).
Following this analogy, a riot i3 the prison's way of making adjustments
in Its social structure, enabling it to maintain equilibrium.
To suggest that the period preceding a riot is one of relative
stability is not to deny that certain events occur which tend to reduce
the effectiveness of stabilizing elements within the prison social struc
ture.

As a case in point, there was a series of nonviolent protests at

Attica in the months preceding the riot in September, 1971.

Some were
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moderately successful in gaining concessions, but others ended ty’ith the
isolation or transfer of suspected ringleaders and troublemakers.

F ur

ther, the killing of George Jackson at California's San Quentin Prison
in August, 1971, resulted in a day of protest at Attica during which
inmates wore black armbands and refused to eat.

There was also some

talk about organizing a prison-wide sitdown strike, but it never
materialized

(The Official R e p o r t , 1972:108).

These events had a d is

ruptive effect on the equilibrium of the prison's social structure by
challenging custodial personnel to maintain control during a period
of increased tension and strain.
Disequilibrium may come about in a number of ways_during a
prison riot.

If the disturbance is spontaneous, there is usually mass

confusion and social disorganization at the outset.
at Attica in September, 1971.

Such was the case

The rioters were at first without

leadership and a plan of action.

Custodial personnel,

lacking proper

training and a carefully prepared riot control plan, were equally con
fused and disorganized.

In short, the stability of the prison organi

zation was displaced by disorder.
Another source, or possibly even an effect, of disequilibrium is
the struggle for power that takes place between the administration and
inmate population during a disturbance.
Attica,

In a riot such as that at

there is a partial or temporary transfer of power or control

from the rulers to the ruled.

This power struggle does not end until

prison officials regain control of the prison.
There may also be a power struggle within the inmate population
itself.

As suggested previously, the occurrence of riots in the prison

1^5
depends heavily on the emergence of influential prisoners into positions
of leadership.

However, there may "be a shift in the elements exercising

leadership as.the riot progresses.

That is, inmates may compete with

one another for positions of power and authority.

This occurred at

Attica when members of various factions within, the prison vied for posi
tions of authority.

Such struggles lead to a temporary disruption of

stability as the inmate society goes through a series of adjustments or
transformations,
Many types of informal relationships among inmates, and between
inmates and authorities in the prison system, remain hidden during the
course of normal prison operations.

However, the importance of such

relationships comes more clearly to light when their normal operation is
disrupted.

In one of his works on social conflict, Lewis Coser comments:

When changes in the equilibrium of a society lead to the
formation of new groupings or the strengthening of existing
groupings that set themselves the goal of overcrowding
resistence of vested interests.through conflict, changes
in structural relations, as distinct from simple "maladjustment,"
can be expected (1967:3*0.
Thus,

out of the struggle for power during a riot, whether it be among

inmates or between inmates and prison officials, emerges a new set of
relationships, and these relationships may very well carry over into the
new social structure following the riot.
Disturbances to the equilibrium of the prison brings about
changes whd.ch act to restore the social order and re-establish equilib
rium.

In those cases where inmate demands are considered legitimate,

they may be accommodated through the introduction of various innovations
and reforms which seek to correct the conditions that precipitated the
riot.

Until these conditions are corrected, the prison*s equilibrium

will remain tenuous.

A stats of balance will be maintained only so

long as changes in the prison system are commensurate with changing
social nesds and expectations.

SUMMARY

This chapter has been an attempt to analyze prison riots in
terms of four different theoretical perspectives.

The first of these

dealt with the theory of relative deprivation which, stated in its
simplest terms, is a perceived discrepancy between what a person has and
what he thinks he should have.

Three different patterns of relative

deprivation were distinguished--aspirational, decremental, and progressive
Aspirational deprivation is most likely to occur in the free community,
whereas the decremental and progressive deprivation patterns may occur
to a greater or lesser extent in the prison community.

Although the

patterns of deprivation occur under somewhat different circumstances,
they all have the same potential effect; they may each result in varying
degrees of frustration and discontent.

In brief, as the gap between

what a person has and what he wants increases, there may be a cor
responding increase in the intensity of discontent and the propensity
to resort to violent behavior.
A second perspective is based on Ogburn's cultural lag theory
which holds that changes in the material or technological culture tend
to outpace changes in the nonmaterial or nontachnological culture.
Under some circumstances, however, changes in the nonmaterial culture,
may occur at a faster rate than those in the material culture.
this may be so was demonstrated to some extant

That

this chapter by

' b

.:

treating prison facilities as the material culture and m a n ’s accumulated
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knowledge of prison.reform as the nonmaterial culture.

Substantial

evidence can be brought to show that prison facilities have progressed
at a slox.7er rate than man's store of knowledge concerning penal reform.
It was generally concluded that prison riots may occur as a result of
the stress created by the two' change rates and, further, that these
riots may aid in reducing some of the stress by forcing adjustments in
prison facilities so that they might become better adapted to new n o n 
material conditions.
A third perspective focused on the cyclical nature of prison
riots.

Here it was proposed that the cycles of prison riots and reforms

take place in recurring patterns.

More specifically, riots and reforms

in prisons are seen in seven different stages labelled as follows:
(1) buildup of tension and discontent,

(2) precipitating event,

(3)

emergence of inmate leaders,

(4) interaction with prison officials,

(5) termination of the riot,

(6) introduction of reforms, and

into public forgetfulness.

(7) lapse

The sixth stage is considered the most

important for purposes of this thesis, as it is during this stage that
reforms are introduced with the intention of rectifying the undesirable
conditions that precipitated the riot.
Finally, a fourth perspective suggests that prison riots may
be viewed as equilibrium-maintaining mechanisms.

During riotous con

ditions, the prison moves from equilibrium to disequilibrium to
equilibrium.

Although riots temporarily disrupt the equilibrium of the

prison, they also bring about changes which help to restore a new
order and re-establish a new equilibrium.

F a t h e r , new roles and

relationships among inmates and between inmates and prison officials
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may develop in the prison social structure during prison disturbances.
The new relationships may help to relieve previously existing tension
and develop a spirit of cooperation between inmates and prison
authorities.
It should be emphasized that a full account of prison riots must
consider the complicated interrelationships of many factors and that an
adequate theory of prison disturbances cannot be developed until more
extensive and detailed knowledge of the nature of the prison social
structure is acquired.

Yet even if the perspectives discussed herein

stand in need of more evidence and development, they have the initial,
presumptive advantage of analyzing prison disturbances not as isolated,
fortuitous events, but as integral to the nature of imprisonment.

Chapter 7

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

'SUMMARY'

This study has examined some of the functions of violence in
terms of change which it may bring in social structure.

Because the

terms violence, change, and social structure subsume a great deal,
attention has been focused on prisons as a special type of social
structure, on prison riots as a major form of violence, and on prison
reform as a specific type of change.

The study originally attempted to

determine whether or not a cause-effect relationship exists between
prison riocs and prison reform.

However, it became both more and less

than that, for it turned into a broad inquiry and synthesis of prison
violence and reform.
To the writer*s knowledge, no study of the functional conse
quences of prison riots has been published.

The majority of social

scientific studies which have been done on prison riots have dealt with
the causes, rather than the consequences, of the riots.

This study,

therefore, has attempted to explore, in a tentative and preliminary
manner, an otherwise neglected field of inquiry..
For the most part, the study is a secondary analysis of quali
tative data.

Although it is based largely on public and published

materials, data were gathered from a variety of sources Including noaparticipant observation and personal correspondence with forty-three
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state departments of correction.

Some of LeX'/is Coser’s works served

as a general theoretical framework within x/nich to analyze the functions
of prison riots and disturbances.

Attention has been focused almost

exclusively on state penal institutions in order to reduce the number
and Lypes of variables that one could expect to encounter if he x^ere
to mingle state institutions with federal institutions.

Further, the

study concentrates primarily on those riots which occurred during the
period January 1, 1968 to December 31, 1971.

This period was considered

particularly appropriate for investigation as it not only encompassed
a new series of riots and disturbances in correctional institutions,
but also was an era of considerable unrest in the larger society.
Accordingly,

it was felt that certain of the riots would reflect some

of the currents of unrest x^hich prevailed in the free community and
thus provide a clearer conception of the sociology of the prison
.community.
The study began in Chapter 2 x^ith a general discussion of some
of the social functions of violence.

The purpose of this discussion

was to show the place of violence in bringing about social change and
to point out that violence is far from being totally dysfunctional as
many people have been led to believe.

Attention then turned to an

examination of a series of contemporary prison riots in Chapter 3.
Here an attempt was made to identify some of the causes and, cotise- , ^
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In Chapter 4, the riot that occurred^pt New York State *s Attica
Correctional Facility in September, 1971, was examined in detail with ••
. a V i e w toward explaining what happened before, during, and after the f ; ,:
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uprising.

This chapter is particularly important to the study, for it

discusses in detailed language the social structure of the prison and
the many problems confronting it.

From this discussion emerges a pro

file of a major disturbance which helps to explicate the many social
forces, both internal and external, which come to bear on the prison.
A number of the causes and consequences of prison riots were
analyzed in Chapter 5.

Some of the fundamental causes of prison riots,

both past and present, were compared and divided into three basic cate
gories --general causes, internal causes, and external causes--for more
detailed analysis.

In the latter part of the chapter, some of the com

plexities involved in studying the relationship between prison riots and
prison reforms were discussed, followed by a synopsis of some of the
major penal reforms which have undoubtedly evolved from prison riots in
recent years.
Finally, Chapter 6 consists of an analysis of prison riots in
terms of several theoretical perspectives.

One of these perspectives

hypothesizes that prison riots may occur as a result of relative depri
vation among inmates.

Another suggests that prison riots come as a

result of cultural lag between prison facilities and man's accumulated
knowledge of prison reform.

A third perspective suggests that prison

riots are cyclical in nature and form a natural step in a pattern of
repeated reform.

Still another perspective theorizes that /prison riots

serve as equilibrium-maintaining mechanisms and, as such, help to
. r e store social order and maintain stability within the prison s social
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CONCLUSIONS

Prison riots are by no means totally dysfunctional in their
consequences.

Indeed, they serve a number of positive functions.

Prison disturbances occur in part because the rioters believe that they
cannot effectively communicate their demands through normal, approved
channels and that prison administrations have become unresponsive.
Thus, the riots serve to dramatize grievances and bring them to public
and higher official attention.

Prison riots also signal the presence

of maladjustments within the prison social structure.

For example,

they reveal inadequacies or weaknesses which need to be remedied in the
prison structure if social order is to be maintained.

Further, prison

riots help to relieve structural strain by draining off hostile and
aggressive sentiments which have built up.

Further still, prison riots

often bring about changes which help to restore the prison to a state
of normalcy and relative stability.
That some prisons are more susceptible to riots than others is
obvious and indisputable.

The fact remains, however, that no prison is

completely insulated against collective violence.

Available data indi

cate that a substantial number of .the nation*s prisons are outmoded and
inadequate by present day standards. . It cannot be stated unequivocally
that antiquated facilities cause riots and that all disturbances occur
in ...old,,inadequate institutions. .^Obviously, disturbances occur in sprne^.
of the more modern facilities, but physical inadequacy is a c o n t r i - ’
touting factor which cannot b e ;overlooked.

One is brought to the con-

elusion that correctional administrators .must ^therefore;be ^constantly p 1 aware .of innovative methods for improving institutional f acilities^ ;

.

The emphasis on physical inadequacy should not overshadow the
personal inadequacies and characteristics of the inmates themselves.
It must be remembered that prisons, unlike most other types of social
institutions, house men who, in some cases, are mentally deficient,
emotionally unstable, prone to violent and other socially deviant
behavior, and who have been convicted of greater or lesser crimes*

When violence-prone men find themselves in institutions which fail to
respond to their needs and appeals, the socially explosive ingredients
of a riot are present.

Whether or not there is a new breed of inmates

in prison today as the New York State Special Commission on Attica sug
gests is a moot point.

However, one thing is certain?

inmates are

shaped by many of the same experiences, expectations, and frustrations
which have culminated in civil disturbances outside the prison*
The factors precipitating a riot are complexly interrelated
and vary in their importance from one institution to another.
these complexities, certain fundamental matters are clear*

Despite

Of these,

the most fundamental is the fact that prison riots do not erupt as a
result of a single "triggering” or "precipitating” event.

Instead, they

are the outgrowth of an increasingly disturbed social atmosphere in
which a series.of tension-heightening incidents over a period of weeks
or months become, in the minds of inmates, linkffd with a reservoir of
grievances.

At some point in a mounting tensioni^an^added’incident

becomes the breaking point and thetension Is transformed into "violence;
This conclusion does not discount the fact that some riots erupt as a
result of a "demonstration effect," but a greater number result from
.I' "V f * -

.'"'■'"'J-

..

‘ V.™.'

'.t-t' ■ ' ■V

»’S-- 1" v-.>v C-'-'fx.■■

~

adverse conditions which exist in many Aaericanf penal institutions

f

■•s...'' ,

154
Another conclusion that might ba drawn is that racism is more
intense, more vicious, and more inhumane in prisons than elsewhere.
What seems to be happening in prisons is essentially what is happening
in larger or smaller degree throughout the greater society.

Black

people and other minorities have become more vocal and.militant in
demanding basic rights that are being denied them.

Outside .rthe ..prison,

the "system1- has given in to some degree and made changes; however,
inside the prison, changes are interpreted as slow in coming, and
,inmatestfeel that they must resort to violence as a means ;of gaining
what they feel are basic rights.

While racial tension exists to

varying degrees in prisons, the evidence presented in this paper does
not support the notion that prison riots are typically racial in nature,
although some of them obviously have what might be considered racial
overtones.
A study of the aftermath of prison riots leads to the conclusion
that the exact origin~|6f^prison-reform is ..sometimes difficult to trace.
For example, from the data available, <a clear distinction cannot.always
be drawn between those\reforms which occurred as a.direct result of the
riot and ;those which might have .-been in; process; prior >*to the riot.
SeB^af^feiie^pas sage^rbf t ime~'between "the >oc cur r ence&of *:the '%'ioti£an4 -iany
subse^iptntlifeforms^acts.ras^an 'Intervening variable,;^thus Complicating
an understanding*iof •thevcausal* relationship Jrt?T h i r d^theipbsitive 'Ait-r
effects;•of ^prison «riots lusually^receive\far< l e s s ^ u b l i c i t y ^ t h a n their .
, causVs^and s h a v ^ e ^ ^ e d ^ h e ^ o b - j j e i t t e s e a ^ i h . :•
i?.?''

r-The foregoing conclusions dead to a final and obvious one:

a

great deal more research is needed before the picture lo f rprisori violence
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can be complete*

One area requiring further exploration -is that having

to do with the influence of external variables as precipitants of prison
violence*

Studies to date have dealt almost exclusively with internal

variables— that is, conditions within the prison— thereby leaving a
large void in the research literature on prison violence.

Another

area, the functional consequences of prison violence, must also be
investigated more thoroughly if the causes and effects of prison riots
are to be fully explained and understood.

To know why men rebel is one

thing, but to know what must be done to prevent them from rebelling is
quite another thing.

IN RETROSPECT

Throughout this study, the author has acted on the premise that
to reach an understanding of the social context of contemporary prison
violence, a broad-ranging inquiry must be conducted into areas where
questions abound but simple answers and explanations do not.

Aware of

an over-ambitious approach, the writer has nonetheless concluded that
this sort of inquiry is the only way to achieve an appropriate perspec
tive on violence and change in American penal institutions.
It should be made clear that collective violence in prisons may
be functional or dysfunctional, depending on the viewpoint of the obser
ver.

Although certain forms of violence in America are considered legit

imate, the general tendency has been to regard prison violence as
illegitimate a n d r consequently, to disregard its positive functions.
For this reason, conventional approaches to the^study of prison vio
lence sometimes obscure rather than illuminate this" important field
of inquiry,

■ "f*'

v -.
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The present study has taken on the difficult task of identifying
some of the positive functional consequences of prison violence by
focusing attention primarily on the reforms which have evolved after
violent incidents.

While the study represents only a beginning,

it has

succeeded, if only in snail measure, in accomplishing what it set out
to do; that is, to demonstrate that prison violence may serve important
functions, not the least of which are the changes it brings about in
the prison social structure.

The nature of these changes and the

direction that-they, take depends on many factors, but most have been i
aimed at making prisons more humane institutions on the one hand and
more effective institutions for rehabilitation of prisoners on the
other.
The negative consequences of prison violence notwithstanding,
penologists and social scientists alike can be reassured by the know
ledge that the key causes of such violence are remediable through con
structive reforms.

It would be utopian to suggest that reforms are a

panacea for all that ails American penal institutions.

Granted, much

could be done with more m o n e y , more highly trained personnel, higher
s a l a r i e s m o d e r n physical plants, and greater prestige for prison
employees , .but all,of these factors, even if realized, probably would
not offer permanent solutions to the.problem of prison violence.

Never

theless, they would go a long way toward reducing or neutralizing the
conditions that foster violence in prisons.
|^In closing, the reader Is left with the following remark jmade by
Austin MacCormick some years ago:

i;!*The-lessoi^of "the riots is that we

cannot reform our prisoners until we have reformed our prisons” (1954:
- '
'
'.,k
27). This statement seems to remain relevant today. I

APPENDIX A

A Note About the Study and Its Author

While the writer advocates change on the one hand, he does not
necessarily sanction violence on the other, although he is a member of
a social organization that does--the United States Army.

Because of

this, it is not entirely unusual that the subject of violence was
singled out for investigation.

What may be unusual in this investigation

is the attempt to give violence the appearance of being functional or a
necessary evil in a society; in this case, the special prison society.
Very simply, the approach used in this paper was chosen because it was
considered to be at variance with customary thinking and intellectually
challenging.
Not only is the author interested in the study of violence and
change, but he is also interested in the field of corrections.

He

received training in corrections while attending the U.S. Army Military
Police School at Fort Gordon, Georgia, and has commanded a correctional
training unit at the U.S. Army Retraining Brigade

(formerly known as

the U.S. Army Correctional Training Facility) at Fort Riley, Kansas.
While assigned to the Retraining Brigade, he worked closely with members
of the Seventh Step Foundation, an organization comprised of former
convicts.

Further, he became involved in a number of pilot programs

designed to improve the training, evaluation, and correctional treat
ment of military prisoners in a structured environment.

During his

second tour of duty in the Republic of Vietnam,' he had staff responsi
bility for the confinement of all United States military prisoners.

APPENDIX B

Listing of Proposed Demands at Attica

The following listing, taken verbatim from the Official Report
of the New York State Special Commission on Attica (1972:251 -257)» pro
vides a breakout of the demands proposed by the observer committee,
including the twenty-eight demands to which Commissioner Oswald acceded.
Proposals Acceptable
to Commissioner Oswald

Observers* Proposals
1,

Provide adequate food and water
and shelter for this group.

1.

Provide adequate food, water,
and shelter for all inmates.

2.

Replace Superintendent Maneusi
immediately.

2.

Inmates shall be permitted to
return to their cells or to
other suitable accommodations
or shelter under their own
power.
The observers* committee
shall monitor the implementation
of this operation.

3.

Grant complete administrative
and legal amnesty to all per
sons associated with this
matter.

3*

Grant complete administrative
amnesty to all persons
associated with this matter.
B y administrative amnesty, the
state agrees:
a.

b.

Not to take any adverse
parole actions, administra
tive proceedings, physical
punishment, or other type
of harrassment such as
holding inmates in-communicado, segregating any
inmates, or keeping them in
isolation or in 24-hour
1 ockup.

The state will grant-legal
amnesty in regard to all
. r civil actions which could '
arise from this matter.
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Proposals Acceptable
to Commissioner Oswald

Observers 1 Proposals

• Place this institution under
federal jurisdiction.

c.

It is agreed that the State
of New York and all its
departments, divisions, and
subdivisions, including the
State Department of Corrections and the Attica Cor
rectional Facility, and its
employees and agents shall
not file or initiate any
criminal complaint or act on
complaints in any criminal
action of any kind or nature
relating to property,
property damage, or propertyrelated crimes arising out
of the incidents at the
Attica Correctional Facility
during September 9, 10, 11,
1971.

d.

The District Attorney of
Wyoming County, N ew York,
has issued and signed the
attached letter as of this
date.

4.

Establish by October 1, 1971, a
permanent ombudsman service for
the facility staffed by appro
priate persons from the
neighboring communities.

Apply the New York State minimum wage law to all work done
by inmates.
STOP SLAVE LABOR.

5.

Recommend the application of the
New York State minimum wage law
standards to all work done by
inmates.
Every effort will be
made to make the records of pay
ments available to inmates.

Allow all New York State prisoners to be politically
active, without intimidation
or reprisal.

6.

Allow all New York State
prisoners to be politically
active, without intimidation
or reprisal.

Allow true religious freedom.

7.

Allow true religious freedom.

End all censorship of newspaper, magazines, letters,
and other publications from
publishers.

8.

End ajyi censorship of newspaper,
magazines, and other publica
tions from publishers, unless
there is determined by qualified

id :

Proposals Acceptable
to Commissioner Oswald

Observers* ProDosals

authority which includes the
ombudsman that the literature in
question presents a clear and
present danger to the safety and
security of the institution.
Institution spot censoring only
of letters.
9.

Allow all inmates on their own
to communicate with anyone
they please.

9.

All inmates, at their own e x 
pense, to communicate with any
one they please.

10.

When an inmate reaches condi
tional release, give him a full
release without parole.

11.

Institute realistic, effective rehabilitation programs
for all inmates according
to their offense and personal
needs.

10.

Institute realistic, effective
rehabilitation programs for all
inmates, according to their
offense and personal, needs.

12.

Modernize the inmate education system.

11.

Modernize the inmate education
system, including the estab
lishment of a Latin library.

13-

Provide a narcotics treat12.
ment program that is effective.

Provide an effective narcotics
treatment program for all pris
oners requesting such treatment.

14.

Provide adequate legal assis- 13.
tance to all inmates requesting
it.

Provide or allow adequate legal
assistance to all inmates
requesting it or permit them to
use inmate legal assistance of
their choice in any proceeding
whatsoever,
in all such pro
ceedings, inmates shall be
entitled to appropriate due
process of law.

15-

Provide a healthy diet;
reduce the number of pork
dishes; serve fresh fruit
daily.

14.

Provide a healthy diet; reduce
the number of pork dishes;'
increase fresh fruit daily.

16.

Reduce cell time, increase
recreation time, and provide
better recreation facilities
and equipment.

15.

Reduce cell time, increase
recreation facilities and
equipment, hopefully by
November 1, 1971.
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Proposals Acceptable
to Commissioner Oswald

Observers * Proposals
17.

Provide adequate medical
treatment for every inmate,
engage either a Spanish
speaking doctor or inter
preters who will accompany
Spanish-speaking inmates to
medical interviews.

16.

Provide adequate medical treat,
ment for every inmate; engage
either a Spanish-speaking
doctor or inmate interpreters
who will accompany Spanishspeaking inmates to medical
interviews.
(See point II
above.)

18.

Provide a complete Spanish
library.

19.

Educate all correction
officers in the needs of
inmates.

20.

Institute a program for the
employment of significant
number of black and Spanish
speaking officers.

17.

Institute a program for the
recruitment and employment of a
significant number of black and
Spanish-speaking officers.

21.

Establish an inmate grievance 18.
delegation comprised of one
elected inmate from each com
pany which is authorized to
speak to the administration
concerning grievances, and
develop other procedures for
community control of the
institut ion.

Establish an inmate grievance
commission comprised of one
elected inmate from each company
which is authorized to speak
to the administration concerning
grievances, and develop other
procedures for inmate partici
pation in the operation and
decision-making processes of
the institution.

22.

Conduct a grand-jury investi 19.
gation of the expropriation
of inmate funds and the use
of protits from the metal and
other shops.

Investigate the alleged expro
priation of inmate funds and
the use of profits from the
metal and other shops.

23.

Cease administrative resen
tencing of inmates returned
for parole violation.

20.

The State Commissioner of Cor
rectional Services will recommend
that the penal law be changed
to cease administrative resenr tencing of inmates returned for
parole violation.

24.

Conduct Menechino hearings
in a fair manner.

21.

Recommend that Menechino hearings
be held promptly and fairly.

Proposals Acceptable
to Commissioner Oswald

Observers 1 Proposals
Permit other inmates in C
block and the box to join
this group.
Arrange flights out of this
country to nonimperialist
nations for those inmates
desiring to leave this
country.
Remove inside walls, making
one open yard and no more
segregation or punishment.
Expansion of work-release
program.

22.

Recommend necessary legislation
and more adequate funds to
expand work-release program.

End approved lists for
visiting and correspondence.

23.

End approved lists for corres
pondence and visitors.

Remove screens in visitation
rooms as soon as possible.

24.

Remove visitation screens as
soon as possible.

Institute parole violation
25.
changes^-revocation of
parole shall not be for
vehicle and traffic violation.

Paroled inmates shall not be
charged with parole violations
for moving traffic violations
or driving without a license,
unconnected with any other
crime.

Due process hearing for all
disciplinary proceedings
with 30-day maximum.

26.

Institute a 30-day maximum for
segregation arising out of any
one offense.
Every effort
should be geared toward
restoring the individual to
regular housing as soon as
possible, consistent with
safety regulations.

Access to facility for outside dentists and doctors
at inmates* expense.

27.

Permit access to outside den
tists and doctors at the in
mates* own expense within the
institution, where possible,
and consistent with scheduling
problems, medical diagnosis,
and health needs.
■5^

Proposals Acceptable
to
Commissioner Oswald
j-------------------------

Proposals
Observers ’ --------28.

It is expressly understood that
members of the o b s e r v e r s ' com
mittee will be permitted into
the Institution on a reasonable
basis to determine whether all
of the above provisions are
being effectively carried out.
If questions of adequacy are
raised, the matter will be
brought to the attention of
the Commissioner of Cor
rectional Services for
clearance.
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